PHILOLOGY AND LINGUISTICS: WHEN DATA MEET THEORY.
TWO CASE STUDIES

I: THE CASE OF HIEROGLYPHIC LUWIAN

By Anna Morpurgo Davies
University of Oxford

1. INTRODUCTION

To write about philology and philologists in English is never easy because, as argued in
the Introduction, the meaning of these words is still ambiguous. In some traditions, those
who study texts for literary or cultural purposes are called philologists (here I shall refer
to them as literary philologists), but those who work on the history of language may also
be called philologists (I shall refer to them as linguistic philologists). The link is provided
by the study of texts, but not all historical linguists work on texts. They may concentrate
on fieldwork and change in progress, or on comparative reconstruction based on oral
sources, or on the theory of change, and, if so, they probably prefer to be called linguists.
However, in a number of instances, perhaps the majority, a detailed analysis of long-term
change inevitably depends on written material of different dates. The result is that the
literary philologists and the linguistic philologists may find themselves working on the
same data, but with different aims: for the linguistic philologists the language rather than
the content of the text is the main point of interest. In fact we are dealing with three
categories: literary philologists, linguistic philologists and linguists. They are all linked, but
the link is not always straightforward; the linguistic philologists are also linguists (vice
versa is not true), but the literary philologists are not. In practice the two types of
philologist approach their subject differently. The linguistic philologists concentrate on the
history of the language, need chronologically arranged data, and may find what they need
in compilations (grammars, lexica, etc.), which in their turn are based on texts. Often
enough, however, they are obliged to turn to the primary sources, i.e. to texts, and to
apply philological techniques (textual criticism, palaeography, epigraphy, analysis of
sources, etc.) to those texts. On the other hand, the literary philologists are trained in the
study of texts, concentrate on their interpretation, and do not think of themselves as
linguists, though they agree that a thorough knowledge of the language in which the texts
are composed is essential. Obviously they use grammars and lexica, but they are put off by
what they see as the theoretical mumbo-jumbo of linguists and by a technical terminology
which they find impenetrable. Consequently they reject the notion that they have much if
anything to learn from the linguists (or linguistic philologists) and may think that the only
real philology is the one they practise. In the context of a collection of papers by young
researchers who were invited to think about the interface between linguistics and
philology, it may be useful to address this second type of philological reaction, all the
more so because the number of people who were trained as literary philologists (as I was),
but feel close to linguistics, is declining. I extract from my earlier work two concrete
examples of textual interpretation which depend on more general linguistic considerations,
while at the same time providing data that may have more general implications for
linguistics.
2. Hieroglyphic Luwian

My two examples come from Hieroglyphic Luwian. This is an Indo-European language of ancient Anatolia, written in a special script devised for it or for Hittite, a closely related language.\(^1\) It is attested first in the monumental texts of the Hittite Empire (initially on seals, then in inscriptions from the thirteenth century BC); then, from c.1000 to c.700 BC, Hieroglyphic Luwian is the language of the small kingdoms that survived the fall of the Hittite Empire in South Anatolia and North Syria. The best understood and most comprehensible texts date from this later period. They are rock inscriptions, wall inscriptions or inscriptions on stelae set up by kings who commemorate their achievements, but there are also a very few letters and administrative texts written on lead as well as graffiti on pottery. The script is a syllabic script rich in logograms (conventionally rendered by Latin words in capitals). The language is close to, but not identical with, Cuneiform Luwian, which is attested between the sixteenth and thirteenth centuries BC and is written in a cuneiform script. This in its turn is related to the better-known Hittite, attested in Anatolia in the second millennium BC and written in the same cuneiform script.

2.1. Nominal clauses

I start with a simple, indeed trivial, instance of textual interpretation. It concerns an eighth-century BC inscription on a stele put up by a high official and found at the site of modern Kululu in the south-eastern part of the Anatolian plateau. The text notes that Ruwas ‘servant of Tuwatis’ restored buildings and set up a cult of the Storm god. At the end Ruwas asks for the gods’ blessing on his lord, Tuwatis, and concludes referring to his own death and remembering his own achievements:

\[[\text{KULULU 1, 6 }\S\text{ 15–16 (Hawkins 2000: 442–444, X 9)}]
\begin{align*}
|\text{á-mu \sim pa \sim wa/i} | & \text{REL-[i]} | \text{DEUS-[n]ar-za} | \text{ta-wa/i-ia-na} | \text{ARHA} \\
|\text{i-nom. \sim PTC \sim PTC} & \ \text{when} & \ \text{gods}_{\text{dat.pl.}} & \ \text{in-front-of} & \ \text{away} \\
|\text{i-wa/i} & \text{tu-wa/i-ti-sa-ti} & \text{|tara/i-u-na-ti} \\
|\text{I- go\text{1st.pres.}} & \text{of-Tuwatis}_{\text{abl.-inst.}} & \ \text{justice}_{\text{abl.-inst.}} \\
|\text{za-ia} & \sim pa \sim wa/i & \text{DOMUS-na} & \text{zi-ti} \\
|\text{these \text{nominative}} & \text{PTC PTC} & \ \text{houses}_{\text{nominative}} & \ ? \\
\end{align*}
\]

‘When I shall go in front of the gods through Tuwatis’ justice (i.e. when I die), these houses zidi.’

The last clause is difficult. Meriggi (1967: 52), who still read the verb as a-wa, declared himself defeated by this passage as a whole, but translated the last clause: ‘but these houses here ...’, arguing that the text continued on a stone now lost. Clearly the stele is not broken and if a part of the text is missing, Meriggi’s solution is the only one possible. But it would be odd to have another stone when in fact the content of the first stone seems complete. Meriggi read the last word i-ti and not, as we now do, zi-ti, and translated it as ‘here’. The meaning is correct; we would expect the standard za-ti ‘here’ but zi-ti could be a by-form (the demonstrative ‘this’ is za-/-zi- in Luwian) or even a misspelling (the signs for za and zi are very similar). This opens the possibility of a nominal clause: ‘(When I die) these houses (will be) here’. The sentiment is

\(^1\)For a basic introduction, see Payne (2010); for the script and the language, see the detailed chapters by Hawkins and Melchert, respectively, in Melchert (2003). The main edition of the First Millennium texts is the monumental corpus edited by Hawkins (2000). For the different views on the origin of the script and the proposal that it originated in the Hittite capital, see Yakubovich (2009: 285–299).

The interpretation is intuitively correct and has been accepted, but why was it not obvious from the start? Two types of consideration were necessary. First, we had to know (and understand) enough inscriptions of this type to realise that the passage quoted naturally fills the final slot – a philological point. Second, a linguistic point. Clearly it was necessary to know that in the ancient Indo-European languages, including the Anatolian languages, nominal clauses that allow for the deletion of the verb ‘to be’ are normal constructions. But this is not enough; anyone who knows about nominal clauses in ancient Indo-European languages also knows that it is only the present of the verb ‘to be’ which can be deleted. In Latin *hominès mortales* is acceptable for ‘men (are) mortal’, but we must say *hic consul fuit* for ‘he *was* consul’; *hic consul* in this sense is not possible. The same is true, for example, for Hittite (Hoffner & Melchert 2008: 412). However, the only way in which Ruwas’s clause can make sense is if it refers to the future and not to the present. How can it be a nominal clause? Once again this is obvious: just like reconstructed Indo-European, the languages of the Anatolian group do not have specific forms for the future; the present is used instead. For emphasis Ruwas might have used the verb ‘to be’ in his clause, but if so he would have used a present form. Hence it could be omitted. For the philologist the important point is that this accounts for the omission of the verb ‘to be’ in our clause; for the linguist there is an added bonus. The crucial condition for the omission of the verb is an internal morphological/syntactical point (present tense) not the external reference (future time).

2.2. Negatives and disjunctions

A second example concerns the Hieroglyphic Luwian negatives. In 1975 J. D. Hawkins discovered that the sign *332 Laroche, which was normally taken as a variant of *319 used to indicate the relative pronoun, did in fact indicate the ‘factual’ negative or ‘negative of assertion’ ‘not’, and occasionally had the syllabic value *na*. He transliterated it as NEG2. From the point of view of text interpretation the consequences of introducing ‘not’ in a clause were remarkable. Consider for instance the passage below taken from a Karkamiš text of the late tenth century or the ninth century BC. Without NEG2 ‘not’ the text would be meaningless.

(2) KARKAMIŠ A 23, 3 § 4, 5 (Hawkins 2000: 119–121, II 17–19)\(^2\)

\begin{verbatim}
*a~ -wa/i ~-mu
PTC~PTC~to-me
*a-mu~ -pa~ -wa/i
me but PTC
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
*a-mi-zi
my_{acc.pl}
*a-ta₄-na-za
to-the-enemies_{dat.pl}
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
|*ta₄-ni-zi
enemies_{acc.pl.
|NEG2
\end{verbatim}

\begin{verbatim}
|pi-pa-sa-ta
|kept-giving
|NEG2
|gave
\end{verbatim}

‘She (the goddess) kept giving my enemies to me, but me she did not give to the enemies.’

The Anatolian languages have two negatives: ‘factual’ (or ‘negative of assertion’) and ‘prohibitive’, like Latin *non* and *nē*, e.g. Hittite *natta* and *lē*, Cuneiform Luwian *nawa* and *niš*. For the Hieroglyphic Luwian of the first millennium, before Hawkins’s discovery we knew only one negative originally read *na-a* (Meriggi 1962: 85–86), then *ni-a* and eventually *ni-i*. We

\(^2\)The transliteration above mostly follows that of the Corpus (Hawkins 2000). However, I transliterated with an initial *a* the so-called ‘initial-a-final’. This follows Hawkins’s (2003: 159–161) demonstration that in archaic texts spellings such as *mi-zi-a* (also read *mi-zi-i*) unexpectedly write an initial /a/ finally. Note also that recently Rieken & Yakubovich (2010) made a good case for an Iron Age reading *la-i* and *lā/i* of the signs that used to be read *ta₄* and *ta₅*. We
now know that this is used in main clauses with the present indicative and never used in relative clauses or with past verbs, while NEG₂ / \textit{na} occurs with both present and past verbs, in main clauses and in subordinate clauses. Hawkins (1975) concluded that like the other Anatolian languages Hieroglyphic Luwian too had a prohibitive negative /\textit{ni}/ and a ‘factual’ negative or negative of assertion /\textit{na}/ (NEG₂).

However, at the time the reading NEG₂ / \textit{na} was confronted with a serious problem: NEG₂ did not always mean ‘not’. Consider another inscription from the same place and same period as (2):

(3) KARKAMIŞ A 11a, 6 § 24–25 (Hawkins 2000: 94–100, II 9)

Katuwas, the king, reports that he built some private and sacred buildings and concludes his text with a curse against those who will undo his achievements:

(If in future the buildings shall pass down to (one) who shall \textit{damage} them)

\begin{verbatim}
§ 23 | za-zì-pa-wa/i-tá (SCALPRUM) ku-ta-sa₃ + ra/i-zi LOCUS-zá’ (SA₄) sá-nì-tì

these \textit{and} PTC PTC orthostats from-places shall-overturn
\end{verbatim}

§ 24 NEG₂-pa-wa/i-tá

PTC PTC this \textit{and} PTC PTC god from-places shall-overturn

§ 25 | NEG₂-pa-wa/i-tá á-ma-za á-ta₃-za-’ ARHA MALLEUS-i

PTC PTC my \textit{and} PTC PTC name away \textit{adv.} shall-erase...

‘(If these buildings shall pass to anyone who shall damage them), \textit{and} overturn these orthostats from (their) places, NEG₂-pa shall overturn this god from (his) places, NEG₂-pa shall erase my name, (may the gods \textit{turn} against him \ldots).’

NEG₂-pa clearly includes the clitic particle \textit{pa}, which means ‘and’ or ‘but’, but the sequence cannot be translated ‘and not’, since the text would make no sense. The various clauses are part of a traditional series of statements frequently found in this type of text: ‘if X does a) and/or does b) and/or does c) he will be punished’; it cannot say: ‘if X does a) and does not do b), and does not do c), he will be punished’, since a), b) and c) are all crimes. Here NEG₂-pa must mean ‘or’. But then is it possible to say that the first sign represents a negative? In theory one could argue for a reading *\textit{na}-pa where \textit{na-} would be a deictic element as possibly in Cuneiform Luwian \textit{nānum} ‘now’.

But there is a parallel that had been known for some time (Meriggi 1962: 87–88) and which may lead to different conclusions. A form \textit{ni}-pa introduces clauses that are clearly disjunctive; cf. a somewhat later inscription (end of the ninth century or beginning of the eighth century BC):

(4) KARKAMIŞ A 6, 9 § 29 (Hawkins 2000: 123–128, II 22)

(If this seat shall pass down to any king, who shall \textit{damage} it \ldots)

\begin{verbatim}
| ni-pa-wa/i-tá | á-ma-za | á-ta₃-za-’ | ARHA “MALLEUS”-la < -i >

or PTC PTC my \textit{acc.} neut. name \textit{acc.} neut. who nom.sg. away \textit{adv.} shall-erase ...

‘or who shall erase my name… (to him may Nikarawas’ dogs eat up his head).’
\end{verbatim}

\textsuperscript{3} Cuneiform Luwian \textit{nānum} ‘now’ corresponds to Hittite \textit{ki-nun} ‘now’, formed from the deictic element \textit{ki-} ‘this’ and \textit{nun} ‘now’ (cf. Greek \textit{vώτ} ‘now’); Latin \textit{nunc} ‘now’ also has the same \textit{nun} element as well as a deictic element –\textit{e} –\textit{ke}. This does not necessarily show that \textit{na-} in Luwian is a deictic element; cf., for instance, Kloekhorst (2008: 478–479), who thinks of a reduplicated form *\textit{no}-\textit{num}.
It is difficult to separate the two forms $ni$-$pa$ ‘or’ and $\text{NEG}_2$-$pa$ ‘or’ and to resist the suggestion that they are formed adding the $pa$-clitic to the prohibitive and the factual negative, respectively. But how do we account for the ‘or’ meaning of an ‘and not’ sequence? Could it all be a coincidence? And, since the ‘or’ meaning is well established, could this be an insuperable obstacle to Hawkins’s interpretation of the sign $^*392$ as $\text{NEG}_2$?

The coincidence theory was implausible in 1975 and is now impossible. A third form of disjunctive has emerged that must be read $/nisa$/ with the prohibitive negative $/nis/$, which, as we now know, is typical both of Cuneiform Luwian and of the very early texts (second millennium) of Hieroglyphic Luwian, though it also appears very occasionally in the first millennium in preference to the standard form $ni$.\(^4\)

In other words in the first millennium we find three forms of disjunction; all include the $<-pa>$ particle and either $/na/$, the factual negative, or $/ni/$, the prohibitive negative, or $/nis/$, the archaic form of the prohibitive negative (Hawkins & Morpurgo Davies 2010). Yet these sequences should all mean ‘and not’ or ‘but not’. How can they mean ‘or’? At this point traditional philologists must turn to linguists. The typology of disjunctives has not yet been fully worked out (e.g. Mauri 2008a, 2008b), but anecdotally there is considerable evidence in unrelated languages for different, but predictable, strategies used to create disjunctive particles. We may have grammaticalised verbal forms like Latin $\text{vel}$ from $\text{volo}$ ‘I want’, or French $\text{soit} \ldots \text{soit}$, ‘either … or’ (but literally ‘be it …. be it’), or conditional particles like Modern Greek $\text{ése} \ldots \text{ése}$ ‘either … or’ (but originally ‘and if … and if’), or negative sequences like ‘if not’ or ‘and not’, as in Colloquial Arabic $\text{walla}$ ‘or’ (from $\text{wa ~i n ~a}$ ‘and if not’), or Turkish $\text{yoksa}$ ‘or’ (from yok ‘no’ and a conditional particle); in Old French $\text{ne}$ from Latin $\text{ne}$ ‘and not’ is used where we would say ‘and’ or ‘or’ (Morpurgo Davies 1975: 162–166; Mauri 2008a: 43f.). It is difficult to reconstruct an ‘or’ element for Indo-European, and the Anatolian languages clearly developed their disjunctives independently, providing us with examples of the strategies just mentioned. In typological terms then to find a semantic development from ‘and not’ to ‘or’ need not be surprising.\(^5\)

More recent work has clarified the process. In the earliest texts of Hieroglyphic Luwian there is no grammaticalised verbal form of disjunction, but we have clear examples of repetition: ‘let nobody do a), let nobody do b), let nobody do c)’. Often a conditional clause is introduced: ‘He who does X, if he is a), if he is b), if he is c)’ and in the transitional period we find: ‘Whoever shall harm my house REL + ra/-i(1-a)-pa city’, where the conjunction must be translated as ‘or’ but literally means ‘and if’. Later versions of the same constructions inevitably introduce the new disjunctions built on a negative particle (Hawkins & Morpurgo Davies 2010: 110–121).

I asked above whether the use of $\text{NEG}_2$-$pa$ in the meaning ‘or’ could challenge Hawkins’s discovery of the sign for the negative particle. Clearly this is not the case, since a sequence ‘and not’ is frequently at the origin of a disjunction, but this conclusion cannot be reached without moving from strict philology to linguistics; in other words at this point the two fields cannot ignore each other. There are some rewards in this process for the linguists as well. In order to understand the diachrony of disjunction we may etymologise the disjunctive particles found in the languages of the world, but only rarely are we able to observe at first hand the grammaticalisation processes that lead to the creation of disjunctive particles. It is both


\(^5\)Cf., for example, Hittite $\text{nas}ˇ\text{ma} \ldots \text{na}ˇ\text{s}ˇ\text{s}ˇ\text{u}$ ‘either … or’ where both forms may include the $\text{na}$- negative like Hittite $\text{natta}$ ‘not’ (Kloekhorst 2008: 596–597). Lycian has $\text{tıbe}$ ‘or’, presumably from the pronominal element $\text{ti}$- ($< *\text{kwi}-$) and a particle; Lydian has $\text{bu(k)}$ ‘or’, possibly from a verbal form $\text{bhũ}ˇ\text{i}$- which acquired the meaning ‘to be’ (Gérard 2005: 45).
surprising and rewarding that a fragmentarily attested *Restsprache* like Hieroglyphic Luwian may give us an insight in the way in which these processes work. Extending the analysis to the other Indo-European languages of the Anatolian group would take us a little further. If in this instance linguistics helps to solve a problem for philology, it is pleasing that philology returns the compliment and does something for linguistics.

*Somerville College*

_University of Oxford_

_Oxford OX2 6HD_

_Email: anna.davies@some.ox.ac.uk_

**References**


Mauri, Caterina, 2008b. _Coordination Relations in the Languages of Europe and Beyond_, Berlin: de Gruyter.


