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Contents

Editorial Note v
About the Contributors vi
Contributors' Addresses vi

Richard Ashdowne
Re(de)fining address: an overlooked French phenomenon 1

Tom Finbow
Scriptura continua: a problem for logographic reading of archaic words in late Latin / early Romance? 37

Paul Hedley
Gender and the interpretation of pronouns in French: a view from Relevance Theory 67

Martin Maiden
Perfect pedigree: the ancestry of the Aromanian conditional 83

Nikola Milic
The debate on linguistic sexism in Italian: a language planning process 99

John Charles Smith
The nominative–accusative opposition between Latin and Gallo-Romance: a study in refunctionalization 117

Rob Truswell
Non-restrictive adjective interpretation and association with focus 133
Editorial Note

Oxford University Working Papers in Linguistics, Philology & Phonetics presents research being undertaken in these fields by past and present staff and graduate students from the University of Oxford. Like previous volumes, which have each been devoted to particular areas of linguistic research in Oxford, volume 9 concentrates on one area, namely topics in Romance linguistics.

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Re(de)fining Address
An overlooked French phenomenon

Richard Ashdowne

‘He's Winnie-ther-Pooh. Don't you know what “ther” means?’
‘Ah, yes, now I do,’ I said quickly; and I hope you do too, because it is all the explanation you are going to get.
Milne ([1926] 2000: 1)

Much attention has been focused in recent years on the historical development of the definite article in the Romance languages. That literary Latin of the classical period lacked articles is well known, and the much-quoted comment of Quintilian noster sermo articulos non desiderat is a familiar tag in this context.1 The developments of the various Latin demonstratives and their reflexes are thus well documented in the scholarly literature, if not always straightforward in either their description or indeed explanation, and synchronic studies of the articles at various stages in the histories of these languages are numerous.

One area of the use of definite articles in some modern Romance varieties seems to have largely escaped such exhaustive scrutiny, however, and this is the possibility of forms of address which seem, superficially at least, to contain the definite article. Modern French is one such variety:

(1) Bonjour, les amis!
Hello, friends!

Likewise, modern Romanian has (admittedly optional) vocative morphology which in some instances (e.g. all plurals) is identical in form to exponents of/containing the definite article:

(2a) cărțițe fetelor
the girls' books, the books of the girls

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1 ‘Our language has no desire for articles.’ (Institutio Oratoria 1.4.19)
2 The Romanian definite article is postposed and enclitic on the first element in a noun phrase. In the plural, the address forms in question are identical to the articulated gen./dat. case, although native speakers very often use the unarticulated form (which does not vary for case) instead; indeed this is the general rule when the phrase contains an adjective. In the singular, no address form is identical to the articulated form of either nom./acc. or gen./dat. case of that noun, but some masculines do have (again optional) address forms which appear to contain the articulated nom./acc (e.g. omul ‘the man’ with ‘voc.’ omule).
(2b) *Am dat cărțile fetelor*.
I gave the books to the girls, I gave the girls the books

(2c) *Bună dimineața, fetelor!*
Good morning, girls!

Since classical Latin had no definite article and so such patterns did not appear, it would seem obvious to claim that these constructions arise in some way as part of the general development of the definite article, albeit possibly within the history of the daughter Romance varieties after they had diverged from one another (the phenomena in question are not found in modern Spanish, for example, and the history of Italian has some potentially related patterns involving demonstratives but no clear address use of its definite article). However, not only have the majority of scholars not made such a claim, but it seems that every such attempt has come across some serious problems. The purpose of this paper is to examine the history of this construction in French and to attempt to offer an explanation for its existence. Evidence from Romanian and Italian will be taken into consideration, since attempts have been made to connect the patterns in these varieties with the French pattern, but from the outset it must be stressed that this paper offers no evidence for these patterns being anything more than potentially parallel but independent innovations.

1. Modern French Data

In modern French the definite article is consistently available for use in certain kinds of address phrases. It is most often found in plural or collective contexts:

(3) *Salut, les enfants!*
Hello, children!

(4) *Bonjour, la classe!*
Good morning, class!

However, it can appear with a noun denoting an individual:

(5) *Salut, l’ami!*
Hello, friend!

It can be accompanied by a grammatically complete sentence or by just an interjection; the address phrase can be initial, medial or final:

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3 On Italian, see §7.1 below; on modern Spanish, see Butt & Benjamin (1994: 31-2). As for other Romance varieties, on Portuguese, see Hutchinson & Lloyd (1996: 108-10) and Perini (2002: 102-3, 333, 380): the sheer complexity of the geographical variation in address usages in Portuguese demands far more detailed study than would be possible in this paper with its focus on French, and I consciously exclude it from consideration both for this reason and because its apparent use of the definite article in address corresponds to the use also of similar forms in bound address (see below) with 3sg and 3pl verb-forms referring to the addressee(s).
(6) *Debout, les morts!*
Get up, dead men!

(7) *L’ami, crois-moi, il faut rentrer chez toi.*
Friend, believe me, you must go home.

(8) *Dois-je entendre, l’abbé, que vous allez me soupçonner aussi?*
Should I understand, vicar, that you are going to suspect me too?

(9) *Passez votre chemin, la fille.*
Go on your way, girl.

The underlined phrases are unexceptional address phrases as far as pragmatic function and sentence position are concerned; in this respect they behave exactly as other clear examples of ‘free’ address phrases do, for instance proper names.4

(10) *Bonjour, Charles!*
Good morning, Charles!

(11) *Dois-je entendre, Marie, que vous allez me soupçonner aussi?*
Should I understand, Marie, that you are going to suspect me too?

(12) *Passez votre chemin, mesdames et messieurs.*
Go on your way, ladies and gentlemen.

We should also note that the patterns of address availability for phrases introduced by the article in French show no particular distinction between use as so-called ‘calls’ and ‘addresses’ (on which distinction see Zwicky 1974).5

Standard grammars of the modern language describe this usage as part of *l’usage familier* (e.g. Grevisse & Goosse 1993: 877; Wartburg & Zumthor 1989: 294), a view shared by earlier accounts of the phenomenon in French (e.g. Brunot 1899: 381; Haas 1909: 103; Guillaume 1919: 300).6

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4 I intend not to consider in detail in this paper so-called ‘bound’ forms of address, i.e. those syntactically integrated into a sentence (e.g. as subject, object, complement etc.), and confine my observations mainly to what I consider to be free forms (on this distinction, see Dickey 2002: 5-7). The interaction between the two (pragmatically-related) phenomena is in my view crucial for understanding some historical developments in address use, notably the evolution of the grammaticalised T/V distinction in languages such as Italian, Spanish and Romanian.

5 In terms of sentence ‘position’, free address forms show up in two superficially distinctive patterns, which I term ‘independent’ and ‘dependent’, i.e. whether the address phrase appears alone in the sentence/utterance or is accompanied by some kind of other material. The patterns typically correspond to the pragmatic functions of attracting attention (‘call’) and maintaining contact (‘address’) respectively, although in fact either pattern may on occasion fulfil the other function. Independent and dependent address phrases appear to share a number of phonological features, morphological patterns and semantic restrictions on the items that can be used (Ashdowne 2002: 17-23); the two patterns can be claimed to be conditioned surface alternations of a single underlying phenomenon.

6 Diez (1874-6: iii.20) remarks somewhat cryptically of a range of data from various Romance varieties both old and modern that ‘*l'article semble avoir pour mission d'ajouter à l'exclamation ou à l'interpellation*
2. The General Development of the Definite Article

This is not the place to rehearse at great length the details of the development of the Romance definite articles, but it is important to sketch a general outline from Latin to modern French for what happened outside the address context.\(^7\)

The origins of the French definite article lie in the Latin demonstrative *ille* (‘that, yon’). Continuous semantic weakening characterised its gradual shift from a real-world (exophoric) demonstrative via a period as an endophoric marker to its present-day status. The first stage of weakening led to the increased frequency of use of *ille* observable in late Latin texts (along with a number of other items including *ipse*).\(^8\) By the old French period we find the definite article being used primarily with noun phrases that are semantically/pragmatically definite: the definite article had an identifying role, marking a phrase as referring to the same thing as something previously mentioned. It was not needed with generic or abstract nouns, nor was it normally used with nouns denoting unique referents (e.g. *Dieu* ‘God’); it was also not necessarily employed with phrases following prepositions or qualified by adjectives, if the latter could be felt in the context to indicate the identification sufficiently. In subsequent centuries the continued weakening of the semantics of the article (a consequence of increased frequency of use resulting from a shift from strict endophoric use to identification with any ‘given’ information whether overt in the discourse or inferred from its context) led to its eventual use with generic and abstract nouns, while it also came to be used with almost all unique items — *Dieu* remains in modern French without the article as one of the few exceptions to this expansion, when it refers to the Judaeo-Christian god.

In the light of Greenberg’s (1978) work looking cross-linguistically for universal features of the development of definite articles, one might say that the modern French definite article has many of the characteristics associated with its having the status of a default determiner, and it is therefore employed whenever no other determiner (e.g. indefinite article, demonstrative etc.) is appropriate; this corresponds to a restriction on the grammaticality of bare NPs. Analysed thus, the definite article is little more than a ‘noun marker’, i.e. a morphological unit that is marked for or varies according to the number or gender of the phrase (categories which in French, as a result of regular phonological change, happen to be no longer necessarily overtly marked in the inherited position, *de la vivacité et de l’énergie* (‘the mission of the article seems to be to add some vivacity or energy to an exclamation or address’). I shall attempt to be more precise.

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\(^8\) Vincent (1997: 150-63) discusses this in detail, with reference to a substantial extract from the *Peregrinatio Aetheriae*; we should note that even in classical Latin, *ille* had a very wide range of uses, many of which could be classed as endophoric (e.g. *hic* … *ille* ‘the latter … the former’), and it is not clear that *ille* was or ever had been only an exophoric demonstrative. The eventual apparent opposition between *ille* and *ipse*, for example as witnessed in the *Peregrinatio*, is worth bearing in mind if it is something in the meaning or use of *ille* that explains the modern address usage: those Romance varieties that derive their article from the reflex of *ipse* might be expected then to behave differently from those deriving it from *ille*. 
namely on the end of words). If accepted, such an analysis would indicate that the French
definite article is at or approaching Greenberg’s final stage (III) of development.⁹

3. The Historical Evidence

In the following sections I summarise the historical evidence for the use of the definite
article in address contexts.

3.1. Latin

3.1.1. The Evidence

Not many scholars have looked at the patterns of address usage found in Latin, and of
those who have, few have attempted a comprehensive study: the most detailed and recent
investigation of address in Latin is that of Dickey (2002), who adopts a sociolinguistic
rather than grammatical approach. What is clear from existing work, though, is that there is
no straightforward evidence that *ille* was available for use in address in the classical
period.¹⁰ Nonetheless, there are some debatable examples which may perhaps be forebears
of the French pattern and thus which merit our attention.

Svennung (1958: 286-8) quotes some apparent evidence for the use of *ille* in address;
his survey is not intended to be exhaustive so I cite in this section his examples and also
others which he does not consider. In fact I quote all the potential instances I have found:
they have not previously been collected (so far as I know) and should be highlighted as a
set of evidence for the use of *ille*.

I have found only two examples from Latin prose:

(13)  *o nox illa quae paene aeternas huic urbi tenebras attulisti, cum Galli ad bellum,
Catilina ad urbem ... vocabantur, cum ego te, Flacce, ... obtestabar ...! o Nonae
illae Decembres, quae me consule fuistis! ... o nox illa quam iste est dies
consecutus, fausta huic urbi, miserum me, metuo ne funesta nobis!*

(Cicero, Pro Flacco 102-3)

O that night which nearly brought eternal darkness to this city, when the Gauls
were being called to war, Catiline to the city, ... when I called on you, Flaccus, as
witness ...! O that 5th of December, which happened while I was consul! ... O that
night which that day followed, propitious for this city, — woe is me! — I fear it
may be the death knell for us!

⁹ This kind of analysis seems to lie behind Harris (1978: 74-6; 1980a, b).
¹⁰ Interestingly in Classical Greek the demonstrative *ὁδὸς* (‘this [near me]’, masc. ‘nom.’ sg.) and its
corresponding fem. sg. *α┦ηγ* could be used in the address function, although almost exclusively
pronominally (i.e. on their own and not accompanying a noun). This use is securely if not frequently
attested: its origins remain obscure (Dickey 1996: 154-8). Though Greek had many influences on the Latin
language as a result of its prestige (and the development of the definite article is often cited in this
connection), I think it is absolutely clear that Greek influence is not what lies behind the phenomena I am
concerned with here.
(14) o nox illa aeternis saeculis monumentisque mandanda! (Panegyricus 4.26.1)
O that night to be committed to the eternal ages and monuments!

Here the underlined ‘apostrophes’ refer to periods of time (or perhaps the corresponding state of affairs), which seem to be personified and have depending on them relative clauses with second-person verbs (attulisti, fuistis). Akin to these but in verse (and with 2sg imperatives) we find:

(15) nullus erat custos, nulla exclusura dolentes
ianua: si fas est, mos precor ille redi. (Tibullus 2.3.72-5)
There was no guard, to shut out those in grief
no door: if it is right, that custom, I pray, come back.

(16) sic mihi servitium video dominamque paratam:
iam mihi, libertas illa paterna, vale. (Tibullus 2.4.1-2)
Thus I see slavery and a mistress arranged for me:
now, farewell, for me, that ancestral freedom.

Again in these two examples the apparent addresses refer in a way to states of affairs. To these examples we might add the following:

(17) ‘salve, vera Iovis, vera o Iovis’ undique ‘proles’
ingeminant, ‘o magnanimitis memoranda palaestris
Taygeta et primi felix labor ille magistri.’ (Valerius Flaccus, Argonautica 4.327-9)
‘Hail true scion of Jove, Jove's true scion,’ on all sides
they re-echo, ‘Hail Taygetus, famed for greathearted wrestling schools,
and [hail] the happy work of your first teacher!’

Yet again we find ille in a phrase referring to a state of affairs or period of time, namely a period of teaching (or perhaps the state of affairs resulting from it).\footnote{There are two further potential examples of address use of ille from the Argonautica, namely 8.10 and 2.486. In the former it is my view that Heinsius' emendation mille should be adopted. The latter I quote as (21).} Finally, note also:

(18) o noctem meminisse mihi iucunda uoluptas,
o quotiens uotis illa uocanda meis,
cum te complexa morientem, Galle, puella
uidimus et longa ducere uerba mora! (Propertius 1.10.3-6)
O delightful pleasure for me in remembering the night,
o that night how often to be called upon in my prayers,
when I saw you, Gallus, dying as your girl embraced you
and drawing out your words with long delay!

Svennung quotes only a single example of a phrase referring to a person which might be in the vocative case headed by a form of ille:
(19) *quid numeras factos ad nova membra pedes?*

*illa Iovis magni paelex metuenda sorori*

*fronde levas nimiam caespitibusque famem;*

*fonte bibis spectasque tuam stupefacta figuram*

*et, te ne feriant quae geris arma, times.* (Ovid, *Heroides* 14.94-8)

Why do you count the feet formed as your new limbs?
That mistress of mighty Jupiter, feared by (his) sister,
you ease your great hunger with leaves and grass:
you drink from springs, and, stunned, see your shape,
and fear lest the weapons you bear might kill you.

To this I might add the following possible examples also with a less abstract referent:

(20) *en concede meos miseris genitoribus artus,*

*quos pater infelix multo mercabitur auro.*

*dona feres victor. Priami nunc filius orat*

*te primus, dux ille ducum, quem Graecia solum*

*pertimuit:* (Italicus, *Ilias Latina* 980-4)

Look, grant my parents my limbs,
which my wretched father will ransom with much gold.
As victor you shall bear the things given. Now Priam's son is the first to implore
you, the commander-in-chief, whom alone Greece feared.

(21) *verum o iam redeunt Phrygibus si numina tuque*

*ille ades auguriis promisse et sorte deorum,*

*iamp cui candentes votivo in gramine pascit*

*cornipedes genitor ... adnue me.* (Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautica* 2.485-9)

But oh if heaven is returning to the Phrygians and you
are present as the one promised by augury and the omens of the gods
for whom my father now feeds in the pastures of his vow
white horses, … nod your assent to me.

In fact (21) is the sole example I have found where an apparently distinctive vocative form
(*promisse*) appears in a phrase containing *ille*.

Svennung also cites some later Latin examples:

(22) *daemones autem videntes fiduciam ejus invis sunt,*

*et volentes terrere eum,*

*vocabant quasi quamdam mulierem dicentes: nonna illa,*

*veni nobiscum ad balneum!*

*(Vitae patrum* 5.7.10 [894c])

But the spirits, seeing his faith, hated his faith, and wishing to terrify him, called to
him as if he were some woman, saying: ‘Sister so-and-so, come with us to the
bath!’
Richard Ashdowne

(23) *coepit singulorum discipulorum suorum cellas pulsare, dicens: frater ille, veni, quia opus te habeo!* 
 (*Vitae patrum* 5.14.5 [948d])

He began to knock on the doors of each of his disciples, saying: ‘Brother so-and-so, come, for I have need of you!’

3.1.2. Could *ille* be Used in Address in Latin?

There is, unsurprisingly, no straightforward answer to this question. There are some interesting things to be observed from examples (12) to (23). The first is that, other than (21), none contains a distinctively vocative form in the phrase containing *ille*. It is important to note that, while apparently distinctively nominative forms could be used in free direct address in classical Latin, the vocative was the regular exponent of this function; moreover, the vocative had few other functions than direct address (i.e. free forms, both dependent and independent), of which appeal to the gods (‘oaths’) was the most common.

Given that *ille* in our examples is always part of a phrase and never on its own, we might well wonder whether this lack of distinctively vocative forms is in fact the result of avoidance rather than an accidental gap. Perhaps speakers felt that both *ille* and *illa* even when actually vocative (triggered by being used, for whatever reason, in address phrases) appear to be nominative (because they do not have any distinctively vocative forms): thus both have to have nouns with them that also are nominative in form in order to avoid perceived superficial case disagreement. For the feminine this is unproblematic as indeed it is for those masculine nouns which do not have nom. sg. in -us; all such nouns exhibit the same case-form ambiguity as *ille* and *illa* and so can appear to be simultaneously nominative (for superficial case agreement) and vocative (for the syntax). However, for masculines with nom. sg. -us, perhaps neither *ille* + ~e seemed acceptable (with its apparent case disagreement) nor *ille* + ~us because such a phrase would appear to be distinctively nominative (since the noun has a distinctive vocative in -e which is not being used). For a speaker faced with such a dilemma, avoidance was an obvious strategy to adopt.

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12 Briefly, the vocative of Latin nouns and adjectives was generally identical to the nominative, except (a) in the singular of second declension nouns with nom. in *-ius* and *-us* whose vocatives were in *-i* and *-e* respectively, and (b) in the singular of second/first declension adjectives whose masculine nominative singular was in *-ius* and *-us* (vocatives respectively in *-ie* and *-e*). Some other nouns had vocatives distinct from the corresponding nominative (e.g. Greek nouns and, in some authors, *puer* ‘boy’), and some nouns and adjectives in *-us* seem to have had a vocative also in *-us* (particularly those in *-eus* e.g. *deus* ‘god’). The possessive *meus* ‘my’ had masculine singular vocative *mi*.

*ille* itself had no distinctive vocative forms. Modern grammars make no reference to *ille* having a vocative at all (implying that it had none — either as cause or consequence it could not appear in address); ancient grammarians gave forms identical to the nominative for its vocative, although these should be taken *cum grano salis*, for we know that they commonly attempted to fill out morphological paradigms even where gaps existed (cf. Law 1995: 109-11, on the vocative of *ego* ‘I’).

13 The few instances of forms in *-us* being used as addresses reflect phrases containing elements for which the inherited vocative form was in *-us*.

14 This could certainly have been conventionalised, and arguably these items (e.g. *mehercle* ‘by Hercules’, *pol* ‘by Pollux’) became lexicalised interjections.
Such a hypothesis is not idle speculation: there is evidence of parallel avoidance for other morphologically problematic items in address, in particular *meus* and *deus*. The regular (i.e. inherited) vocative of *deus* ‘god’ was *deus*, but this is very rarely found indeed; it seems that its apparently nominative form led to its avoidance (cf. Dickey 2003). Likewise inherited masc. voc. sg. *meus* ‘my’ became rare and died out to be replaced by a suppletive form *mi* (believed to be etymologically a dative of the personal pronoun *ego* ‘I’): however, on the rare occasions when we find *meus* we find it only with second declension masculine nouns of the -*us* type, which are always attracted into their -*us* ending (Svennung 1958: 252).

A problem for this view, of course, is example (21), where we have a pattern (*ille ... promisse*) which my hypothesis should rule out: having *ille* in the phrase should either block altogether the use of an item that has a distinctive vocative form available, or at the very least insist that the ‘nominative’ -*us* appear here. In my view, however, (21) is not an example of *ille* used in direct address: the morphology of *promisse* appears to be vocative, but in poetry a predicative phrase in a phrase with a verb in the second person (here *ades*) often appears in the ‘vocative’ case (i.e. adopts its morphological form) where a nominative is expected and also possible.\(^{15}\) I would claim, then, that it is precisely because this is a predicative construction that the expected avoidance does not occur: *ille ... ~us*, the expected phrase, is not syntactically vocative but nominative (and there is no case disagreement so it is not blocked). It is then through a superficial poetic or stylistic rule that -*us* is realised as -*e*, which is in effect as much an ‘honorary’ nominative here as it is in other similar predicative vocative examples which do not contain *ille*.

The second point to note about the remaining examples is how many of them refer to periods of time or states of affairs. Presumably a literary and rhetorical trope, the use of *ille* in (13) to (18) has not been properly considered before. In each it is used to indicate a situation that is, at the speech time, treated as remote, but presumably the situation is expected to be familiar to the audience; this is an expected use of a distal demonstrative, particularly when we note its change from real-world deixis to relying on audience knowledge (the mechanism being the same as discourse-internal anaphora which relies on and connects with audience knowledge deriving from previously mentioned information).

We might wonder, however, whether these uses really are addresses. Admittedly in (13) we have relative clauses with second-person verbs that depend on these supposed ‘vocatives’, but we also find a vocative *Flacce* referring to a person present in the discourse situation. It seems to me that all these examples are very literary apostrophes in which a state of affairs is personified and this personification is achieved through treating these phrases as forms of address — forms of address most typically refer to people. It is

\(^{15}\) The most often quoted example is:

*quo moriture ruis ...?* (Virgil, *Aeneid* 10.811)

Where are you, about to die, rushing to ...?

Here, *moriture* is taken to be not a free form of direct address (‘O one about to die’) but a bound form attached to the (understood) second person pronoun subject of the verb as a (predicative) adjective: it thus stands for *moriturus*. (Cf. Kühner & Stegmann 1914: i.255-6; Hofmann & Szantyr 1965: 25-6.)
then important that these phrases could be taken to be nominatives, and in fact to be nominatives in exclamation (albeit in place of the expected accusative). In my view the underlined phrases in (13) are indeed nominatives in exclamation which, because they are indistinguishable in form from vocatives, present a literary option of personification: it is then because of this that they then can and do have second-person verbs in dependent relative clauses. I would further argue that the nominative rather than the accusative is chosen for the exclamation precisely because this option is thereby made available. Indeed (14) may just be an exclamation and not an address at all.

Personification is equally apparent in (15) and (16) where the ille phrase accompanies sentences with imperative verbs. If the explanation for (13) is right and can be validly extended to these, we might assume that the basis for these constructions again is a nominative, this time not in exclamation but as the subject of a third-person (jussive subjunctive) verb. Because their morphology is likewise ambiguous, these subject phrases can be personified, and this personification is effected through the use of the second-person verb.

In all of these instances, then, the use of ille originates (notionally) outside the address (→ vocative) context but when the phrase is personified by being made a form of address the ille is retained. The most striking examples, of course, are those with personal reference already, namely (19) and (20). Svennung argues that illa ... sorori in (19) is an apposition to the (covert) subject of the verb levav. In syntactic terms this example is then parallel to (15) and (16) where the phrase starts as a nominative subject for the main verb. It is surely no coincidence that the meaning of ille here alludes again to a past/remote state of affairs when Io was Jupiter's mistress, whom Juno feared as a rival, although at this stage she no longer is (following her metamorphosis into a cow). (20) is deeply problematic and I include it only because it is cited by the TLL (s.v. ille) as being vocative: the context is Hector addressing Achilles and talking about himself in the third person. If we accept Baehrens' emendation primus agreeing, as a secondary predicate, with filius —

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16 See Kühner & Stegmann (1914: i.272-4), Hofmann & Szantyr (1965: 48). Note also Vairel-Carron (1975: 68-76), who believes there to be a subtle difference in force between the use of the nom. and the acc. (and indeed the voc.), but despite considerable discussion finds it difficult to be certain precisely what it is (74): ‘que nous ayons du mal à percevoir — et à rendre dans la traduction ... — cette différence de valeur ne nous autorise pas à nier son existence’ (‘that we have difficulty in perceiving this difference — and rendering it in translation — does not allow us to deny its existence’).

17 I mention it because it has been quoted elsewhere. Interestingly, Rodgers (Nixon et al. 1994: 335) alludes to a tradition that Nazarius, the author of this text, originally came from the area around Bordeaux, though I would stress that it is of little linguistic significance even if it is reliable.

18 This is a slight simplification. The imperative, which is prototypically second person, can sometimes take a nominative subject: in the plural this could, in Latin at least, sometimes be distinguished on semantic (but not morphological) grounds from a form of address (since the 2pl denotes a set including the addressee(s) but may, unlike address, include others too). The phrases in (15) and (16), which, for my argument have necessarily to be ambiguous in form, could thus still be nominatives even ‘after’ personification, and for the speaker perhaps they were intended as such. This possibility does not undermine my position but strengthens it: address is in fact a likely reanalysis of such ambiguous types by the audience given that, in general, addresses are more common with imperatives than nominative subjects are. The stages thus are: nom. + 3sg subjunctive → nom. + 2sg imperative > voc. & 2sg imperative; all I have needed to show is that ambiguous instances allowing this final reanalysis existed.
Hector is attempting to anticipate his father's pleads for his body —, we are left with two further constituents *dux ille ducum* and *quem Graecia solum pertimuit*. It seems to me likely that both should be taken to refer to the same individual, but I am not at all sure that the referent is the addressee, Achilles: from the meaning, it makes more sense to take both as referring to Hector himself and thus *dux ille ducum* is a nominative apposition to a normal third-person sentence subject and not an address accompanying *te*. We can thus exclude this example from any further consideration.

The final observation I wish to make of the classical examples is that in all of them except (21) (for which I offered a separate analysis) the form of *ille* does not appear at the start of the phrase. The significance of this is not clear, but perhaps it may be connected with the force of *ille*: it seems unlikely to be purely the result of chance.

Before I move on to the evidence from the history of French (and I will return later to some further aspects of the meaning of *ille* in these examples in the light of the subsequent usages), I should comment on Svennung's two later Latin examples, (22) and (23). Superficially they might well look much more like a forebear for the French pattern than any of the examples we have considered so far; the underlined phrases are simply *ille* with a noun (and indeed one with human reference). While these could be subjects for the imperatives *veni*, Svennung's view seems more likely, namely that this is address but involving a different use of *ille*, possible outside address contexts, where *ille* means ‘so-and-so’ and functions as a pro-proper-noun: it is thus standing in for the name of each person called in turn. What was actually called out was, for example, ‘Brother Francis, come! Brother William, come!’; a ‘condensed’ report of these would be ‘... each ...: “Brother so-and-so!”’ and indeed in (23) we have evidence for this in the distributive *singulorum* (‘each individually’). (23) is not, therefore, evidence of *ille* in direct address at all, only of *ille* in a non-verbatim report of direct address.¹⁹ In respect of (22), the use of *quamdam* corresponds to the meaning ‘a (certain) woman’: she could be named but is not, and *illa* stands for that name in the quoted direct speech, the actual name called out being of no importance.

Overall, I conclude that there is, at best, marginal evidence of *ille* in address in Latin but cannot deny that there is good evidence of patterns which might form the basis for a reanalysis and thus establish the reflex of *ille* as available in address.

### 3.2. Old French

Among the earliest examples of the use of the definite address in the context of direct address are the following from the *Chanson de Roland* (early 12th century):

¹⁹ This pro-proper-noun usage was certainly available in non-address contexts in classical Latin (cf. *OLD s.v. ille* sense 15).
What is most striking about these examples is that they all contain some kind of possessive element. The phenomenon is not limited just to the *Roland* but can be found in other texts of the old French period:

(28) *Li chevalier Mahom, aïe!* (Jean Bodel, *Jeu de S. Nicolas* 452)
Knights of the Prophet, help!

(29) *Que pensez vos, dist il, le filz Charlon?*22 (Aliscans 3425)
What do you think, he said, son of Charles?

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20 The Saracens are held to have three gods: Bédier translates: ‘*Vous, nos dieux, vengez-nous de Charles!*’
21 The plural form here is problematic and should be explained as influenced by (24); Bédier translates: ‘*Vous, notre Dieu, défendez Charles!*’
22 This line is problematic: I quote Régnier’s text here, but note that both Wienbeck (l. 3044) and Holtus (l. 3256) adopt readings with the definite article in address.
3.3. From the 13th Century to the Present

A pattern not found in earlier French, we begin to find the address use of the definite article in combination with adjectives but without nouns starting from the 13th century. Meyer-Lübke (1890-1906: iii.§176) traces this pattern back to examples such as the following from the end of the 15th century:

(30) *ne plorés plus, la belle,*
    *car il est trespassé (Chansons du XVe siècle 126.13)*
    cry no longer, pretty one,
    for he has died

There appears, however, to be some earlier evidence, from the 13th century:

(31) *la bele, des nonpers la flors,*
    *ne faites vostre pris mentir (Chansons du tresorier de Lille 2.22)*
    fair maid, the flower of those without equal,
    don't make your price deceive

From the mid-15th century we find examples of nouns with the definite article but no possessive used in address, a pattern which appears frequently in literature thereafter.23

(32) *Dieu gard, les marchans ...* (Mistère de viel testament iii.17689)
    God preserve, merchants

(33) *Or sa, que dictes vous la belle?*
    *La chambre est-elle despechée? (Mistère de viel testament ii.13892)*
    Now, what are you saying, fair one?
    Is the room cleared?

The 16th century sees the earliest examples of the pattern monsieur le X in referential (i.e. non-address) use: the TLF (s.v. monsieur) cites the following, dated to around 1515:

(34) *monsieur le Prevost (Vie Monseigneur St Louis ii.205)*
    Mr. Provost

It seems reasonable to suppose that the address usage should be dated to around this time also.

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23 It is well attested in, for example, Molière:

*Enfin, le beau mignon, vos bons déportements*
*troubleront les vieux jours d'un père à tous moments. (Dépit amoureux III.vi, 907-8)*
In the end, young man, your excesses
will disrupt a father's days all the time.

*Holà, ho, l'homme! ho, mon compère! ho, l'ami! un petit mot, s'il vous plaît. (Don Juan III.1)*
What ho! Good chap! Hey, my fellow! Hey, friend! A brief word, please!

*Et vous avez, la belle, une chaise roulante, ... (Amphitryon Prol., 20)*
And, fair one, you have a chariot on wheels …
The origins of monsieur as a form are, in my view, significant: Foulet (1950a, b, 1951a, b, c) provides a comprehensive study of the development and use of the forms sire and messire (→ monsieur) both in referential and address use; the address use of messire with a following proper name or (later) absolutely, without any following nominal element, can be traced back into the old French period, but (34) is the earliest instance I have found of the pattern involving the definite article (though not in address). Similar points might be made concerning madame (and mademoiselle), although for these the evidence is rather less substantial.

I turn finally to the present day, since I have not found evidence of further significant developments in the patterns after the early modern period. We have already looked at some present day evidence (§1), but at this point I think it useful to classify the uses into the following main patterns:

- forms which could (though they are not) be preceded with monsieur or madame (e.g. l'abbé),
- ‘substantivised’ adjectives (e.g. la belle),
- forms which could be preceded by a first-person possessive instead of the definite article (e.g. l'amī), and
- collective and plural forms (e.g. la classe, les gars).

Further examples, which can all be straightforwardly fitted into these groups, are cited by Grevisse & Goosse (1993: 877).

4. A Problematic Analysis

Svennung (1958: 301-6) summarises the various attempts to explain the address use of the French definite article, and there have, to my knowledge, been no significant studies since his work. None of the recent general literature on the origins of the Romance definite articles makes any reference to this modern use or considers it to need explanation. In some instances this may be because scholars have concentrated on the early stages of the article and believed the address use(s) to arise relatively late (i.e. after the individual

24 Sire, without the (later fused) 1sg possessive, is found earlier than messire, and earlier still we find dan(s) (< dominus) which sire seems to have supplanted: see Foulet op.cit. for detailed textual evidence; Stowell (1908: 191-223) also documents the development of the forms sire and messire in address.

25 An example of the type Madame la X, parallel to (34) in not being in address, is found in the Pèlerinage de Charlemagne (mid-12th century):

Ma dame la reine dist folie et tort. (813)
My lady queen spoke foolishly and mistakenly.

See Stowell (1908: 123-5, 133); note also Lagorgette (2004).

26 These are, in my view, intersecting categories and not mutually exclusive.

27 The major previous accounts are the following: Tobler (1899), Spitzer (1927), Meyer-Lübke (1890-1906: iii.§176), Haas (1909: §178), Lerch (1925-34: iii.70-8), Diez (1874-6: iii.19-20).
Romance varieties diverged, given that they appear most obviously in French and Romanian and have rather different characteristics in each), but even in works concerned with the later development of the article within individual varieties there is little if any comment.

One possible reason for this is that it is tacitly assumed that the French usage exemplified in §1 above simply fits into the observed general tendency for expansion in the use of the definite article in the language: the modern use is thus explicable in terms of the modern (wide) distribution of the definite article outside address contexts. In old French the article corresponded primarily to semantic/pragmatic definiteness (i.e. it was used only anaphorically and thus never with abstract or generic nouns) whereas by the 17th century, through a process of semantic weakening, the definite article came to be used even with abstract and generic nouns; the apparent status in the 20th century of the definite article as a default (used when no other determiner is appropriate) might lead one to argue that it has become a noun marker (cf. §2 above). Accordingly, the definite article in address in modern French could simply be a further example of this default status, being used precisely when no other determiner is appropriate.

In favour of this view one might reasonably claim that the use of the French definite article has developed ‘further’ than its correlates in other Romance varieties and that this is why this address phenomenon is limited to French: the definite article does not have the right meaning/status in the other varieties. (A separate alternative explanation for Romanian is then, of course, required, but since the Romanian definite article is in morphosyntactically rather different from the French, perhaps independent explanation is not undesirable.)

There are, however, two serious difficulties. The first is the age of the construction in French: we have seen examples which demonstrate that the definite article was being used in address long before a time for which it is justifiable to speak of the ‘default’ status of the French definite article,28 this is especially problematic given that even the present-day status of the French definite article as a default is hotly debated. While there is no doubt that its use is no longer confined to NPs that are semantically definite, and its use for generics, as in, e.g., *j'aime le poisson* (‘I like fish’), is evidence enough that the term ‘definite article’ is now a misnomer, many would take issue with the noun-marker view.

The second problem is that even if we accept for the sake of argument the default status of the modern French definite article, it is still not clear this would necessarily explain the data: many instances of address usage would still remain to be explained,

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28 Nyrop (1899-1930: v.173) remarks that ‘l’ancien usage n'était pas constant; il régnait une très grande liberté dans l'emploi de l'article défini’ (‘usage was not constant in old French; there existed a very great freedom in the use of the definite article’). Some might try to claim that the earlier address use (before the article became a default) is an example of such liberté: however, since I intend to show that the usage was conditioned and thus not merely free variation, I see no reason to adopt such a line of argument, which neither describes nor explains the situation at the time nor how it arose in the first place.
although it would instead be (the frequent) addresses without the article (or any other
determiner) which would be at issue.29

Perhaps we could salvage this view were we to accept that the present situation was
one of transition to default status for the definite article (a more reasonable standpoint): a
state of variation might be expected during such transition, in which address may or may
not involve the article; address would then be the last bastion of bare NPs still attempting
to hold out against the inexorable spread of the definite article (or, better, a prohibition on
bare NPs), i.e. the final part of a diffuse change.30 However, appealing though this proposal
may be, the historical evidence in its support is far too weak: the possibility of the article in
address can be traced back to examples at a time when the definite article (in all other
contexts) was apparently confined to semantically definite NPs. There is, so far as one can
tell, no evidence that its use in address has undergone a diffuse transition in precisely the
same way that abstract and generic NPs can be shown to have changed from having no
article through variation (with and without it) to having an obligatory article; however, I
will outline below (§6) my view of the transitions for which there is evidence and which
may have prompted some to adopt the default value as an explanation for the definite
article in address.

5. Restrictive vs. Non-restrictive Modification

How then are we to explain the modern French pattern? It seems to me to be fundamental
to explain the examples in old French outlined above (§2.1). To do this I draw on a number
of different threads of analysis: there is, despite their now dated terminology, much of
value in the earlier accounts, and I gladly acknowledge that I have retained a good deal of
their insights. Still, I think it is fair to say that my view nonetheless differs in various ways
(both in terminology and analytical detail) from each of them, though I believe they all
were trying in their way to describe the distinction that I draw.

The distinction in question is in fact a familiar one, namely that between restrictive
and non-restrictive modification. We are most familiar with this in terms of types of
relative clauses:

(35a) The children, who are ten years old, are enjoying the party.
(35b) The children who are ten years old are enjoying the party...

29 Grevisse & Goosse (1993: 877): ‘L'article est absent d'ordinaire devant le nom en apostrophe.’ (‘The
[definite] article is normally absent in front of a noun in address.’)
30 Greenberg (1978: 58) speaks of languages which ‘have the unarticulated form for the vocative of
common nouns’ being ‘strictly speaking, … still in the stage of the non-generic article [i.e. stage II], albeit
at an advanced stage.’ This formulation seems to allow for a period of variation during the transition from
one stage to the next and also to imply, perhaps, that address forms might be resistant to such a
development; the explanation for such apparent resistance lies beyond the scope of this paper, since I
believe French not yet to be at a stage where it is having a significant or observable effect. In connection
with this latter point, I note that Lyons (1999: 153) is, given his view that that definiteness is to be
identified with the grammatical category of person, surprisingly non-committal on the interaction between
the semantics of definiteness and address (stating that ‘in general, vocatives are not consistently definite or
indefinite’): despite the scale of his work, much research on this general issue remains to be done.
In (35a) the underlined phrase is non-restrictive and merely describes the ‘children’; it tells us more about them, something which of course we may or may not already know, but it is said of all the children salient in the discourse context. By contrast, in (35b) the underlined phrase is restrictive and picks out from a set of salient children those aged ten years; this construction tells us nothing more about the children in question than we are supposed to know already, for it relies on (logically) prior knowledge in limiting the ultimate set of referents to a subset of the set referred to by the antecedent, the children, on its own.

The same distinction can be applied to the use of many different types of modifier including adjectives and indeed genitives expressing possessors (cf. Truswell 2004). For example, parallel to (35) we could consider the following to be ambiguous between the two readings:

(36) The ten-year-old children are enjoying the party.

Albeit depending (for some speakers) on the placement of stress, we can get both restrictive (e.g. with stress on the underlined phrase) and non-restrictive readings (no contrastive stress).31

Reviewing our examples in old French, I believe that the fact (highlighted by Svennun 1958: 297, Diez 1874-76: iii.19-20) that the phrases include a possessive is significant, not because there is a possessive but because there is something, i.e. the possessive is a modifier. Moreover, in my view, the modifiers in these phrases are crucially not non-restrictive but restrictive: it is the restrictive modifier within the phrase that seems to trigger the presence of the article.32

Let us consider the examples in detail. In (24) and (25) nostre is used to indicate that the pagans and French are respectively crying to their (own) god(s) rather than to god in general.33 In (27) the restrictive meaning of mien is evident from the overall speech which

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31 Martin Maiden points out to me that the non-restrictive usage is less common and perhaps limited to or more typical of certain registers (e.g. the compressed style of newspaper journalism) rather than everyday language. This need not undermine the general principle that modifiers can alternate (with stress) or be ambiguous (in writing) in this way.

32 While there is undoubtedly a phonological link between the so-called stressed (‘strong’) personal possessive adjectives and accompanying determiners, such that the presence of one generally correlates with the presence of the other, I do not share the view that choosing a stressed form necessarily triggers the presence of the article simply because they have to appear together (pace Svennun 1958: 297). Rather it is in my view the choice of the stressed form since it can and does have the correct (i.e. restrictive) ‘meaning’ which triggers the use of the article. Its restrictive meaning may perhaps relate to the connection between stress and contrastive elements: restrictive elements are generally taken to be notionally if not actually contrastive and contrastive elements are likely to be phonologically prominent.

Note that for the sake of clarity I illustrate the argument in this and subsequent sections with reference to the 1sg possessive. Thus by mon X and le mien X I refer to these structural patterns or types and they encompass feminine examples as well as masculine: they also encompass the 1pl possessives, although for the latter there are two major problems (the lack of evidence that stems from their infrequent use and the lack of distinction in form between strong and weak forms that arises from not meeting the conditions for diphthongisation), since in my view they develop in parallel.

33 There is perhaps an issue here given that each side would presumably consider recognising the existence of other (or others’) gods as heresy — but grammar need not take a theological risk here: ‘our’ here also implies ‘genuine’ of its referent and thus contrasts implicitly with the others’ ‘so-called god(s)’.
might be paraphrased ‘(you are barons, but of all the people whose barons you might be, in
particular you are) my barons (and) I have supported you for a long time — (now I want
something in return)’. In (28) the designation Mahom picks out the knights who are to help
inasmuch as it indicates why they should help; it's not because they are knights (which is
taken for granted) but because they are knights of the prophet. The restrictive force of (29)
is more difficult to interpret from the context: I do not wish to argue that possessive
phrases are necessarily restrictive, but those where the possessor is expressed by a proper
noun seem to me to be likely to require restrictive interpretation. The fact that the referent
is someone's son is obvious, but the modifier restricts (i.e. identifies) the reference: in
support of this I would claim that the force is indeed (weakly, at the very least) contrastive
(‘of Charles’ ~ all the other people of whom he might have been the son): ‘You're Charles'
son! That's why we're asking you.’

One might make a similar kind of claim for (26) where Baligant is urging on people to do something for him, because they are ‘his people’.

In order for this analysis to be convincing and to prove that what we have here is a
robust generalisation, we should contrast some examples of address which contain
modifiers and see whether those modifiers are non-restrictive:

(37) e! Deus, dist il, bels reis qui tut guvernes,
    se tei ploïst, ici ne volisse estra. (Vie de S. Alexis 201-2)
    Ah! God, he said, good king who rule all,
    if it had pleased you, I would not have wanted to be here.

(38) e! reis celeste, tu nus i fai venir! (Vie de S. Alexis 335)
    Ah! King in heaven, you make us come there!

(39) mercit, mercit, mercit, saintismes hom! (Vie de S. Alexis 359)
    Thanks, thanks, thanks, most holy man!

(40) tere de France, mult estes dulz pais (Chanson de Roland 1861)
    Land of France, you are a very sweet land.

(41) E! France dulce, cun hoi remendras guaste
    de bons vassals, cunfîndue e chaiete! (Chanson de Roland 1985-6)
    Ah! Sweet France, how shall you remain today emptied
    of good vassals, humiliated and fallen!

34 Personal possessives (‘my, your, his’ etc.) are quite clearly able to be used non-restrictively, as we shall
see, both within and outside address contexts, although in old French this tended to correspond to the
distinction between so-called ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms in those persons where such a distinction was
morphophonologically marked; we would expect full phrase possessives (such as those in (28) & (29)) to
allow the same semantic distinction even if the default interpretation might be different. It occurs to me that
an example of non-restrictive interpretation for proper name possessives would be the formulae ‘son of
Adam’ and ‘daughter of Eve’ found in C.S. Lewis' The Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe and his other
Narnia books; interestingly, these phrases are used both referentially and as forms of address.

35 Given that parenthood is a typical example of inalienable ‘possession’, there is also an implicit contrast
here with the very likely default interpretation for such items (i.e. the speaker's own son).
In almost all of these examples it seems to me that the modifiers are very clearly non-restrictive: in (42), (43) and (44) the adjectives malvais, orguillos and franceis are descriptive and do not serve to pick out referents from among all the gods, kings or barons of the world — this is, of course, not to say that these words could never do this, merely that they are not doing so in these examples. (38) is similar in that ‘heavenly king’ is simply intended to mean ‘king in heaven’ as opposed to ‘king in heaven rather than king on earth’, and indeed in (37) there is a longer descriptive apposition to Deus (including a relative clause with a 2sg verb) which could in no way be taken to be intended to pick out one divine referent from among many. (39) contains a superlative saintismes; superlatives could be argued to be necessarily restrictive (i.e. ‘most X’ implies a contrast with referents that are ‘a little X’ or ‘rather X’). but this is not an instance of a so-called ‘relative’ superlative but is an absolute superlative (‘very X’) intended by the speaker to describe its referent as having a lot of holiness, a compliment that corresponds to the degree of emotion shown in the repeated mercit. The least obviously non-restrictive examples (given the observations about modifiers containing proper nouns) are (40) and (45). For (40) it is sufficient, I believe, to note that the context is Roland's lament for the fallen and France is already highly salient: de France does not serve to pick out France as opposed to other lands, and the sense is more ‘French soil’. For (45) there appears to be a serious challenge to my view because this speech occurs as one of a series in which a number of emirs are addressed by phrases including their territorial designation, and so modifiers like d'Orkenie in this speech look very much as though they are restricting the reference (since they implicitly contrast with the designations of the other emirs). However, the view normally taken of the scene in question is that Auberons is addressing each emir at his own court and thus acting a journey between each short dialogue;36 if this is so, then the non-restrictive interpretation is very much available since Auberons is in/at Orkenie and Orkenie presumably has only the one amiraus.

36 Warne (1951: 74, note on l. 320).
I am not the first to observe a connection between the definite article and restrictive modification with respect to personal possessives (cf. Lyons 1986, Posner 1988) but I believe I am the first to identify its significance in this context: Posner (1988: 392) notes that the definite article is preferred in apostrophe in old French when there is a possessive in the phrase but she makes no further remark and indeed some of her putative examples are doubtfully addresses. My observation is, however, not limited to possessives and is a general claim about the distribution of the definite article in address in old French.

We should of course now reconsider the Latin examples looked at earlier: much of what I have claimed for old French could be said to be true of the Latin examples too. It is noticeable that they all also have some modifier in the phrase (with the exception of (22) and (23) with their own explanation). The presence and status of this modifier seem to me to be the justification for the presence of *ille* in these phrases, and in my view it is through reanalysis of examples of this kind of pattern that *ille* and its reflexes came to be possible in address.\(^{37}\)

6. Later Developments

I now need to return to the points made earlier (§2 & §4) about the development in the use of the definite article outside address contexts. The later developments of the article within address usage in my view do correspond to the general spread of the definite article through its semantic weakening but not perhaps in the way we might have expected: the reason it is used in address in modern French is not that the article is now effectively obligatory in the absence of any alternative. Rather, the correspondence is that, through the same weakening, the article comes to be (available to be) used in address with phrases not necessarily (or, in anachronistic terms, no longer) containing a restrictive modifier.

My analysis is in three parts, concerned with three aspects of what I take to be a single development. First, I consider the status of *adjectives* when used without nouns in this construction. Second, I claim that, for *nouns*, the definite-article-in-address construction supplanted an earlier construction which contained not only the article but also a possessive adjective with restrictive interpretation; I explain how the restrictive force and the possessive form both came to be lost, leaving this source for the modern

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\(^{37}\) Why these can be reanalysed in this way, if there is a general and inherent semantic clash of some kind between address and demonstratives/articles (or perhaps determiners in general), remains a serious issue but it may perhaps be put down to weakening in the meanings of the latter towards evaluative descriptive meanings, e.g. for *ille* ‘known, famous’ (cf. fn. 41 and 49 below). Nonetheless, for the explanation of the subsequent developments after these are analysed as address forms, it seems to me that we do require at least some of the determiner force of the article: that may require us to assume a degree of ‘contamination’ from its non-address uses. However, while Lyons' (1999: 153) observation that ‘in general, vocatives are not consistenly definite or indefinite’ may be descriptively accurate in general (depending on the definition of ‘definite’), it should not be taken to imply the existence of an unconditioned free-for-all, whether diachronic or synchronic, within individual varieties that obviates the need for its own explanation and can be taken to explain any possible pattern in the data: both the possibility or existence of a semantic clash and any contamination require much further research and I present them here as hypotheses to illustrate the kind of approach I think needs to be taken in attempting to explain the intra- and cross-linguistic data on definiteness and the address context (cf. also fn. 30 above).
construction with the form and meaning it has today. Third, I consider the semantic status of *phrases* headed by the article in construction with some specific items containing possessives, namely *monsieur* and *madame*, and argue that some modern examples are the result of abbreviation of such phrases.

6.1. **Substantivisation**

The first stage of this development is the use of the article with phrases containing only the restricting ‘modifier’ and no head that is modified, i.e. ‘substantivised’ adjectives. Examples such as (30) & (31) are evidence for this: adjectives, which could with a noun have been either restrictive or non-restrictive (because the noun could provide the reference), on their own have to be taken to be semantically restrictive and indeed (still) require the definite article to do so.38

6.2. **First-person Possessives**

Alongside this development, we need to observe the general replacement of possessives of the form *le mien X* (i.e. involving the strong personal possessives) with *mon X* outside address contexts even when the possessive is restrictive: although the strong (restrictive) possessive persists in such attributive use for some centuries, it becomes increasingly rare and obsolete. In passing, we might note that its use in predicative contexts (*c'est le mien ‘it's mine, my one’*) is retained perhaps as we might expect on semantic as well as phonological grounds, for in that situation the usage is contrastive (‘not yours’) and thus restrictive. A thorough and adequate *explanation* for the general loss of *le mien X* in favour of *mon X* has in my view not yet been found: it appears to come from the general weakening of the article's force in phrases not including a possessive and thus the possibility of interpreting it as weakened in *le mien X*; this weakening (corresponding to increased frequency of use) was such that the article no longer necessarily signalled that a modifier within a phrase was to be interpreted restrictively. Thus the meaning of *le mien X* drifted or weakened towards non-restrictive ‘my’. This meaning, however, had a realisation already in existence (*mon X*) which was already common and indeed perhaps always had been more common than contrastive *le mien X* because it expressed a relation more often needed in discourse: *mon X* then superseded the latter altogether.39

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38 Posner (1988) seems to argue that *le* in configurations of this type in modern French remains (or is) pronominal and is qualified (restrictively) by the accompanying adjective, at least in non-address contexts. Her view may or may not be right, but in any case does not affect my argument since we both view the adjective as a defining or restricting element in a phrase of this type.

39 Descriptively, at least, this whole change has been compared (Posner 1997: 335-42) with structural realignment elsewhere in the French determiner system between old and modern French, whereby forms which had once expressed different semantic values (e.g. degrees of proximity, *cist* ‘this’ vs. *cil* ‘that’) came to represent different categories (determiner vs. pronoun). For personal possessives, to regard *mien* and the like as pronominal (vs. *mon* as the determiner) represents something of a change of view from Posner (1988), but one should not lay too much stress on the theoretical significance of these superficially parallel developments, which may but need not share an explanation.
In address contexts we may suppose a similar development to have occurred. However, we must take account of the fact that in address contexts the non-restrictive (weak) possessive was in old French rare to the point of virtual non-existence. Such a distribution is very surprising given the cross-linguistic availability and frequency of such examples (e.g. in English my friends, German meine Freunde, Italian amici miei) and indeed the fact that it had been common in Latin (mi amici, mi Attice) and is common in modern French (mes amis). There is clearly no reason to assume that the function did not exist and was not wanted by speakers: in fact, it seems to have been realised with other lexical items, in particular bel, ch(i)er and doux (cf. Stowell 1908, Love 1985):

(46) E! kiers amis, de ta tendre char bele ... (Vie de S. Alexis 476)
    O dear friend, of your delicate fair flesh …

(47) tenez, bel sire, dist Rollant a sun uncle,
    de trestuz reis vos present les curunes. (Chanson de Roland 387-8)
    Take it, good sire, said Roland to his uncle,
    of all the kings I present you the crowns.

This synchronic and diachronic gap in usage has, like so many aspects of address, not been previously discussed at length nor indeed noticed at all; even Foulet (1950-1) tracing the development in which messire (→ monsieur) replaced sire hesitates to say anything of the reasons for the near total absence of weak possessives as part of such address phrases earlier. All the more remarkable is the fact that the function clearly did exist and had, in a way chronologically ordered, realisations in the forms bel, ch(i)er and doux. Although none of these items etymologically expresses possession, we should remember that the speaker meaning of non-restrictive possessives in address is cross-linguistically rarely that of possession (since they do not, by definition, contrast one possessor with another) even though that may be their (etymologically) literal meaning; rather, such non-restrictive possessives are used very often to express affection, and they certainly indicate a speaker's attitude towards the addressee. Bel, ch(i)er and doux have meanings that can do precisely this, namely indicate a speaker's (complimentary and thereby affectionate) attitude, and

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40 The Latin situation is typologically complex: the loss of inherited voc. meus in favour of mi (supposed to be a dat. of the corresponding pronoun ego) may perhaps be viewed as some kind of parallel, for we cannot be certain there was no gap between its loss and the arrival of the new form. If so, this may be a cyclic development prompted by some inherent instability in the status of these items which are possessive in form but in address are often only very weakly possessive in meaning. On the etymology and history of these items, see Dickey (2002: 214-24; 2003).

41 It is for this reason that such possessives can accompany proper names in address, which would, of course, not generally admit of restrictive modification in their prototypical ‘meaning’: thus, for example, in Latin we find mi Attice, while in English we have the type ‘my dear Atticus’ where ‘dear’ is present perhaps to ensure that ‘my’ is interpreted non-restrictively and thus avoid any potential perceived semantic clash between its restrictive meaning and the following proper name that might otherwise occur. There are, however, certainly varieties of English where the 1pl possessive adjective can be used with precisely the force I suggest without needing any intervening adjective, for example ‘our Charlie’: such usage is possible also in non-address contexts and may in some way have been carried over from them, but the possessive must nonetheless be explicable on semantic grounds, for not all phrases used in non-address contexts (e.g. English nominal phrases introduced by definite articles) can be carried over and used unmodified in address.
they seem to have done so in turn, the one replacing the or being added to the other(s) as bleaching led to a need for reinforcement (Stowell 1908, Love 1985). It may well be the case that such bleaching was what had led to the near total demise of the non-restrictive use of the first-person possessive in address between Latin and old French, but I have not discovered any illuminating evidence to substantiate such a claim.

The (re-)entry of the weak possessive into address usage is a crucial stage for our investigation of the definite article in address: it seems to correspond chronologically to the point at which, outside address use, the construction involving the strong possessive could sometimes be replaced with the weak possessive construction, possibly because the former had gradually become less and less restrictive and a grey area of near overlap came to exist with some of the functions for which the non-restrictive weak possessive construction had been used. At this point and as a result of this overlap the latter, which was the pattern that occurred more frequently anyway, began to be considered as acceptable anywhere in place of the strong possessive construction.

Importantly, because the weak form was now in general increasingly being used to carry out the functions which had previously employed the strong form and the latter had previously had greater semantic force, the weak form enters into address then not as the attitudinal marker we might have expected but as a successor to or replacement for the le mien X construction we have already documented in address. Once, however, it starts to be used in address, the fact that it can also have a non-restrictive meaning (unlike its predecessor le mien X, which despite attenuation elsewhere, seems to have retained its strong restrictive meaning in address) means that it becomes available for that use also. The existence of bel etc. may perhaps have had a limited blocking effect to begin with, but it seems clear that relatively quickly the possessive supplants these uses (which we have seen already to have undergone bleaching and reinforcement cycles).

In support of this analysis, we should note that the fact that it could also be used for the restrictive use explains the well-documented fact that messire and madame containing the weak possessive are initially used only of and to those of whom it was literally true (Stowell 1908: 123-5). To begin with, such expression is of possession and thereby (because one is mentioning it at all) attitude, but before long, such use came to be reanalysed as attitude and thus possession: the attitude of deference expressed could then be extended to others of whom the possession relation would not exist but can be metaphorically employed. It is this which ultimately ensures the non-restrictive interpretation of the possessives in messire and madame etc. so that they fit alongside the mon ami type.

42 Examples such as (30), (31) and (33), however, may point to limited survival of bel(le) with this force in address: near impossible to render directly into English (e.g. 'don't weep, 'mine, for …'), they seem to be examples where the speaker wishes to use a non-restrictive quasi-possessive (as we might describe this item) on its own, i.e. with no head for it modify. Without the head to provide the reference, the quasi-possessive necessarily becomes restrictive and requires the article, but this solution is preferred to using the true possessive which I imagine would have been felt to be too strongly possessive in the same construction (the one requiring the article).
So much for possessives, but how does the modern definite article usage relate to these historically? The answer to this lies in the existence of the new mon ami type of address when used in lieu of the earlier le mien ami; it is reasonable to think that, for at least some non-restrictive uses, the new type seemed too closely associated with its alternative emphatic/restrictive meaning, and that thus a hypercorrect non-restrictive form could develop. The options for such a form are, it seems, two: one is to use a bare phrase (i.e. ami) if the attitudinal modification is evaluated as not really sufficiently important to need to be retained — this bare phrase option remains to this day —, or alternatively one could use what appears to be a derivative of the old le mien ami form including the article le but without the possessive mien, i.e. the definite article in address without a modifier.

In support of this view, we should recall that, as a general development outside address contexts, the pattern definite article + strong possessive + noun gradually became unacceptable: if one wanted to express possession, the former weak possessive form was the developing successor; where the possession relationship was less significant (especially so in the case of inalienable possession where its expression might be felt to be tautologous), the pre-existing pattern of definite article + noun (which originally had nothing to do with possession) could appear to be a suitable alternative and appear to be derived from (the increasingly unavailable) le mien X type. This would, in my view, also be likely in the case of the (by now occasional) use of le mien X for non-restrictive possession in address resulting from the overlap between le mien X and mon X already considered above, since we have seen that there it is the attitude and not the possession which is the intended force, something which the new construction could convey simply by virtue of being employed.

6.3. Apposition Revisited

We saw, in considering the Latin evidence, that the very earliest origins of the definite article construction lie in the possible reanalysis of structurally ambiguous phrases from exclamation or apposition to address. Address has very often been mistaken for apposition and vice versa in linguists' attempts to explain the general characteristics of address grammar. However, the origin of one of the types of address involving the definite article in modern French can be convincingly traced to a pattern involving restrictive apposition, namely the development from monsieur l'abbé to l'abbé: this is, as we have seen,
relatively late (compared with the other developments considered) and indeed represents exactly what we might expect to be *usage familier* (cf. §1 above).

*Monsieur le X* did not arise itself until many people could be addressed by a single speaker as his/her lord (i.e. there had been significant pragmatic weakening), and thus the speaker needed to restrict the meaning of *monsieur*: the use of the article again indicates that part of the succeeding phrase is to be interpreted as restrictive. This is the situation for non-address use, and later this whole *monsieur le X* becomes fixed as an appellation. It then becomes used as a form of address even to the person (where the restriction seems unnecessary as he would not usually need to pick out the referent). Naturally, once this is fixed as a locution, familiarity and consequent frequency of use can lead to its abbreviation. The same analysis is equally applicable to feminine forms, in which *madame* is, of course, the parallel to *monsieur*.

### 6.4. Summary

In §3.3 above, I identified four types of example of definite article use in address in modern French. The origins of each have now been examined. Those which could be preceded by *monsieur* or *madame* are examples of abbreviation of the full form resulting from the restrictive apposition of a phrase headed by the article (§6.3). Substantivised modifiers can be treated as restrictive and thus as requiring the article (§6.1). Those where a first-person possessive could be appropriate instead of the article can be treated as instances where the article construction replaced the lexical possessive (§6.2).

The final class I suggested was that of collective and plural forms: in my view the explanation for these combines aspects of all three of the other groups and confirms the non-mutually-exclusive nature of the groups. This type is arguably the most frequently occurring in everyday use, and the historical basis for it is the type involving replacement of the lexical possessive (§6.2), this being more expected for collectives and plurals: addressing a group of people is more likely to be less personal and thus any ‘possession’ expressed is less likely to be restrictive, emphatic or indeed literally applicable. However, since speakers are of course unaware of the history of the locution, once established as a construction with the relevant meaning (i.e. a way of addressing a group), the analogical extension to plurals or collectives in general even where a first-person possessive might never have been employed is perfectly understandable. The reinforcing influence of the existence of the abbreviated and substantivised types can be seen as facilitating the necessary reanalysis because their existence obscured the existence of an alternation or connection between this type and those involving first-person possessives.

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46 Cf. Diez (1874-6: iii.20) ‘Lorsqu’en français l'article se trouve placé entre deux titres, comme dans *Monsieur le comte*, on a là une espèce de composé et l'article ne disparaît pas au vocatif.’ (‘When in French the article is found between two titles, as in *Monsieur le comte*, we are dealing with a compound type and the article is not lost in the vocative.’) It is interesting to observe the way that the address form is here assumed to be logically posterior to the referential form: if the relation is generally so, we might wonder whether the relationship with the base form is purely inflectional (especially in languages, like Latin, that have a morphologically distinct form) or is morphosemantically derivational.
7. The Definite Article in Address in Other Languages

The investigation so far has concentrated on tracing the development of a phenomenon through from the Latin evidence to the present day, but modern French is just one Romance variety among many; to set our findings in context we need briefly to look elsewhere both within and outside the Romance-speaking world. In particular, we need to consider why it should be that French differs in this respect from its sister languages if, as I have claimed, the roots of the pattern are old enough for it to have been possible for it to be inherited by other varieties.

7.1. Italian

In modern standard Italian the article is not admitted in address use. However, there are some examples of the demonstrative *quello* in address (Renzi et al. 2001: ii.386-7):

(48) Buongiorno, (*i) ragazzi!
Hello, (*the) children!

(49) Ditemi, quel giovine, … (Goldoni, *Le femmine puntigliose* 1750)
Tell me, young man, …

This is notable because, of course, *quello* shares part of its etymological source with the French (and Italian) definite article. It seems to be in the light of this fact that some have taken the use of the French definite article in address to lie among its demonstrative uses (as also, less controversially, in phrases such as *de la sorte* etc.). In this paper, however, we have seen the evidence for the degree to which the French usage can be considered demonstrative through its history: in my view, it is only in the earliest (i.e. Latin) examples that we see a true demonstrative value and even in those examples one might observe the extent to which *ille* means ‘that famous, that one with which you are familiar’ rather than ‘that over there, yon’.

To make such a connection is, then, not without its problems. Furthermore, the meaning of the modern French definite article is rather different from that of this Italian demonstrative in other contexts. One might perhaps allow for this by hypothesising that it corresponds to a difference between so-called ‘address’ and ‘referential’ meanings of nominal phrases; if so, however, it would hardly be necessary to claim that either the French or the Italian address usage is ‘demonstrative’ (i.e. deictically ‘pointing/picking out’ in the real world) at all. The reason for doing so seems to be only the genetic relationship.

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47 For example, Diez (1874-6: iii.19-20), Meyer-Lübke (1890-1906: iii.§176), Tobler (1899: 128), Spitzer (1927) and Svennung (1958: 293-5).
49 Cf. Svennung (1958: 287-8). In fact, it is from the ‘famous, familiar’ meaning that the use to indicate a phrase as containing a restrictive modifier (which relies on prior knowledge) arguably derives.
50 It is widely accepted that items used in address may have different ‘meanings’ from their normal lexical meaning when used referentially (i.e. within a sentence).
between the two items going back to their common demonstrative origin in Latin *ille*, and that is by no means sufficient.

The parallel that I prefer to hypothesise instead is slightly different: it is between the development of Latin *ille* into the French definite article (which can be used in address) and that of Italian *quello* into a form that can be used in address; in other words, these are at most independent but similar innovations shown by two original demonstratives that happen to be genetically related and which acquire an address use perhaps in a similar way, though not at the same time nor as a direct result of their genetic link. Evidence (albeit negative) in support of separating these phenomena comes from the relatively late date at which the Italian pattern seems to have appeared.51

Renzi et al. (2001: ii.386) also point out affective phrases used in address in Italian (specifically, in spoken Florentine and its literary derivatives) of the type *il mio* + noun (optionally reinforced with an adjective such as *caro* or *povero*) as an exception to the general exclusion of the article from address:

(50) *che dite mai, la mia povera giovine?* (Manzoni, *I promessi sposi*)

Whatever are you saying, my poor young woman?

The history of this pattern in Italian remains to be investigated thoroughly, but it may indeed be a relic of the reflex of the Latin pattern observed and thus the result of a development somewhat akin to that which I have claimed happened in French. If so, the fact that it survives so much later than French *le mien X* presumably would reflect the fact that *il mio X* is the normal way to express ‘my’ outside address contexts (and thus *il mio* + noun does not seem in any way ungrammatical), while the ‘reinforcement’ with an affective adjective may correspond to the fact that, in general, addresses containing possessives now do not take the definite article, *caro* or *povero* therefore indicating that the possessive is only quasi-possessive.52

51 The earliest dictionary citations I have found for the address use of *quello* are in Battaglia (1961-2002: s.v. *quello*) and come from the sixteenth century authors Firenzuola and d'Ambra. The history of this phenomenon within Italian deserves much greater treatment than is possible here, but our conclusion for French regarding the semantic developments in the article should prove a valuable comparison, particularly for establishing why this Italian usage is also described as ‘familiar’ (e.g. by Tommaseo) though usually addressed to those one is reluctant or unable to name, and why it ultimately became obsolete.

52 I am still not arguing that a possessive has to be accompanied by the article but that here, at least, it has inherited the option of doing so: the meaning need not be restrictive possession, and indeed where it is not and the article pattern is selected nonetheless, the optional adjective serves to obviate any ambiguity.

Incidentally, it seems that Italian also at some point had a formula of the *monsieur le X* type: Renzi et al. (*ibid.*) cite ‘*Messer lo frate*’ (Boccaccio) which is fairly clearly a borrowing (of structure and, for the word *messer*, form) from French.
7.2. Romanian

The Romanian situation is extremely complicated and I do not intend here to deal with it in any detail. I outlined in my introduction the kind of patterns (of morphology) which may be relevant to our present investigation.\(^{53}\)

In fact, it seems to me that, as in the case of Italian, we have no good evidence to connect the Romanian phenomena in direct historical terms with those in French. Although the Romanian article shares an etymology with that of French, it is not even entirely clear that these so-called ‘vocative’ desinences indeed contain the definite article etymologically: at best we may have evidence that these forms have at some point been (and for some speakers perhaps still are) considered as containing the article. If the morphology, however, has a different source from the article, the parallel with French is again no more than a parallel and not a shared development: given that the plural forms in -ilor continue the Latin genitive plural of ille namely illorum, this seems to me to be by far the most likely solution.\(^{54}\) Nonetheless, we should note that speakers appear to feel (or have felt) little or no incompatibility between the meaning of the article in other contexts and its apparent use in address, and this is worth bearing in mind.\(^{55}\) For this reason, the kind of approach to considering semantic developments in French determiners and modifiers that I have adopted in this paper may well be able to be usefully extended to Romanian.

7.3. English

Finally, before turning to my conclusions, I wish first briefly to consider a parallel/contrast from outside the Romance languages, namely from English.

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\(^{53}\) On Romanian address in general, see Braun (1984).

\(^{54}\) The Romanian morphology has had little investigation: the most thorough examination is that of Meyer-Lübke (1895: 478-9) who suggests that the origin of the voc. masculine forms that purport to contain the definite article in Romanian may be parallel to the borrowing from a Slav source of a voc. sg. in -o for some feminine nouns. He cites various forms which appear to contain an -l- and which he alleges to be expressive, emotive or in some way hypocoristic (but note Leskien 1914: §371, §443, §581). The theory seems to involve borrowing this morphology only in the vocative, where perhaps such forms might be more common, and then combining them with the inherited masc. voc. sg. inflection -e. The plural forms then derive in some way by analogy from these, and thus contain the article because the singular is analysed as containing the article; the gen./dat. pl. form is the articulated form chosen because it too contains the -l-. On Slav borrowing in general in Romanian and some detail on its effects on vocatives in particular, see also Petrucci (1999).

\(^{55}\) There remains a great deal of research to do on explaining the precise semantic details of the developments, i.e. what in the ‘meaning’ of the article overlapped with or approached close to the address meaning associated with the ‘vocative’ morphology, assuming it is not historically the definite article or its demonstrative etymon.

As for modern speakers, while they identify the ‘vocative’ morphology, when it is used, with the article, their widespread use of the nominative in more complex address use (cf. fn. 2) suggests that (a) the semantic contribution of this ‘article’ is now somewhat limited and (b) if the contribution is felt to be present, it is also felt to be slightly incompatible with what address requires.
Address forms in English have received about as much semantic and syntactic investigation as those of the other languages discussed in this paper so far, with the emphasis placed squarely on sociolinguistic analysis. However, there has been some limited attention (e.g. Thorne 1966, Zwicky 1974) to some grammatical aspects of address usage. The consensus (which on this matter recently has been tacit but is expressed clearly by, e.g., Jespersen 1928-49: vii.529-31) is that the definite article may not introduce address phrases in modern English (nor, for that matter, may demonstratives or other determiners except personal possessives):

(51a) Hello, (*the) children!
(51b) Hello, (*the) friend!
(51c) Am I to understand, (*the) vicar, that you're going to suspect me too?

The chief further generally-agreed exception to this principle is the use of the second-person pronoun you introducing phrases such as the following:

(52) Am I to understand, you idiot(s), that you're going to suspect me too?

Postal (1966) analyses you and we in phrases of the kind you X or we X as articles, and Thorne (1966) treats you as the second-person form of the, citing examples of the kind (51) as evidence of a complementary distribution of the and you. Whatever the correct analysis of you as an element in noun phrases, whether in address contexts or elsewhere, examples such as the following have rarely been considered:

(53) Stand up, that man/the boy in the corner!
(53') What time is it, that man/the boy in the corner?
(53'') *The door's open, that man/the boy in the corner.

The underlined phrases in (53) and (53') superficially look like free dependent address phrases, but we can see from the ungrammaticality of (53'') that all may not be as it seems: in fact they should perhaps be treated as some kind of subject for the (implied) commands.56 Of course, we saw that in old French many examples of the definite article

56 Questions which require an answer from the interlocutor arguably share the feature of interactivity with commands, which similarly require something (i.e. an action) from the interlocutor. Quirk et al. (1972: 403) remark that vocatives and imperative subjects may easily be confused. On imperative subjects, see also Jensen (2003), Potsdam (1998), de Rycker (1984), Downing (1969) and Thorne (1966).

There is a further issue brought to the surface here by the examples in (53). If (53'') is taken as having directive illocutionary force (i.e. ‘close the door’ albeit in statement form), its ungrammaticality is considerably diminished. This may point towards illocutionary force (which very often correlates with grammatical form) as the synchronically significant factor in determining whether an address headed by a determiner is grammatical. However, it remains to be seen whether in historical terms there has been a spread in English from sentences with the grammatical form of a command to other grammatical forms which, when employed, share the most common illocutionary force of a command, i.e. being directive. The importance of this for my account of French is that it would provide a suitable parallel for the kinds of development associated with a reanalysis from imperative subject to address between Latin and early old French (cf. §3.1.2) and that this may be in a period for which better evidence for English exists than for my investigation of Latin and old French. If such a spread happened, it seems to be complete by the time of old French, while it may still be ongoing in modern English.
pattern were accompanying sentences containing directive expressions, and the parallel with the modern English pattern is obvious. However, since there is a robust alternation between the grammatical (53) and ungrammatical (53''), while in old French both, e.g., (27) and (24) are grammatical, it is probably wise not to treat the English pattern as a straightforward parallel to that in old French.

A satisfactory analysis of the English pattern remains to be found, but Zwicky's (1974: 790-1) concern at the availability in English of bare you only as a call and not as an address (or, in my terms, in independent rather than dependent address) may possibly also be dealt with alongside this phenomenon, for you in address seems to me in fact to have a remarkably similar distribution to that seen in examples (53) and not be as limited as he suggests. Zwicky also observes a difference in grammaticality between the use of you in combination with ‘evaluative’ and ‘non-evaluative’ nouns (e.g. idiot and man respectively) which may be significant in this context: if the (non)-evaluative distinction actually corresponds to a difference between non-restrictive and restrictive use, aspects of my solution for French could possibly be applied to resolve a number of these phenomena in English, with the very real possibility of capturing an important cross-linguistic generalisation.

In cross-linguistic terms, there are also some related questions surrounding the use of the definite article within phrases where the first element is not you but a noun: examples include English William the Conqueror, Henry the Eighth, and the French Monsieur le Président type which we have already dealt with. The questions here arise out of the contrast with, e.g., Louis quatorze or Mr. President, and they concern the semantic (and categorial) status of the two elements separated (or not) by the article. Further work is needed to establish the proper synchronic analysis of the internal structure of these phrases, although the diachronic claim I made for French (§6.1 on defining apposition) seems justified by the evidence, along with the subsequent fossilization as part of a fixed formula or name. Whether, of course, one might apply the same analysis to Winnie-the-Pooh is perhaps unknowable, but it seems to me to be parallel in form at least.

At any rate, the whole problem of nominal phrases containing two elements, somehow combined, is for most of these types a wider one than simply in the context of address, since the same form (whether with or without the interposed article) is found consistently for the same item in both address and referential usage (cf. Zwicky 1974, Lyons 1977: 223, Braun 1988: 264); the issues raised thus need not prevent us drawing our

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57 Independent address in my view can be regarded synchronically as derived from dependent address and it very often has the illocutionary force of a directive or interrogative (cf. Ashdowne 2002).
58 Even in the absence of determiners, the apparently limited interpretation of a term like English ‘driver’ when used as an address (i.e. meaning only ‘professional driver’ rather than ‘person who happens to be driving’, though both interpretations are possible in non-address use, cf. Zwicky 1974: 790) is a further type of semantic pattern which might be captured by the restrictive ~ non-restrictive analytical approach, although that lies well beyond the scope of this paper: treating all these phenomena together may prove to be a way of finally laying to rest the general puzzle that linguists have had concerning the existence and nature of any systematic relationship(s) between referential and address meaning.
59 The Latin type Socrates ille sapientissimus should perhaps be included in this list (cf. Lölstedt 1981).
conclusions regarding the history of the types of address that begin with the definite article in modern French.

**Conclusions**

In this paper I have attempted to describe and explain the origins of the modern French use of the definite article in address, a usage which contrasts very strongly with its near total ungrammaticality in English and some other Romance varieties. I have shown that the key to understanding the development is a period during which the article was apparently triggered by the presence of a restrictive modifier within the phrase, and have suggested that this in turn was the result of a reanalysis of an earlier state of affairs in which the etymon of the French definite article, Latin *ille*, was present for this kind of reason but in which the phrases in question were not addresses. The date of this reanalysis is still unclear although we know it to be between Latin and old French and we may suppose it took place relatively late given that it seems to be limited to this one major branch of Romance, and not present in the others which derive their definite article from *ille*. The allegedly parallel patterns of Romanian and Italian are not straightforwardly parallel developments from the same original source in Latin, but the possibility of tracing this development in French should encourage renewed investigation along similar lines for these varieties.

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Scriptura continua
A Problem for Logographic Reading of Archaic Words in Late Latin / Early Romance?

Tom Finbow

1. Introduction

In recent years, there has been much discussion of the relative iconicity of various modern orthographies, e.g. Chinese characters, Modern English and French, in conjunction with the theories about medieval romanophones reading Latin aloud (e.g. Blake 1991a, b, 1995; Emiliano 1991; Wright 1994a, b). In this debate significant emphasis has been laid on the divorce of written form from physical realisation that one finds in these orthographic systems in order to propose that medieval romanophone scribes employed a technique similar in some respects to logographic reading when they read out documents written in Latin in a manner comprehensible to illiterates.

This logographic theory is closely associated with the practice of silent reading since grapho-phonemic separation, a fundamental aspect of so-called ‘logographic’ reading in modern scripts, depends on the presence of certain good conditions of visibility for an individual written form in the text. Lexemes must be discrete visual entities whose written form can be directly associated with a meaning independently of their phonic value. Because of this, the theories proposed initially by Wright and developed by Emiliano and Blake involving reading Latin logographically presuppose a convention of regular separation by spaces in the Latin of the early middle ages. At the same time, it is well known that the use of spacing in Roman and medieval times was not at all consistent. In fact the normal convention was to write in scriptura continua with punctuation per cola et commata (1), or aerated script composed of hierarchical blocks of syllables (2) or words (3).

(1) GALLIAE STOMNISDIVISA IN PARTESTRES QVARVM VNAM INCOLVIN TBELGAE
ALIAM AQVITANI TERTIAM QVIIPSORVM LINGVACELTAE
NOSTRAGALLIAPPELLANTVR HIOMNESLINGVA INSTITVTIS
LEGIBVSVINHERSEDIFFERVT GALLOSABAQVITANISGARVMN AFLVMEN
ABELGISMATRONAETSEQVANA DIVIDIT HORVM MORNIVM FORTISSIMISYNTBELGAE
PROPTERAQVODACVLTATQVEHVMANITATEPROVINCIAE LONGISSIME ABVSVT
MINIMEQVEADEOMERCATORESSAEPMEAN TATQVEE AVEADEFFEMINANDO
SANIMOSPERTINENT IMPORTANT PROXIMESVNTGERMANIS
QVITRANSRHENMINCOLVN VT QVIVBSCVM CONTINENTERBELLVM GERVNVT

1 Gallia est omnis diuisa in partes tres, quarum unam incolunt Belgae, aliam Aquitanit, tertiam qui ipsorum lingua Celtae, nostra Galli appellantur. hi omnes lingua, instititus, legibus inter se differunt. Gallos ab Aquitanis Garumna flumen a Belgis Matrona et Sequana diuidit. horum omnium fortissimi sunt Belgae propterea quod a cultu atque humanitate provinciae longissime absunt minimeque ad eos mercatores saepe
How can these two aspects, separation and logography, be reconciled, and what are the implications for our knowledge of reading Latin in the early middle ages? Wright (1994b: 127) wrote that ‘historical research has come to suggest that most texts, however old-fashioned, seem to have been expected to be generally comprehensible when read aloud sympathetically …’ (my italics), but what level of sympathy did the lector have to attain to make a text containing many of archaic words that had left no descendents in the vernacular comprehensible to an illiterate audience?

The aim of my investigation has been to analyse a corpus of passages taken from seven manuscripts written in Visigothic letters from the ninth, tenth and eleventh centuries that come from the collection of the British Library. My intention was to discover if these texts could have been read in silence according to the criteria established by Saenger (1982, 1991, 1997). If the early medieval scribes had separated the lexemes in their manuscripts enough to enable silent reading then one can admit the possibility of logographic reading, since, as has been mentioned above, logographic reading requires the separation of individual words by means of blank space in order that the lexemes’ ‘shapes’,...
formed from of the outlines of the letters used to compose the word, become distinct visual items for the reader.

2. Late Latin Orthography: Phonographic or Logographic Principles?

Nowadays, nobody familiar with recent developments in Romance historical linguistics is surprised by the idea that the form written VERECVNDIAM could have been pronounced [ber'gojna] or [ver'gojna] or even [ber'gwentsa], and what was written VERITATEM may have been read [ver'dade]. Wright (1982: 166-7) has offered a reconstruction, which, despite its highly speculative nature, illustrates just how complex the relation between phonemes and graphemes may have been, given the many silent graphemes and polygraphs as well as many polyvalent signs that early medieval Latin inherited from the literary tradition of late antiquity.

(4) In Dej nomine. Ego Splendonius tiui Fredesinde In Domino
[en 'die 'nwemne 'io esple'dono 'tie fre'dzinde en 'dweno
salutem. Ideo placuit mici atque conuenit, nunlljusque cogentis
sa'lude 'ijo 'plogo 'mie ek kom'bine 'nuj'joske ko'dżentes
Inperio neque suadentjs artjculo set probria mici acesi uoluntas
em'perjoni swa'dżentes ar'te'xo se 'probrija 'mie a'teze volun'tade
ut uinderem tjui Iam dicte Fredesinde terra In uilla Uiasco
o ven'djure 'tie ja'dijte fre'dzinde tjera en 'vila 'vjasko
super Illa senrra donniga lloco predicto Agro rrodundo.
sobre la 'serra do'ñiga 'kwego pre'dijto 'ayro ro'dondo]
(based on Wright 1982: 166-7)²

2.1. ‘Weakly Logographic’ Latin

A further example of just how such a complex, polyvalent, but essentially phonographic orthography might function can be gleaned from the investigation of the ‘orthographic consciousness’ of tenth-century Galician and Leonese scribes in Wright (1994a: 181-204). Here he suggests that the chronological ordering of the educational process (whereby students first learned to read and only afterwards progressed to writing) might have influenced how the relations between phonemes and written characters were perceived by the literate in the middle ages. Writing may have been in fact a process of recalling the forms that were associated with certain sounds when reading and reproducing these on the page. In this study, Wright focuses on the prominence of orthographic techniques employed in writing morpheme combinations, which he interprets as evidence that a

² To Wright's original I have added spaces to separate lexical items in the phonetic transcription for ease of reading and replaced his use of the acute accent with the IPA primary stress mark. The underlined letters in the transcription indicate the expansion of abbreviations employed by the medieval scribe.
word's root form was taught as a single unit, essentially logographically, with minimal analysis of the individual sound–letter correspondences, while inflectional morphemes were taught as separate logographic units. For instance, AMAVIT /a'mo/ (MSp amó; MPort amou) would have been divided into the stem morpheme <am-> /am-/ and the inflection <-avit>/-o/; the preposition /sobre/ would have been written SVPER or SVP i.e. <su-> + per-ligature (a scribal abbreviation for the group <per> formed of a letter <p> with a horizontal stroke through the descender). This practice would have experienced difficulties in representing morphemes that were non-syllabic, e.g. the /-s/ of Ibero-Romance plurals. Only when a scribe encountered a word for which there was no traditional Latinate spelling (for example, in Iberia, words of Arabic or Germanic origin or more recent colloquial developments that did not possess a Latin spelling) would he have been forced to fall back on rules of thumb based on broad phonemic principles of Latin orthography and extrapolation from the written forms of other words he had learnt.

2.1.1. Orthographic Variation in the Representation of /p/, /b/ and /o/

Under the influence of vernacular phonology and the oral/aural medium of the teaching process (Walsh 1991), it is unsurprising that there should have been variations that developed between ‘correct’ SVPER and other forms with syncopated spellings or letters generally associated with voiced intervocalic stops such as <supra> ~ <subra> (León, AD 962; Eslonza, AD 1005) that surface in other related words, e.g. INSVPER, SVPERIVS, SVPERDICTVM, SVPERFATA, DESVPER, SVPERTAXATVM etc., all containing /’sobre/ as a bound morpheme (Wright 1994a: 185-7). In the same way, forms related to SVPERARE /so’brar(e)/ varied, e.g. <soberado> (Coimbra, AD 1108), especially in toponyms, e.g. <superato> (AD 1070), <sobradu> (AD 1102) (Wright 1994a: 187). However, in Sahagún in the tenth century, the scribes were apparently very competent at writing /’sobre/ ‘correctly’, i.e. Latinate SVPER, even when it formed part of a longer, compound word: of 372 documents none of the forms of /’sobre/ contained the letter <b> (Wright 1994a: 187).

However, not all scribes were so consistent, nor were all words so straightforward to spell. The word SOBRINVS has changed very little in its phonological realization since Imperial times down to the present day (MCast [so’brino], MGal [so’bríjo], MPort [su’brinu]). The difficulty lay in the representation of the initial two syllables of this word, i.e. /so’bri-/. Different scriptoria had different orthographic conventions: the chroniclers of Oviedo wrote <subr-> while the ‘cheese list’ from San Justo y Pastor used <sopr->, both were ‘incorrect’ for SOBRINVS by modern normative standards (based on etymology and phonology), either in the representation of /o/ or /b/. The word is twice spelled <svperino> ~ <svperinis> in a document of 1191 from Xubia (Wright 1994a: 187). In these examples it would seem that the scribes who found themselves obliged to spell the initial section had interpreted it as being in some sense a prepositional prefix derived from SVPER ~ /’sobre/. However, of the thirty-six occurrences of the word in the documents examined, only these two employed a medial <-e->. In contrast, amongst twenty spellings of SOBRINVS using <p> for /b/, i.e. <svperins>, <soprins>, <suprins>, etc., eighteen did not contain <-e>, and all sixteen instances in which <b> appears for /b/ also did not write <-e->. The complete breakdown of this analysis (Wright 1994a: 188) is:
As can be seen, only one sixth of the spellings (6/36) reflect the phonological composition of the word /so'brino/ with the ‘correct’ form SOBRINVS ~ <sobrino>, despite minimal phonological development and no variant pronunciations. At no time did a form descended from SOBRINVS containing /u/ or /p/ exist in Iberia, and yet on twenty occasions the scribes preferred <p> to <b> for /b/ (56%) and twenty-nine times <u> was used to represent /o/ (89%). Interestingly, other spellings seem to be logically consistent with canonical sound-letter relations in the Latin alphabet (Wright 1994a: 189).

(6a)  <n> served for /n/ ~ /n/.

(6b)  <r> and <i> were normatively employed to represent /r/ and /i/.

(6c)  (i) <s-> stood for /s + V-/
      (ii) <s + CV-> could represent a prothetic ‘e’, i.e. /es + C(C)V/, e.g. <Scaurietum> (AD 934, Celanova) vs. <Escoredo> (c. AD 1118, Penamayor).
      (iii) Sometimes this convention appears in other contexts, presumably under the influence of a mistaken analysis of contemporary phonology, e.g. <Spania> for HISPANIA, <ste> for ISTE.

Similar data to that for SOBRINVS can be found for ABADESA /aba'desa/ (Wright 1994a). The medieval scribes certainly knew the masculine form ABBA corresponding to /'aba/ but the textual record furnishes widely fluctuating approximations:

(7a)  <abbatissa> (7)
(7b)  <abbatisa> (2)
(7c)  <abbatisi> (1)
(7d)  <appatissa> (6)
(7e)  <apatise> (1)
(7f)  <appatisa> (3)
(7g)  <apatesa> (1)
(7h)  <apatesam> (1)
(7i)  <apase> (1)
(7j)  <apa> (1)

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3 This final example (5f) could well be classified together with the 16 occurrences of <supri-> (5c).
Thus, of twenty-six instances, only 38% (10/26) are written with <bb>, as one might expect of the feminine for ABBA, while 62% (16/26) are spelled with a <p> or with <pp>; in the case of SOBRINVS the occurrence of /b/: <p> was 56% (20/36) against /b/: <b> 44% (16/36) (Wright 1994a). Why should <p>, and especially <pp>, generally associated with the intervocalic voiceless /p/ occur here? Even given its masculine counterpart <abba> spelled consistently with <bb>, and no confusing formal similarities like those between SVPER /sobre/ and SOBRINVS /so'brino/, <p(p)> was considered valid for intervocalic /b/ in over half the attestations for both /aba'desa/ and /so'brino/.

2.1.2. Multivalent Graphemes: <p(p)> <b(b)> : /b/

Uncertainty about how to represent the /b/ phoneme is comprehensible, as the scribes were aware that intervocalic <p> could be realized as voiced [b ~ β] just as [d ~ ð] could appear written as <t> or [g ~ γ] as <c> as the result of a process of voicing that occurred in Latin voiceless intervocalic stops, i.e. /p/ > /b/, /t/ > /d/, /k/ > /g/, e.g. PRATVM MSp, MPort /'prado/, AMICVM MSp, MPort /a'mzego/, FOÇVM MSp /'fuego/, MPort /'fzego/, CAECVM MSp /'θiego/, MPort /'sego/. In the same way (Wright 1994a: 189), a number of written reflexes existed for [b ~ β] for a scribe to choose between.

(8a)  <p> RIPARIA (MSp /ri'bera/, MPort /ri'beira/)
(8b)  <b> BEBER / BIBERE (MSp & MPort /be'ber/)
(8c)  <v> VIVER(E) (MSp /bi'bir/, MPort /vi'ver/)
(8d)  <bb> ABBAS (MSp & MPort /'aba/)

One reason compounding this ambiguity about how to represent /b/ in nouns may have been the association of <b> with /p/ for a section of commonly occurring verbal inflections that were always spelled with <b> and never with a <p>. This may have favoured the connection that scribes made linking <p> with /b/ in nouns in which voiced labials did not feature as inflectional morphemes. This is not to say that verbs could not be spelled with a <p> of course, only that where <p> did appear it was in the root morpheme and not in the inflection. The etymological Latin spellings of certain verbal inflections continued to employ <b> consistently and Ibero-Romance phonology perpetuated the voiced (and eventually fricative) character of the phoneme in question, thus maintaining correspondence, at least in some verbal inflections, between <b, v> and /b ~ β ~ v/.

(9) Imperfect indicative (LLat & Romance):
AMABAM (MSp amaba, MPort amava),
AMABAS (MSp amabas, MPort amavas),
AMABAT (MSp amaba, MPort amava).

(10) Future indicative (LLat):
AMABO,
AMABIS,
AMABIT.
This could have been reinforced by the use of 
\(<-v(i)->$ for /b ~ \beta ~ \emptyset/$ in the perfective stems, e.g.

(11) Perfect indicative (LLat.)/preterite indicative (Romance):

- AMAVI (MSp amé, MPort amei)
- AMAVISTI (MSp & MPort amaste)
- AMAVIT (MSp amò, MPort amou)

(12) Pluperfect indicative (LLat, MPort)/imperfect ‘-ra’ subjunctive (MSp):

- AMAVERAMVS (MSp & MPort amáramos),
- AMAVERATIS (MSp amaráis & MPort amáreis; OSp & OPort amarades)
- AMAVERANT (MSp amaran, MPort amaram)

(13) Pluperfect subjunctive (LLat)/imperfect subjunctive (Romance):

- AMAVISSEM (MSp amase, MPort amasse)
- AMAVISSES (MSp amases, MPort amasses)
- AMAVISSET (MSp amase, MPort amasse), etc.

The effect of these conventions would have provided a good morphologically-based rule of thumb for scribes, founded on the category distinctions of Latin grammar between nouns and verbs. A scribe spelled verbal desinences with \(<b> \sim <v>/$ for /-b-/ \sim /-\beta-//$, whereas in nominal spellings, in which labials did not appear in the inflectional morphology but only in the root, there was no clear distribution enabling the scribe to chose between \(<b(b)>/$ and \(<p(p)>/$ for intervocalic /-b-/ \sim /-\beta-//$, and the orthography of nominal root morphemes therefore fell together with that of verbal root morphemes as orthographical environments in which \(<p(p)>/$ was the appropriate written form for voiced bilabial stops or fricatives.

The letter \(<t>/$ allowed even more room for confusion than \(<p>/$. In word initial position, like \(<p>/p/$, \(<t>/$ could be Ibero-Romance /-t/-/$, e.g. TERRAS, TAVROS, TALEIGA (Wright 1994a: 196). Also, \(<-C + t>/$ was frequently /-t/-/$, e.g. MONTEM, PORTVM (MSp monte, puerto; MPort monte, porto). Thus, at least in syllable-initial position, \(<t>/$ does not seem to have been much of a problem. Equally, although it is not completely certain at what point Ibero-Romance final [-\emptyset ~ -\emptyset] < [-t] ($<Latin /-t/-/$ was lost from verbal desinences, final \(<t>/$ was probably silent, despite its persistence in spelling, e.g. \(<dicent>/dizem/$ (MSp dicen, MPort dizem) is attested for Classical DICVNT; STAT appears in the contexts in which one encounters MSp & MPort está (/e'sta/); \(<sunt>/$ occurs where MSp son /son/, MPort são /sáu/ would be expected (NB \(<u>/$ for /o/$, cf. (5) above). If in these final environments \(<t>/$ were silent then it may also have been the case in other final positions, e.g. \(<eytat>, <heitat>, <eitit> = /'etfa/ ($<LLat IACTAT)$ (Wright 1994a: 196). In Ibero-Romance, intervocalic /-t/-/$ was also not uncommon and this could be written \(<tt>-/$, e.g. GVTTAM /'gota/ (MSp & MPort gota), or \(<pt>-/$, e.g. SCRIPTOS /e'skritos/ (MSp & MPort escritos), as it had been in its Latin etyma. The option of using \(<t>/$ was available, though avoided since this risked confusion with the spelling for intervocalic /d ~ \delta/ (Wright 1994a: 196).
2.1.3. Orthographic Neutralisation of Voice Contrasts

Adding yet another facet to the complex relationship between sound and shape, Pensado (1991) explains this employment of canonically ‘voiceless’ letters <p t c> as the reflexes of the voiced phonemes /b d g/ by showing how <p t c> can be perceived as having become functionally equivalent to <b d g> in the minds of medieval scribes, given certain circumstances. This occurs amongst modern children learning to write Spanish in Gran Canaria whose pronunciation of <bonita> as /boˈnida/ means that <t> and <d> and by extension other voiced-voiceless doublets are interpreted as representing the same sound (Pensado 1991: 194).

Textual evidence does exist of <c qu k> alternating with <g> after front vowels, i.e. <c qu k> + <e i> for /dz/ ~ /dʒ/ and <g> + <e i> for /ts/:

(14a) <iudigio> ~ IVDICIΟ
(14b) <salges> ~ SALCΙES
(14c) <Giprianus> ~ CIPRIANVS
(14d) <vindigetis> ~ VINDICETIS
(14e) <quermanos> ~ GERMANOS
(14f) <subroquita> ~ SVBROGITA
(14g) <Eucenius> ~ EVGENIVS

This apparent bivalence of the graphemic representation of voiced and voiceless intervocalic consonants in eleventh-century Leonese notarial texts, i.e. <c t p> = /k t p b d g/ = <g d b>, particularly in the problematic post-consonantal context where voicing did not occur in spoken Leonese, gave rise to forms such as <potesdatem> for POTESTATEΜ, <espisgopi> for EPISCΟΠΙ, <spondania> for SPONTΑΝΙΑ. These show graphemes typically associated with voiced sounds (Pensado 1991: 193, 15.2b). In most instances, save post-consonantally, voicing can be accounted for as being hypercorrect extensions of the intervocalic voiced value for a letter (Pensado 1991: 193, 15.2a), e.g.

(15a) <palumpa> for PALVMBΑ
(15b) <Gontesalves>, <Gontesalvo>, <Gontesalviz> for GONDΗSALVES
(15c) <Leanter> for LEΑΝΕΡ
(15d) <vulco> for VVLGO

Such variation amongst what are generally considered the graphic representatives of voiced and voiceless intervocalic consonants in eleventh-century Leonese notarial texts, i.e. <c t p> = /k t p b d g/ = <g d b>, particularly in the problematic post-consonantal context where voicing did not occur in spoken Leonese, gave rise to forms such as <potesdatem> for POTESTATEΜ, <espisgopi> for EPISCΟΠΙ, <spondania> for SPONTΑΝΙΑ. These show graphemes typically associated with voiced sounds (Pensado 1991: 193, 15.2b). In most instances, save post-consonantally, voicing can be accounted for as being hypercorrect extensions of the intervocalic voiced value for a letter (Pensado 1991: 193, 15.2a), e.g.

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(15d) <vulco> for VVLGO

Such variation amongst what are generally considered the graphic representatives of voiced and voiceless sounds is accounted for by positing a neutralisation of these canonical sound values, allowing a sporadic reading of <p t c> as /b d g/ in intervocalic positions.

2.1.4. Multivalent Graphemes: <o> <u> : /o/

In paradigms of nominal declension /o/ was often written as <u> in inflectional desinences, e.g. <us>, <um>, and possibly <ibus> (Wright 1982: 42), and some regional varieties
may in fact have had a final /-u/, especially if there was a high vowel in the root, e.g. Galician-Portuguese or Asturian-Leonese. Some words were consistently spelled with <o> for /o/ or /uo ~ ué/ < /é/ throughout their history, e.g. MONS ~ MONTEM, PORTVS ~ PORTVM, PORTA ~ PORTAM (monte ~ (O Sp) muente, puerto ~ porto, puerta ~ porta), while sound-changes in other words rendered an older /u/ as /o/ as we saw in <super> /sobre/ above. This tendency to write <u> for /o/ was massively favoured in the Galician documentation to the extent that 89% of what the evidence from reconstructed phonology showed would have been pronounced as /o/ was spelled with <u>, while just 19% of these /o/ were spelled with a letter <o> (29 : 7) (Wright 1994a: 191).

2.1.5. Representation of ‘Romance’ Phonology without Latin Orthographical Precedent

One of the principal areas of Late Latin orthography in which /o/ and /t/ were problematic was in the spelling of the initial grouping /o(t)/ (< CLat AUCT-, AUT-, ALT-). The Castilian spelling tradition eventually settled for spelling this <ot-> for /ot-/, e.g. <otoño>, <otorgar>, <otro> and <otero>, and Galician-Portuguese scribal practice employed <out-> for ['out-] to produce <outonho>, <outorgar> and <outeiro> (Wright 1994a: 197). However, neither of these spellings is likely to have been available as a ‘naturally occurring’ phenomenon in Late Latin since the only Imperial Latin words which began <ot-> were OTIVM and its derivatives, e.g. OTIOSE, OTIOSVS, which were not likely to have been current terms in tenth century speech. The main alternative spelling for /o/ as we have seen was <u> but this was also not available, since forms in <ut-> like VTRVM, VTER and VT were either not present in colloquial speech or, if they had survived, they would probably have been vocalised as /odro/, /odre/ and /oð/ in vernacular phonology, i.e. /o(u)t-+ /ð/, and thus did not offer themselves as obvious models for /o(u)t-+ /t/ (Wright 1994a: 197).

Nevertheless, in Late Latin a number of orthographical techniques did exist to spell this syllable based around the pronunciation of the spellings <auct->, <aut->, <oct-> and <alt->, e.g. /o(u)t/ could be written AVTVMNV and /o(u)t/ could be spelled AVCTOR(I)GAR(E). Similarly, OCTO was pronounced /ōto / 'otjo/ in all probability, for the Latin word OCTOBER appears as <ochubre> ~ <otubre> ~ <ochubrio> in the first Castilian documents of the thirteenth century, suggesting that it was read /oi'tobre ~ /o'tubre/ (Wright 1994a: 197). The subsequent influence of the prestige of medieval Latin led to the generalisation of /ok'tubre/ octubre in Spain relegating /oit/- ~ /out/- ~ /o't/- pronunciations to non-standard varieties (NB MPort outubro /o'tubru/).

In the same way, <alto> became the standard form for the descendents of the Latin adjective ALTVS, -A, -VM ‘high’ due to the influence of the prestige medieval Latin /altus/ in a like manner to the competing variants of DVLCIS ~ DVLCE coalescing around prestige /dulst/ > MSp /dulθe/ ~ /dulst/ (NB MPort /dose/ ‘sweet’ ~ /dose/ ‘twelve’). The result is that the more highly evolved variants such as /o(u)t/ from the development of /alt-/ > /aut-/ > /o(u)t-/ survive only in toponyms like Villota (Burgos), Montouto, Outomonto (Galicia) (Wright 1994a: 198-99). This resulted in /o(u)te(i)ro/ and /o(u)t/
being spelled ALTARIVM, ALTO+-ARIVM and ALTVM (Wright 1994a: 197; see also Williams 1997: 269-73).

However, certain potential forms appear to have been blocked from representing words because of pre-existing traditional spellings that already occupied that role. For instance, ALTARIVM is disqualified from functioning as the representation of /o(u)te(i)ro/ (‘hill’) as this was already the spelling for /al'tario/ (‘altar’). The Sahagún texts present a mixture of spellings for the latter.

(16a) <altario> (22)
(16b) <altariorum> (31)
(16c) <altariis> (3)
(16d) <altari> (1)
(16e) <altaribus> (5)

To avoid ambiguity, Galician scribes seem to have opted for spelling /o(u)t-+e(i)ro/ with any of <aut-> (15), <auct-> (14), <oct-> (7), <out-> (3), <ot-> (2), and, significantly, they did not employ a spelling in which <-l-> appeared, while in Sahagún the form taught seems to have been <autero> (Wright 1994a: 202-03).

The use of <al + C-> to represent /o(u)t-/ in the descendents of ALTVS, -A, -VM, coupled with similar developments in the pronominal adjectives ALTER, ALTERA, ALTERVM, accounts for the forms <altras> (Sahagún, 1097) and <autra> (León, 1163) (Wright 1994a: 199), while the Riojan glosses exhibit <altra(s)>~<altro(s)> for /o(u)tro/.

As Wright says (1994a: 200), if this feature were truly a cultismo then one would expect an <-e-> to bring the spelling into line with the ‘correct’ Latin spelling, i.e. <alte(ro)s>, etc, which does in fact appear in some tenth century manuscripts from Sahagún.

(17a) <alterum> (2)
(17b) <alteros> (1)
(17c) <alteram> (1)
(17d) <alterutrum> (4)

However, this set of inflectional forms is now ‘incorrect’ insofar as the masculine nominative singular inflection (17b) is taken to be formed in <-us>, i.e. /o/, by analogy with the second declension desinences and the phonology of tenth-century Leonese. Likewise, hypercorrection occurs in the syncope of /-e/- in feminine and neuter singulars.

2.1.6. *<auctoricare> : /otor'gar/ : The Right Spelling that Never Was

Interestingly, the spelling *AVCTORICARE, which would have been the expected written rendition for spoken /o(u)tor'gar/, is never encountered in Late Latin texts spelled as such, despite the existence of both its component morphemes AVCTOR and the verbal suffix -ICARE. Of twenty-eight instances from Galicia written with <auct-> the verbal suffix was spelled <-izare> four times; in the same set of documents the initial syllable occurred in
four different spellings as <oct-> (7), <aut-> (2), <ot-> (7), <obt-> (1), all of which were
spelled with <-iz-> in the second morpheme. Therefore, *AVCTORICARE cannot necessarily
have been taught as a whole written unit since the two Classical morphemes never co-
occur.

Even if the morpheme <auct-> was taught as the ‘correct’ form, it never appears with
the equally ‘Classically correct’ ending <-icare>; and in fact, as well as the form <-izar(e)>
(4) mentioned above, one finds just <-igar(e)> (2), while all the rest used <-gar(e)> (22).

(18a) <au(c)torgare>
(18b) <otorgar>
(18c) <obtorgar>

The spelling with <-rg-> is supported by the phonology of words such as /largo/ (Wright
1994a: 200), although here it is applied to a verbal context rather than a nominal, or
adjectival one, and syncope of the unstressed /-i-/ produced this combination in
/o(u)torgar/.

The free morpheme AVCTOR could conceivably have been taught as a single,
irreducible written form but it does not occur frequently in notarial documents (Wright
1994a: 197). What is more likely is that scribes may have felt that /o(u)t-/ could be
represented legitimately by <auct-> or <oct-> and the instances of <aut-> may originate in
the link with other common words in which /ou/ appeared as <au> in slightly different
orthographic contexts, e.g. <caut-> /ko(u)t-/, or the conjunction AVT that would have
represented /o/ as well (cf. Sp <o>, Ptg <ou>) (Wright 1994: 197). All the Sahagún
documents supply <aactori- + -c/z->, i.e. /-ar/ <-ar>, and the form could have come from
here as a whole:

(19a) <auctorizamus> (1)
(19b) <auctorizare> (2)
(19c) <auctorizaverimus> (2)
(19d) <auctorizemus> (4)
(19e) <auctoricabit> (1)
(19f) <auctoricationis> (1)
(19g) <auctoricare> (1)

Elsewhere in León however, things were not so regular (Wright 1994a: 197): the Fuero de
Valfermoso de las monjas contains

(20a) <otorguet>
(20b) <coutorguet>
(20c) <otorgan>
(20d) <autorgam(i)ento>
(20e) <otorgant>
The Galician form <obtorizare> dating to AD 929 is reminiscent of the Pompeian graffito <obsclutat> /əʊsklʊtət/ for Classical AVSCVLTAT (MSp escuchar, MPort escutar), cf. MSp <ciudad> and Osp <cibdat> < CIVITATEM. Interestingly, <auctinuerit> was thought appropriate for OBTINVERIT, which exhibits the inverse phenomenon to that in the Pompeian example above (Wright 1994a: 200-2). The very early Romance glosses from Santo Domingo de Silos present this verb in the forms <scuitata> (120), cf. MSp escuchada, and <scuita> (125), cf. MSp escucha, (MPort escutada, escuta) (NB the use of -<it-> to represent /ʃ/). These derive from a postulated hypercorrect verb-form written *<scultare> in which the /e/ in the initial syllable was dropped since it was reanalysed as a case of prothesis, rather than being related to the noun AURIS, and -<lt-> stood for the /-jt-, -ʃ/ as <multus> represented /mʊtʃ/ (MPort muito, MSp mucho).

This evidence seems to indicate that scribes had a psychological correspondence of the syllable /u(ɔ)t-/ to <auct-> and not /o(ɔ)-/ representing <auc-/oc->. All the cases of writing <auc-/oc-> in which the <c> was not intended to be pronounced also contain <t> following the <c>, indicating that the sound value implied by this <ct-> was /t/ or possibly /ʃ/. The tenth century manuscripts from Sahagún furnish various spellings of /au(ɣ)men'ar/: (21a) <aumentare> (2) (21b) <aumentaberit> (1) (21c) <augmentare> (2) (21d) <acmentare> (1) (21e) <acmentum> (1)

But these never occur without <-c/-g-> since it is possible that a trace of the original velar consonant may have lingered (MSp & MPort aumentar). <auc(t)-/oc(t)-> also shows up in the middle of words (Wright 1994a: 204), e.g. <saucto>, <sauctis>, i.e. /'so(u)to/ ‘copse’ (MSp soto, MPort souto), occurs as <sauto> (10), <soto> (2), <salto> (1), <sulto> (1) and <cocto> appears for /'ko(u)to/ ‘hunting ground’, ‘reserve’ (MSp coto, MPort couto).

2.1.7. Summary

Statistical analyses of the actual spellings used by medieval scribes and notaries from a selection of documentary sources indicate that variation in the manner in which certain lexical items were represented was probably due to the phonologically multivalent character of a large number of letters and multigraphs that comprised the orthographical repertoire of the early medieval writer. Examples (5), (7) and (8) show how evolution in Latin phonology rendered some individual letters polyvalent in certain environments. Examples (14) and (15) indicate what the outcome of such polyvalence can be in terms of scribal practice, i.e. the neutralisation of the association of a voiced/voiceless opposition to any single letter pairing, e.g. <b(b)> ~ <p(p)>, <c qu k> ~ <g>, <t> ~ <d>. Examples (16) to (21) show the development of novel, ‘Romance’ orthographic conventions when a
particular set of phonemes occurred together in vernacular lexical items but had no parallel in traditional spelling practices.

Thus in conclusion, it can be shown that there existed enormous tensions within the Late Latin orthographic tradition that had arisen out of the phonological evolution of spoken registers while the traditional spellings remained unchanged. The result of this clash between innovative phonology and static orthography was that writers found themselves obliged to operate within a system of increasing complexity in terms of the analysis of traditional spellings and matching graphemes and grapheme-clusters to phonemes. Whenever he picked up his quill, the medieval scribe was confronted with a number of potential ways to represent a single vernacular item, in some cases each syllable of a word might be able to be written in several ways. Which one he chose to employ depended on any number of sociolinguistic criteria that today are hidden from us, although not all decisions of this type may have been imbued with a definite significance.

2.2. The Influence of Vernacular Phonology on (Mis)spelling

The most frequently occurring words would have had their spellings learnt by heart, and in a similar way formulae and semi-formulaic phrases would also have been committed to memory, possibly learned by rote both in spelling and in pronunciation and therefore these experienced less deformation. But by indicating the speech habits of modern pronunciations of Latin by speakers of several of modern languages, Walsh (1991) paints a convincing picture of the Leonese scribes struggling to remember quirks of the orthography in which source language phonology produces irregularities on those occasions when it clashes with that of the target language. All this without recourse to textbooks or dictionaries makes it so much more likely that the types of errors presented in the texts should have occurred. The distortions of traditional spellings through the prism of native phonology can be employed to offer quite precise information about the state of Leonese vernacular phonology in the tenth century, despite Wright's and others' claims that orthography need not express phonological detail.

By analysing variant spellings, Walsh is able to provide evidence for numerous phonetic mergers and deletions by drawing on the conviction that speakers of a ‘dead’ language for which they lack the models of native speech will fall back on their own phonological patterns to guide them. For instance, Americans realize CREDAM ‘I shall believe’, CRETAM ‘grown’ (fem. acc. sg.) and CRETAM ‘Crete’ (acc. sg.) more or less identically as [krεram]; Francophones may speak with a word- or phrase-final stress; British English speakers will aspirate pretonic voiceless stops, realize simple vowels as falling diphthongs and reduce certain unstressed vowels to schwa; Hispanophones will spirantize postvocalic voiced stops, merge non-intervocalic and post labial <b> and <v> as [b], pronounce <-m> as [n] or [ŋ], and render <-rr-> as a trill; Italian speakers are likely to utter geminate consonants, and hardly anybody observes the full system of Classical Latin vowel quantities. The allophonic rules and phonotactic constraints present in their own native tongue will be included in their attempts to produce the target language. Furthermore any phonetic contrasts existing in the target but alien to the source are likely
to be ignored (Walsh 1991: 212). Walsh indicates (1991: 213-15) many sound-changes which were only postulated by reconstructions but which notarial Latin spelling can offer evidence for.

- Raising of /a/ to /e/ under the influence of yod:
  (22a) <kefɔs> for CASEOS ‘cheeses’. This requires metathesis of yod to produce the chain of vocalic changes /a/-j/ CASEOS > /aj/ /*kajʃɔs/ > /ej/ /keʃɔs/ (cf MPort queiʃɔs /keʃ3us/) > /e/ /kesɔs/ (MSp quesos).

- YRaising of /a/ to /e/ under the influence of yod:
  (22b) <lexauiɔt> for LAXAVIT ‘he left’. The evolution proceeds as follows: LAXAVIT /laksiwa/it/ > */lajʃawə/ > */lajʃaʃə/ > /leʃʃo/ (cf. MFr Past Hist. laissa) > /leʃʃɔ/ (cf. MPort deixou /deʃʃɔ/ < delaxavit).

- YMonophthongisation of /əj/ and /əw/:
  (22c) <benfectria> for BEFECTORIA ‘free town’. The yod affecting the /a/ is obscured by spelling /-jt/- as <-ct->, i.e. /benefaktoria/ > /benefajtoria/ > /benefejtoria/. It was this change of /-kt/- > /-jt/-, a parallel evolution to the evolution of /-ks/- > /-js/- > /-ʃ/- in (22a) & (22b), that formed Castilian /tʃ/ or Portuguese /-V + jt/-, e.g. NOCTEM > <noche>, <noite>.

- /o/ > /u/ under the influence from /w/:
  (24) <puerɔn> for POSVERVNT ‘they put’

- Raising and fronting of /e/ to /i/ (or /j/) in hiatus (22c), and, conversely, lowering and backing of /i/ > /e/:
  (25a) <uinia> (alongside <uenea>) for VINEA ‘vineyard’
  (25b) <Feleʃ> for FELIX
  (25c) <entrequidate> for INTEGRITATEM ‘soundness’
  (25d) <tiue> for TIBI ‘to you’

- Monophthongization of /aj/ and /au/:
  (26a) <hec> for HAEC ‘this’
  (26b) <etate> for AETATEM ‘age’
  (26c) Hypercorrect <audie> for HODIE

- Diphthongization of tonic /o/:
  (27) <puablo> for POPVLVM ‘district’, NB proparoxytone reduction by loss of the atonic vowel; voicing of /p/ > /b/ and possible frication of [b] > [β] intervocally.
Prothetic /e-/:  

Syncope matching Romance reflexes:  
(29a) <cadnato> for CATENATVM ‘padlock’, cf. MSp candado (NB metathesis), MPort cadeado (NB loss of intervocalic /n/)
(29b) <cargatura> for CARRICATVRAM ‘load’, cf. MSp carga, cargamento, cargar, MPort carga
(29c) <domno> for DOMINVM ‘lord’, cf. MSp dueño, don, MPort dono, dom
(29d) <-eblis> for -IBILIS ‘-able’, cf. MSp -able, -ible, MPort -ável, -ível
(29e) <benfectria> for BENEFACTORIA, cf. bien + OSp fech(o), MSp hech(o) + nominal suffix, MPort bem + feit(o) + nominal suffix

Merger of /b/ and /w/:  
(30a) <lebaron> for LEVARVNT ‘they raised’
(30b) <falbatore> for SALVATOREM ‘saviour’
(30c) <cauallo> for CABALLVM ‘horse’
(30d) <uarua> for BARBAM ‘beard’
(30e) <tiui/-e> for TIBI
(30f) <uouis> for VOBIS ‘to you (pl.)’
(30g) <nouis> for NOBIS ‘to us’
(30h) <auitacione> for HABITATIONEM ‘dwelling’
(30i) <uocauatur> for VOCABATVR ‘he was called’

/-nt/ > /-n/:  
(31a) <lebaron> for LEVARVNT ‘they bore’
(31b) <taliaron> for TALIARVNT ‘they cut’

Neutralisation of /t/ and /d/ in word-final position:  
(32a) <aput> for APVD ‘at’
(32b) <aliut> for ALIVD ‘other’

Merger through palatalisation of /tj + V/ and /kj + V/:  
(33a) <uendiciones> for VENDITIONES ‘sales’
(33b) <porcione> for PORTIONEM ‘part’
(33c) <doncionif> for DONATIONIS ‘of giving’
(33d) <populacione> for POPVLATIONEM ‘population’

Deletion of intervocalic /d – ð/:  
(34) <Freinandici> ‘Fernández’ < FREDINANDVS (NB metathesis of /fred-/ to /ferd-/)}
Palatalisation and loss of /g/ before /j/:
(35) <Lejone> for LEGIONEM ‘León’

Loss of /h/:
(36a) <abuimus> for HABVIMVS ‘we had’
(36b) <abeatis> for HABEATIS ‘you might have’
(36c) <auitacione> for HABITATIONEM ‘house’, ‘dwelling’, ‘room’
(36d) <ereditauerunt> for HEREDITAVERVNT ‘they inherited’

Loss of final /m/:
(37a) <poblacione> for POPVLATIONEM ‘village’, ‘settlement’
(37b) <mesa> for MENSAM ‘table’
(37c) <auitatione> for HABITATIONEM ‘house’, ‘dwelling’, ‘room’

Loss of /n/ before /s/:
(38a) <Leonefil> for LEGIONENSIS ‘Leonese’
(38b) <mesa> for MENSAM ‘table’

Replacement of intervocalic <p t c> with <b d g>, suggesting voiced, fricated sounds ([β ð ð]):
(39a) <abut> for APVD ‘at’
(39b) <acebit> for ACCEPIT ‘he took’
(39c) <artigulo> for ARTICVLVM ‘article’
(39d) <ederna> for ETERNA ‘eternal’
(39e) <episcobus> for EPISCOPVM ‘bishop’
(39f) <eredidade> for HEREDITATEM ‘inheritance’
(39g) <exido> for EXITO ‘gone away’
(39h) <nebotes> for NEPOTES ‘grandchildren’
(39i) <nodicia> for NOTICIA ‘notice’
(39j) <pacifigas> for PACIFICAS ‘you pacify’
(39k) <plaguit> for PLACVIT ‘it pleased’
(39l) <prado> for PRATVM ‘meadow’
(39m) <probrria> for PROPRIA ‘own’
(39n) <Stebano> for STEPHANVS ‘Stephen’
(39o) <suber> for SVPER ‘above’
(39p) <subra> for SVPRA ‘above’
(39q) <terridorio> for TERRITORIVM ‘territory’
(39r) <uindigare> for VINDICARE ‘to venge oneself’
(39s) <uolumtade> for VOLVNTATEM ‘will’
One of the values of a Late Latin orthography of this type, as Walsh points out (1991: 211), lies in its capacity to serve as a source of direct information on the phonological structure of very early old Romance varieties from textual sources that previously have been considered too Latinate to provide useful quantities of data. The influence of vernacular phonology on the scribes' memory of spellings that no longer corresponded precisely with pronunciation, as can be seen above in §2.2, occurred because the medium through which the notaries acquired their knowledge of Latin grammar and orthography was ‘almost entirely oral’ (1991: 211):

(40) After learning the general phonetic value of the letters of the Roman alphabet, they must have assimilated morphology and lexicon through auditory, rather than visual stimulation. Their language-learning experience must have consisted largely of rote repetition of paradigms and word-lists. The predictable result was a far stronger auditory than visual image, which would have caused few problems were it not [for] the chasm separating Latin orthography from Old Leonese phonology. When in doubt about the spelling of a particular word, given the likely unavailability of dictionaries, the only solution was to attempt to ‘sound it out’, something you may recall being forced to do in elementary school, with predictably poor results, at least for those of us raised in an Anglophone context.

The kind of orthography described here also meets the perceived need for a Late Latin writing tradition to be interpretable in terms of evolved, early Romance phonology in order that documents might be read back to witnesses and sermons preached to congregations which in the majority of cases would have been composed of illiterates. The basic phonemic principles that underpin the Roman alphabet are maintained — the relatively close association between the individual letters and certain key phonemic distinctions — while at the same time one notes the need for a more sophisticated, abstract level of spelling, such as can be found in Modern French or Modern English, with which the orthographic system can handle the high degree of separation of the written forms from the vernacular phonology.

However, this system does not explain how Latinate syntax, obsolete morphology such as the synthetic passive voice or the synthetic future tense, and archaic vocabulary, all of which feature prominently in Latin texts from across the chronological spectrum under investigation, were rendered understandable. I agree with Blake (1991: 206) when he wrote that he did not believe it would have been possible for the average, tenth-century addressee to understand a cleric pronouncing the sentence written INGREDIAMVR INQVID DOMVM as [en'gre'djamor en'ki'do 'domo] when the same proposition was expressed as [en'tremos 'diʃo en ela 'kaza] in the vernacular Iberian language, irrespective of the fact that vernacular phonology may have been employed to pronounce the Latin text.
2.3. ‘Strongly Logographic’ Latin

Expanding on Wright's initial ‘weakly logographic’ notion of reading Late Latin aloud and basing themselves indirectly on the notion that ‘the fact that Roman letters originally stood for segmental sounds would not in principle be any bar to constructing a purely logographic script with them’ (Sampson 1985: 203, cited by Wright 1994a: 132), Emiliano (1991: 233-47, 2003) and Blake (1991: 220-32, 1992: 291-305, 1995: 463-8) have both proposed that the reader pronounced an obsolete word as if it were the equivalent contemporary term and supplied additional items, e.g. prepositions, articles, etc., omitted by the scribe in his efforts to produce a text with a traditional Latinate appearance: reading aloud during the early middle ages approached what for us would be a process of translation but for the readers of the period was just the manner of reading Latin ‘sympathetically’ so that the illiterate listener could understand the content of the text.

(41a) The relation of synchronic equivalence in Notarial Latin between PERCVSSERIT and FERIR is the same as between FECERIT and FEZIERE with the difference that the latter are diachronically related. PERCVSSERIT and FERIR, as their free inter-changeability in Latinate texts tells, are grapho-lexemic variants with the same representational status. […] This means that replacement of Latin opaque forms by more transparent ones involved only a substitution of orthographic variants, without entailing translation. […] VOLVERIT and OCCIDERIT would simply be regarded as written representations of [ki‘dzjer] and [ma‘tar], and would be equivalent to QVESIERIT and MACTAVERIT, and to quisier(e) and matar(e).

(Emiliano 1991: 244)

(41b) One would have read QVI PERCVSSERIT AVT MESSAVERIT AD VICINVM as something like [‘ki fi‘rjer o me‘sar a vi‘dzino].

(Emiliano 1991: 243-4)

Reading in this manner, the obsolete, learned language of Latin texts became comprehensible to the old-Romance-speaking populace. Thus, the notion of a logographic orthography for Late Latin has been widely discussed (e.g. Emiliano passim; Blake passim; Wright 1994a, b) and it is very attractive given that it offers a solution to the difficult problem of apparently archaic vocabulary and grammar. Nevertheless, there is at least one aspect of the Latin literary tradition that proves problematic: the fact that words were not separated consistently with spaces.

3. Scriptura Continua and Canonical Separation

The studies of Saenger (1982, 1991, 1997) demonstrate that original development of the modern habit of reading rapidly and silently occurred in Irish and Anglo-Saxon scriptoria between the seventh and eighth centuries AD. Canonical separation (see below), the convention that considerably facilitates silent reading in the Latin alphabet, was only adopted for Latin during the tenth and eleventh centuries in continental Europe and was not
generalised for vernacular languages until much later still, both in the British Isles and elsewhere. Until the introduction of canonical separation late antique and early medieval scribes employed various forms of reduced separation, and Saenger classified these conventions generally as aerated scripts within which he sub-divided them into techniques using hierarchical word blocks and hierarchical syllable or letter blocks. In these scripts larger spaces were inserted between some phrases or words and other smaller spaces appeared between some syllables (see examples (1)-(3)).

Saenger defines canonical separation as writing in which the ‘unity of space’ used in forming a single letter is in the ratio of 1:1.5 or higher to the ‘unity of space’ separating words. Without this degree of separation, it is not possible to identify the gaps between words either using parafoveal vision (6° or approximately 15 to 20 characters in standard modern type) or peripheral vision (>6° or approximately 20 spaces) with the result that the reader cannot isolate the beginning and end of a written word amongst the symbols on the page. In turn, this prevents the perception of the Bouma shape of the word. Bouma shape is the highly individual visual outline of a written word that makes a single written word almost immediately recognizable when reading. It is Bouma shape that lets us read a text even when all but the first and last letters are jumbled up, and the recognition of Bouma shape is the key to how modern readers of languages written in alphabetic scripts are able to skim across the page rapidly and silently extracting meaning logographically in a similar manner to that in which readers perform the decoding of Chinese characters.

(42) Bmoua sphae awlols us to raed a txet eevn wehn the mojtaiy of the ltetrs are mledudd wlihe the frsit and lsat ltetr rmiean in tiber namrol poosiin so taht a slbmeacne of the wrod's onultie is kpet as a vusailuint taht the eye pevierces and acisotsaes whit the licaxl uint's miennag.

The absence of canonical spacing does not only prevent the perception of Bouma shape. When there are no spaces between words there is also no means by which the reader can regulate his ocular saccades. These are movements that the eye makes along the lines of symbols: it does not skim evenly across all the text but proceeds in series of jumps as it recognizes the outlines of words. In modern printed texts a block of around fifteen letters is the most that the eye is able to process physiologically as a single visual unit in one fixation (Saenger 1982: 378). Therefore, at any moment during silent reading the reader is maintaining between ten and fifteen characters to the right of the focal point in parafoveal vision and up to twenty spaces in peripheral vision (Saenger 1982: 373, 1997: 27). This means that while the reader focuses on the details within the focal area, in his parafoveal vision he is already deciphering the next section and is analysing the spacing up to a whole line ahead in preparation for future ocular saccades. If no canonical spaces are inserted then there is no way that the reader's ocular saccades can be regulated, and therefore the distance the eye jumps in each fixation is reduced dramatically while at the same time the frequency of fixations is at least double what is found in readers of canonically separated text.

It was normal for Roman books to be written in lines of thirty or even fifty letters without any interruptions. Confronted with such a page, the human eye cannot perform the
processes outlined above. Before such a page, the reader suffers a kind of tunnel vision and the eye–voice span is eliminated completely, signifying that the reader can no longer ‘prepare’ a passage in advance in parafoveal and peripheral vision when confronted with the text for the first time as the modern reader can. Owing to the absence of Bouma shape, one is reduced to processing only what appears in foveal vision, staring fixedly at the written characters and moving regularly and steadily across the page. When an ocular fixation ends, the reader’s mind does not contain a series of words but a series of letters (and syllables) which must be combined to form words. Words are thus discerned compositely, by connecting letters into syllables and then dividing the chains of syllables produced into words according to syntax and context. Moreover, the reader of a text written in scriptura continua experiences the following difficulty: sometimes, because of an ocular fixation that ends in the middle of a word, that word remains incomplete in the reader’s mind since not all the component syllables have been deciphered. Therefore, the function and the identity of the fragmentary word is uncertain until the following fixation uncovers the next part. This process becomes even more complicated when one takes into account the relative freedom of word-order in Classical Latin (particularly verse) whereby words and phrases related syntactically were not necessarily juxtaposed.

The reaction to non-canonical separation such as that which occurs in aerated script is oral reading, because both the overt, physical pronunciation and the covert, slow, mental pronunciation facilitate the retention of a series of phonemes of ambiguous meaning. Scriptura continua obliges the reader to read aloud since oral reading aids the retention of the fragment of a word or phrase already phonetically realized in short-term memory while the cognitive process of recognizing syllables and words that is necessary for understanding the meaning of the initial part continues in the following section. It was by means of the ear that the reader decoded a text in scriptura continua, realizing the phonic values that the scribe had noted down even though the complex orthographic system that was employed to do so never resembled a phonemic transcription.

Saenger’s investigations confirm that the maximum separation ratio in ancient texts never managed to pass above 1:0.67 unities of space, a situation that was intensified by the lack of distinction between upper and lower case letters. Hence it was not possible to use a system of direct correspondences between morphemes and images as happens in reading Chinese characters, which allow direct visual access to the meaning, without the mediation of phonic articulations both physical and mental. The intellectual faculties of the early medieval reader were occupied by deciding if the chain of syllables that had been extracted from COLLECTAMEXILIOPVBEM was to be divided COLLECTAM EX ILIO PVBEM following Donatus (‘a people gathered from Troy’) or COLLECTAM EXILIO PVBEM according to Servius (‘a people gathered for exile’) (Manguel 1996: 47). Is it probable that as well as performing this task the reader also had to remember that OCCIDERIT was pronounced [ma'tare]? I do not wish to claim that this would be impossible but that, as it stands at present, the theory of logographic reading adds yet another level of complexity on top of those already in place. The study of the relation between Latin and its Romance descendents has suffered much through time by the imposition of anachronistic concepts. Is logographic reading another anachronism from which we should free ourselves?
Even many centuries later, a feature of the seventeenth-century documents studied by Williams (1994/5) is still the unstandardized conventions for word division and fusion that combined to compound the complexity of the reader's task. The outcome of the custom of not separating some elements while combining other must have frequently upset readers' initial expectations about the content of an upcoming passage, obliging them to retrace their steps and reanalyse what had been written; the Modern Standard Spanish renditions appear in square brackets following the italicised seventeenth-century versions:


(43b) … se quedaron a comer con migo [conmigo] el, el conde de Tolonjion su hermano El Marques Gonzaga, el Conde de Quincè, yal gunas [y algunas] otras Personas particulares …

(43c) … resguardando que la Plaza nunca vinie se acaer [viniese a caer] en manos de franseses …

(43d) Y q quedando el Duque obligado a todo lo que yo quiero de tenerla a la deboçion de VMgd dar paso por ella asus [a sus] tropas quando le huuiere menester y que la françia quede obligada enel [en el] mismo Articulo no solo ano [a no] ayudar al Duque, si no avnir [sino a unir] sus Armas con las de VMgd para casti garle [castigarle], siempre que faltare a lo que aora ofrece que daua [quedaba] VMgd tan dueño de la Plaza como lo es oy …

(43e) … representa a VMgd el consejo que por la restituçion de Bergas y de molicion [demolición] de la Basè, se hauia Juzgado por tratable el dar a st Omer si ellos se contentasen de añadir a estas dos Plazas la de Betuna, y con calidad que semejore [se mejore] de manera el Partido del Prinçipe a satisfacion de VMgd …

(From the correspondence of the Spanish Prime Minister, Don Luis de Haro, to Philip IV of Spain, 23rd September 1659, cited by Williams (1997: 268))

In those cases in the extracts where word division does not occur as modern readers would expect, it is necessary to return to the item and re-divide it seeking for another orthographic form within the collection of letters that the contextual restrictions will permit. In the absence of regular word spacing, it becomes very difficult to store a lexical item's written form in the brain — potentially several orthographic realisations of a lexical item in some cases — and be able to select the appropriate one on every occasion. The probability of a 'garden path' scenario occurring is very high and dependence on context and experience must have been essential for readers to have any chance of decoding a document successfully. As has been discussed above, the impact of undefined word boundaries proved crucial to the way in which medieval readers were able to approach their texts.

Additional features with very important impact on the ability to read logographically have been uncovered by Williams (1994/5) amongst the orthographic habits of these mid-
seventeenth-century Spanish writers, which she also applied to the context of medieval reading strategies. In Williams (1997: 266), as in Walsh (1991), she describes the high degree of variation amongst orthographic representations in these documents. Like Wright (1994a), she finds evidence of the high frequency of multivalent graphs/digraphs, with some possessing more than one value while others shared values with other, distinct graphs/digraphs (Williams 1997: 266). For example,

(44) Intervocalic $<r>$ and $<rr>$ represent both the voiced alveolar multiple vibrant /r/, e.g. $<virey>$, $<guerra>$, and the voiced alveolar flap /ɾ/, e.g. $<estaremos>$, $<querellas>$.

(45) $<ll>$ stands for the palatal lateral /ʎ/ in $<caballo>$ and, like $<l>$, the alveolar lateral /l/, e.g. $<estillo>$ /esˈtilo/.

(46) The digraph $<nn>$ is bivalent, either assuming the value of $<ñ>$, i.e. a palatal nasal /ɲ/, as in $<dannos>$ and $<daños>$, or it is an alveolar nasal /n/ the same as $<n>$, e.g. $<annulados>$.

(47) $<x>$ transcribes a voiceless prepalatal fricative $<execute>$ /eʃeˈkutəɾ/, as well as the sounds /ks/, /ɡs/ and /s/ which appear in $<exitis>$.

(48) $<qu>$ plus $<e>$ represents /k/, e.g. $<quedo>$, and also /kw/, e.g. $<quento>$ (MSp cuento).

(49) $<gu>$ followed by $<a>$ sometimes must be read as /ɡ/, e.g. $<entreguas>$ /enˈtregas/, but elsewhere it is /gw/ as in $<guante>$.

(50) The letter $<c>$ with $<a>$ usually is /k/, e.g. $<vaca>$, however, especially in drafts of documents, it should be interpreted as representing dental /s/ or the voiceless interdental fricative /θ/, e.g. $<balança>$ or $<balança>$.

(51) $<g>$ before $<a>$ is /ɡ/, e.g. $<vaga>$, and less frequently $<g + a>$ stands for a prepalatal fricative /dʒ/, e.g. $<eliga>$ (MSp eˈlija /eˈlixa/).

(52) $<ch>$ can be either /k/, e.g. $<choronas>$, $<chorónica>$, or /ʃ/, e.g. $<noche>$.

(53) Despite being differently distributed within words, $<u>$ / $<v>$ occur for /u/, e.g. $<mucho>$, $<vna>$, and the voiced bilabial fricative /β/, e.g. $<archiuo>$, $<varraca>$.

Confronted with the multiplicity of forms available in the orthographic tradition such as those listed above, amongst many more, all of which were sanctioned by scribal convention, a reader could certainly not depend on phonographic principles alone to guide him to the pronunciation of a word. But while it is true that in some situations he would be able to call on logographic techniques to interpret items in which the traditional spelling was fixed by custom and practice but which was not isomorphic with its reflex in the spoken language, logography can only really function well in a literary tradition that is sufficiently normative for standardised spellings to exist, and thus, besides the need for a high degree of visibility for iconic items within the text, Williams' (1997: 267) view of the
problems that such an unstable, multivalent orthography presents to a reader is worth citing at length:

(54) Precisely because of the unsystematic nature of orthography during this period, not only are spelling and pronunciation often anisomorphic, but, just as significantly, it is not unusual for a particular lexical item to have no fixed orthographic shape which can be stored in the brain as a single unit and retrieved spontaneously as part of the process of reading logographically. Put simply, many words are cloaked in a number of different orthographic guises and so it is essential to know, for instance, that the digraph <ch> in <chorona> and <archero> (which are also spelled <corona> and <arquero> [less frequent]) represents the phoneme /k/ rather than the voiceless prepalatal affricate. Similarly, the reader must know that <ll> in <estillo> and <illustre> (also spelled <estilo> and <ilustre>) does not represent a palatal lateral but an alveolar lateral. Failure to take account of the multivalent properties of such graphs and their overlap with other quite distinct graphs could easily throw the reader into confusion and lead him to conclude wholly erroneously that he was confronting unfamiliar vocabulary, which he then proceeded to misread as a result of assigning to the relevant graphs the wrong values. This suggests that successful readers of seventeenth-century diplomatic texts in Spanish often required a strategy that was neither strictly logographic nor strictly phonographic. In many instances at the level of the word and/or sound, the reader needed to carry in his brain multiple images. But whether this means that he would have had had in his head a separate image for each of the orthographic guises which a given lexical item might assume (complex logographic reading) or whether it means that he carried a set of images which allowed him to cope successfully with the intricate correspondence between sounds and graphs, including silent letters (complex phonographic reading) or whether he variously employed both strategies, it is difficult to say. What we can say with confidence is that memory and experience would have had crucial roles to play whichever of these strategies were employed.

As has been shown above in §2, Late Latin presents an even greater variability in conventions for orthographic values and techniques of separation than the seventeenth-century diplomatic documents studied by Williams (1994/5, 1997). How much more applicable, therefore, are her comments above to the period of early medieval writing under discussion?

4. A Case Study

Saenger's analysis (1997) provides a mechanism for investigation of whether logographic reading is a viable practice. If early medieval Iberian manuscripts were written in a ratio of 1:1.5 or less for the unity of space (see §3) then the logographic theory (see §2.1-2.2) can
be admitted; if not, we must seek out some other notion to explain grapho-phonemic relations since it will no longer be possible to have recourse to an orthographic system comprising highly abstract relations between written representations and spoken forms to account for how illiterate speakers of early, old, Romance vernaculars were able to understand the (formal) written language of the Latin literary tradition.

I examined five liturgical manuscripts written in Visigothic script from the ninth and tenth centuries from the British Library collection (B.L. Add. Ms. 30055, 30854, 30846, 33610, 30852) and two fragments from the eleventh century from Cambridge University Library (Add. Ms. 5906, INC.4.D.1.23 [2557]). I noted all spaces larger than 0.5mm both between words and within them (inter-letter and inter-syllabic spaces) and also those inserted around punctuation marks. Next I calculated the average width of a letter (using either <n> and <o> or <o> and <u> according to availability) and I compared this with the average general space, i.e. the average width of the spaces between words plus the average width of any spaces inside them; I also compared the average letter width with the average space that I found between words in order to discover what was the ratio of letter breadth to the size of space for each manuscript. This ratio would indicate whether it was probable or not that the manuscripts in question were read silently and thus the probability of logographic reading.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manuscript</th>
<th>Average letter</th>
<th>Average general space</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
<th>Average inter-word space</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>BL 33610</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1 : 1.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>BL 30846 (ll. 1-6 &amp; 13-23)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1 : 0.9</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>BL 30846 (ll. 7-13)</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1 : 1.05</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>BL 30852</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1 : 0.4</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>BL 30055</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1 : 0.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>BL 30854</td>
<td>(1.0mm)&lt;sup&gt;4&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1 : 1.3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.5mm)</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1 : 0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.0mm)</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1 : 0.7</td>
<td>0.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.5mm)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1 : 0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(3.0mm)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1 : 0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>Cam. UL 5905 (INC.4.D.1.23 [2557])</td>
<td>4.96</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>1 : 0.95</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>4</sup> The average breath of a letter is missing for this manuscript. However, only with the lowest hypothesised value for this variable would it be legible like a modern printed text, something that is not very probable if one compares it with the other values in this column.
As can be seen in the table, none of the manuscripts in the corpus investigated has a ratio for the unity of space within a letter to the unity of space between words that is equal to or higher than 1:1.5, while a further four manuscripts (b, g, c & a) have values (1:1.0, 1:1.0, 1:1.1 & 1:1.2) that could be interpreted as a sign that some passages approach legibility in the modern sense of exhibiting Bouma shape to some reduced extent. However, the irregularity of the word separation is likely to have impeded any attempt at silent reading considerably. Sometimes spaces are inserted between letters or between syllables that are as broad and ever broader than the spaces that divide canonical lexemes. The conventions of separating prepositions, pronouns and adjectives from the noun, in particular those that were monosyllabic, had not yet developed in full which made the process of identifying the words' boundaries even more uncertain and increased ambiguity.

At least for these texts, I believe to have shown that it was not the case that one read ‘by eye’ while one wrote ‘by ear’: in this format the reader needed to pronounce the whole text physically to process the phonological information that was necessary to access the content. It was not possible to go directly from the written image to the meaning since there was no image. It seems to me to be more likely that the reader would first analyse a text, reading by pronouncing according to a complex orthographic system. Once this had been carried out, a more fluent performance could occur, either muttering to oneself, or declaiming aloud to whatever audience was there. Thus the manner in which the text was deciphered would have been similar to that which the modern reader of English and French uses, i.e. combining various grapho-phonemic and grapho-morphological techniques to arrive at the phonological realization although, as we have seen above, the mental process is not the same for lack of canonical separation.

The most important difference in practice between the modern reader and the early medieval reader is that without this preliminary phase of praelectio in which the latter went along preparing the text, separating the words with diacritic signs (in the texts I analysed I did not find evidence for the practice of separation by written signs as happened in other manuscripts), the succeeding processes of understanding (lectio) or interpretation (enarratio) could not occur. The only other conceivable means that the reader might have coped with the intricacies of the orthographic conventions is if he knew the content of what he was reading extremely well and in effect only employed the text occasionally, as an aide mémoire to check that he was performing accurately. If he was confronted by a book written in scriptura continua or one of its aerated descendents with hierarchical blocks, the medieval reader could not read it aloud immediately: he could not be confident that he had identified the limits of the words, because these were not marked consistently with spaces. Therefore, he would have had first of all to realize the text acoustically so as to be sure that he had accessed the subject matter and thus to parse the strings of sounds into words. He could not just open a book and begin reading.

4.1. Conclusions

I do not believe that one should accept the idea of strictly logographic reading for the texts that I have analysed here. In my opinion, the logographic reading proposed by Emiliano
and Blake and pondered by Wright is not logographic in the same way as Chinese
characters are logographic or ‘morphographic’. Even when it was not isomorphic, the
relation between graphemes and phonemes was always much closer in the alphabetic
system inherited from Late Latin; the phonological aspect was always present:

(55) Unlike ideographic scripts, orthographic scripts encourage sound/letter
correspondences. If, as seems likely, no orthographic script reveals a total
absence of such correspondences, it should not surprise us to find that
correspondences are sometimes made which should not be made or that
that these should filter through into speech.

(Williams 1997: 269)

I prefer the notion of an alphabetic ‘polyvalent norm’ (Marquillas 2000), or the mixed
logographic and phonographic method suggested by Williams (1997), supported by the
analysis of the conventions to which every scribe had access in traditional writing. This
would function similarly to Modern English spelling which is characterised by a pervasive
morphemic instability in which seemingly arbitrary spelling alternations occur between
one form of a word stem to another, e.g.

(56a) [ˈspiː] <speak> ~ <speech>
(56b) [ˈhai-] <high> ~ <height>

Modern English spelling also possesses highly unpredictable patterns of purely graphic
inflection, e.g.

(57a) [p]: <gossip> ~ <gossiped> but <worship> ~ <worshipped>
(57b) [-ŋ]: <-ing> / <-eing> as in <rage> ~ <raging> but <age> ~ <ageing>
(57c) [-əʊz]: <-os> ~ <-oes>, e.g. <piano> ~ <pianos>, <potato> ~ <potatoes>

Identical orthographic letter-strings can also correspond to widely and wildly different
sound-values, leading to confusion that could lead to pronunciations that rhyme
<undermine> and <determine> (i.e. [ˈdɪˌmain] following [ˈændəˈmain], or [ˈændəmən]
following [dɪˈtʌmın]) (‘Regularity and Irregularity in English Spelling’, Simplified Spelling
Society, Pamphlet nº 15, p. 1).

Nevertheless, despite its complexity on the surface, Modern English spelling still
possesses a series of simple, phonographic principles that underlie the whole alphabetic
orthographic system. These become obvious in the event of creative acts, for example,
inventing new spellings with which one can transcribe neologisms, in writing
onomatopoeia, or when pronouncing non-English word and names.

5. Future Developments

Emiliano's notarial documents (1991) have not yet been analysed to discover the ratios
between the unity of space in the letter strokes and the unity of space that was inserted
between words, if the latter were employed at all. However, I would suggest that my
evidence points towards confirmation of the hypothesis that logographic reading was not used for reading texts aloud in the earliest period of Latin textual production in the Iberian Peninsula (ninth and tenth centuries). Nonetheless, for the moment, I do not wish to make predictions about the possibility or otherwise of the use of logographic reading either for later, formal, Iberian texts (e.g. late twelfth and thirteenth centuries), or for notarial documents from any period; I have no data at this stage of my research against which to further test my hypotheses. Furthermore, I should point out that the manuscripts in the British Library are not notarial documents like those Emiliano (1991) used to develop his logographic hypothesis. Unfortunately, this kind of text cannot (as far as I am aware) be found in the U.K. I selected the texts that I did for the present corpus because they are works that possess a high incidence of archaic words due to their age, and because they are missals, homilies and monastic rules, they would have been read frequently to congregations. The next phase in my investigation will be the expansion of the corpus to include examples of documentation from a wider period and to examine the conventions for separation in notarial documents.

References


APPENDIX: Palaeographical Details of Texts Analysed

B.L. Add. Ms. 30852


B.L. Add. Ms. 30055

A collection of monastic rules. Vellum; 237 folios. Written in Spain in Visigothic letters; with ornate initials.

[p. 8r, col. II, ll. 7-11]


[p. 122v, col. I, ll. 18-22]

3. ‘Precepta patris nostri sancti Pacomi hominis dei qui fundavit conversationem cenobiorum as [sic] principio per mandatum dei’: precedes the preface to St Jerome and a Life of St Pachomius. The rules pertain to the first series (Migne, Patrologia, vol. xxiii, col. 65), the chapter ‘De virginem monasterio’ beginning ‘Nemo ad cas uadat’ (ibid., col. 86), the series ‘Quo modo collecta fieri debeat’, etc. (ibid., col. 77), and the series beginning ‘Plenitudo legis’ (ibid., col. 81). Ends with an epistle of St Pachomius ‘Ad Sirum patrem monasterio Cenum et Ihohannem prepositum domus eiusdem Monasterio’ (ibid., col. 91). Folios 117b-142.

[p. 210, col. I, ll. 1-10]

6. ‘Regula beati Isidori episcopi Hispalensis’. Imperfect, ending in the middle of chap. iii. [ii.] ‘... de abbate’. Two folios are missing between this and the next section.

B.L. Add. Ms. 30854

[p. 9r, ll. 1-3; p. 59r, ll. 10-12; p. 123v, ll. 15-18; p.182r, ll.7-13]

B.L. Add. Ms. 30846

[p. 2v col. 2 ll. 1-6 & 13-23]

Contains masses for the Easter period from the second day of Easter until Pentecost. Tenth century manuscript from Santo Domingo de Silos. 173 folios.

B.L. Add. Ms. 33610


*Liber Iudicorum*. Single folio

*Cambridge U. L. Add. Ms. 5905 (fragmento 2) in INC.4.D.1.23 [2557]*

The initial line is the end of the Gregorian collect for the Christmas vigil in the office of the Roman Rite. It is most likely that this is the prayer that ended the hour of nones. The rest of the text comes from the office of Christmas vespers according to the Roman rite (Brou 1950: 139). The second fragment can be found at the end of the Christmas homily by St Gregory (*Liber I Homiliarium in Evangelia*, hom. VIII: *Quia largiente Domino...*, no. 2: Mauriste edition, t. 1 *Opera Omnia* of St Gregory, col. 1462b; or Migne, *Patrologia* vol lxxvi, coll. 1103-5). Even today, the beginning of this homily constitutes the seventh lesson for Christmas matins in the Roman Breviary (Brou 1950: 141).
Gender and the Interpretation of Pronouns in French
A view from Relevance Theory*

Paul Hedley

This paper is primarily intended to consider the role of grammatical gender on French pronouns in the process of their interpretation in utterance contexts. I will first discuss the theoretical context which underlies my general account of pronominal interpretation, the cognitive perspective of Relevance Theory, and sketch the bare bones of that account. I will then move on to a fuller discussion of grammatical gender on pronouns, its effect on interpretation and its representational status, using French as a test-bed, and taking psychological and psycholinguistic data into account. I conclude that in terms of their semantics, French pronouns carry primarily procedural meaning which has a fundamentally pragmatic effect on interpretation, but that gender is conceptual, and as such contributes in a rather different fashion both to the semantics of the pronoun, and to the process of its interpretation.

1. Concepts, Language and the Mind

At some level it seems incontrovertible that linguistic interpretation is a cognitive process, and as such a theory which intends to explain and account for it must have some cognitive component at the very least. For Relevance Theory, the cognitive perspective is fundamental, both in terms of its context, and its application. In the sphere of pronominals and their interpretation in particular, this cognitive view seems a fruitful path to follow: greater generalisations regarding usage and interpretation seem to be accessible, and we find ourselves in a position to ask different, deeper and more interesting questions, as well as receiving somewhat fuller answers. Similarly, when one tries to think about a linguistic feature such as grammatical gender, particularly if that feature has clear surface realisation in a particular language, it seems that to ignore the cognitive side of things is to avoid grasping the central concern of accounting for linguistic interpretation. For a speaker of a language that makes use of grammatical gender, the strategies used for interpretation are likely to make use of that feature to a greater or lesser extent. In considering pronouns, it may be that such information is categorical, directly constraining the process of reference resolution. Alternatively, speakers might use it as a guide, as evidence to weigh in order to successfully resolve the speaker's intended reference. Either way, such processes take place against the backdrop of a fundamentally cognitive system, and one in which hearers as well as speakers bear a significant responsibility for successful communication.

Relevance Theory takes the reasonably uncontroversial view of the mind as involving representations of some kind which are manipulated by the mental computational

* This paper draws on a paper I gave at the Durham Postgraduate Conference in July 2004 entitled ‘Pronouns, Procedures and Relevance Theory’. Thanks to Stephanie Pourcel, an attendee of the talk, who drew my attention to the work of Boroditsky et al. (2003), which led to this extension and application of the approach put forward in that original paper.
apparatus. If such mental representations do take the form of concepts at some level, as many have argued,1 our mental computational apparatus must include some system for the manipulation of those concepts. Applying such a picture to the processes of utterance interpretation results in a clear bipartite model, involving two fundamentally different types of process. As Wilson & Sperber (1993 :1) put it:

a modular decoding phase is seen as providing input to a central inferential phase in which a linguistically encoded logical form is contextually enriched and used to construct a hypothesis about the speaker's informative intention.

Clearly, these two processes must be of a radically different nature, one based on the decoding of the linguistic signal into conceptual representations, and the other appealing to cognitive faculties of inference in order to reason towards a rational hypothesis concerning the intended meaning of that signal, and its import (relevance) to the individual(s) concerned. But what about the relative importance of these two processes in relation to each other? Many have argued, perhaps beginning with Grice (1967), that a significant amount of inferential processing is needed in order to interpret utterances, particularly in terms of the notion of implicature,2 a position which is now widely accepted by linguists of widely differing outlook. However, one of the key advances of Relevance Theory is the demonstration that such inferential processing is not just a factor in the construction of implicatures, i.e. in the field of the implicit. Carston (2002) shows convincingly that linguistically encoded meaning underdetermines not only ‘what is meant’ by a speaker in a particular context (a point disputed by very few), but also ‘what is said’ or explicit,3 a point of view which she terms “The Underdeterminacy Thesis” (2002: 19). In short, she argues, inferential processing is not confined to implicit content (as Grice had argued) but also has a significant bearing on explicit content.

Consider the semantics of a pronoun, say *il*, for a moment. Apart from some sort of gender information (which I will come to later) and some notion of the type of linguistic element such a lexical item may replace or stand for, we seem to be able to say little about what *il* might mean — a situation that is strikingly different from most nouns. All speakers seem able to do is indicate the referent in the particular usage at hand: ‘*il, ça veut dire Thierry*’.4

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1 Aitchison (1994) to name but one.
2 In brief, the implicit content of an utterance.
3 There is substantial debate as to whether notions such as ‘what is said’ have any real place in theorising of this sort, particularly as such a concept has turned out to be so problematic to define. Grice clearly felt that some notion of ‘what is said’ was of central importance, and much of the Neo-Gricean camp follows this view (notably Levinson 1995, 2000; Bach 1994a, b also bases his approach on such a construct). Relevance theorists however do not accept that any notion of ‘what is said’ is needed to interpret utterances, nor that human beings actually have or use such a level of representation (see particularly Carston 2000).
4 “*il* means Thierry”. It might also be interesting to investigate whether native speakers of a language like French whose grammar is comprehensively taught in schools are able to come up with a more satisfactory definition of a word like *il* than speakers of British English, for example, could for the corresponding English pronoun.
So, what do the truth conditions for a sentence like (1) look like?

(1) *Il porte un pyjama.*

Clearly, this is true iff the person referred to by indexical *il* is indeed wearing pyjamas. It seems that it is the referent of the pronoun which enters into considerations of truth or falsity, and not the pronoun itself. The proposition expressed thus contains the referent of the pronoun, raising the interesting question of whether any of the semantics of the pronoun itself (if it has any actual semantic content) survive, and show up on the surface. We shall return to this later on. For the moment however, the key consequence to be drawn from all this is that pronoun resolution must take place prior to any level of propositional evaluation. We are seeing inferential pragmatic processing here, the output of which enters into the proposition expressed.

What are speakers doing when they interpret a pronoun like this one? Intuitively they seem to be following a heuristic along the following lines:

Accept the first candidate referent that yields an overall interpretation that is relevant.


However, we clearly want to be rather more explicit than this regarding the nature of the sub-processes involved in the assignment of such reference to a pronominal, and the contribution of the pronominal itself. In a system as complicated and sophisticated as that needed for utterance interpretation, it seems likely that any information accessible either from the content of the particular linguistic item, or from the context that is potentially relevant to interpretation will be made use of in the interpretative process. This is particularly clear in cases of reference resolution, where accompanying gesture and physical indication, and the immediate physical and linguistic contexts can all have a significant role in fixing referents for items like pronominals. Sperber & Wilson (1986/95) argue that cognitive processes in general are geared towards maximising relevance, defined thus by Carston (2002: 44):

relevance is a property of the inputs to cognitive processes (whether perceptual or higher-level conceptual); it is a positive function of cognitive effects and a negative function of the processing effort expended in deriving those effects.

In short, an utterance is relevant if it achieves a cognitive effect, and as it is the speaker's prerogative to make his utterance worth the attention of his intended addressee, the claim is that any ostensive stimulus (a paradigm case being linguistic communication) carries a presumption of its own relevance. This is known in the theory as the (Communicative)
Principle of Relevance. The extension of this principle is the assumption that an utterance (and the linguistic items within it) will achieve relevance in certain ways which the speaker might manifestly have foreseen, and which the hearer can safely assume were so predicted by the speaker. So, it seems reasonable to claim that a speaker's utterance of a pronoun will achieve relevance by uniquely picking out an accessible individual from the context, so satisfying the hearer's expectations of relevance. It also seems reasonable to suggest that features of the pronoun selected will aid the hearer in its resolution in a predictable way (predictable indeed by the speaker himself). Grammatical gender is, of course, a paradigm case of such a feature which undoubtedly has an effect of some sort on the process of interpretation. It just remains to show how hearers interpret such items, satisfying their own expectations of relevance, what sort of ‘sub-elements’ exist in pronominal representation which aid the process of interpretation (if any), and the nature and effects of those elements.

2. Content and Character, Concepts and Procedures

In terms of the semantic side of the divide, Kaplan (1989) provides an interesting point of view on these issues: he distinguishes between the ‘content’ and the ‘character’ of lexical items. For pronominals, ‘content’ is the individual, and ‘character’ refers to a rule for identifying the content of such an expression in any given context. Wilson & Sperber (1993) reformulate this distinction, in terms of a opposition not within some concept of ‘meaning’, but between two different types of encoded meaning: conceptual meaning and procedural meaning. The crux of this argument is the pronoun I in the following sentence:

(2) I do not exist.

Kaplan argues that if I means ‘the speaker of this utterance’, such a sentence would be necessarily false — its truth conditions being that the sentence is true in any situation where the speaker of the sentence does not exist, a distinctly counterfactual circumstance. What we are seeing in this analysis is an instantiation of the direct encoding of the concept of ‘the speaker’. If, however, I is treated as an instruction to the hearer to identify the referent of the pronoun by first identifying the speaker of the utterance, i.e. a procedure, we do not have such a problem: I would be used here to refer to an individual, and the sentence would most likely come out false, but would not be necessarily false.7 As Wilson & Sperber claim, Kaplan's distinction is a striking forerunner of the conceptual/procedural one in Relevance Theory, and indicates that treating such pronominal elements as encoding procedures rather than concepts looks very much like the way we want to go, particularly as the reformulation accounts straightforwardly for the fact that pronominals do not appear in explicit propositional content: their meaning is computational, not representational, and so is not the sort of meaning that would or indeed should show up.8

7 For Kaplan (1989: 523), ‘they [indexicals] “determine” the content (the propositional constituent) for a particular occurrence of an indexical. But they are not “part” of the content (they constitute no part of the propositional constituent)’.

8 Kaplan, of course, still needs some sort of ad hoc mechanism to prevent the ‘character’ from showing up in truth-conditional content — perhaps a feature along the lines of Recanati’s (1993) REF feature.
The theoretical notion of procedural meaning has been developed primarily by Diane Blakemore (1987 onwards) in relation to the account of the two-phase process of utterance interpretation discussed above: decoding and inference. In such a model based on a Fodorian representational–computational system and governed by principles of relevance, this idea of another kind of meaning seems to find a natural home. If the inferential phase plays as significant a role, as the evidence seems to suggest, it may not be immediately obvious to a hearer how the speaker intends his utterance to be interpreted, and which contextual assumptions should be used to derive what sorts of effects. Therefore, Blakemore argues, one might expect that languages and human users of those languages would have developed some means by which the hearer might be guided towards the intended context and cognitive effects in the first instance, and thus towards the speaker's intended meaning. On this formulation then, procedural expressions reduce the processing effort required on the part of the hearer by limiting the range of potential hypotheses that must be evaluated concerning the intended meaning, thus contributing to the overall relevance of utterances.

Wilson & Sperber (1993) cite one piece of direct evidence for this conception of linguistically procedural items in discourse. Under this general cognitive view of language and understanding, it seems plausible to claim that human thoughts are structured strings of concepts, and that human beings can typically be conscious of their thoughts. From this perspective, utterance interpretation can sensibly be categorised in terms of the formation and manipulation of conceptual representations, as put forward above. So, if we accept that the semantic distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning does indeed reflect a particular cognitive opposition (representation vs. computation), it follows that the meaning of a linguistic expression that encodes conceptual information should be mentally accessible, in the sense that a speaker should be able to bring it to mind. Native speakers of any particular language generally do have specific ideas about the meanings of lexical items in their language, or the concepts invoked by them. However, there are also computational processes that occur in the mind to which human beings do not seem to have such direct access: namely phonological computations, syntactic computations, or indeed the inferential computations used in the comprehension of utterances. Blakemore's account predicts that the 'meanings' of linguistic items which encode procedural information should be very difficult to 'bring to consciousness', and this is what we seem to find.

If ‘now’ or ‘well’ encodes a proposition, why can it not be brought to consciousness? […] The procedural account suggests an answer […]. Conceptual representations can be brought to consciousness: procedures cannot. We have direct access neither to grammatical computations nor to the inferential computations used in comprehension.

(Wilson & Sperber 1993: 16)

While this argument was originally proposed in terms of non-truth-conditional expressions like discourse connectives, it seems that items like pronouns have a very similar status in cognitive terms. In a particular context, speakers will quite happily provide a ‘definition’
of *il*, relating to a specific referent in the discourse or situation, use the verb *mean* to do so. While this is a clearly non-technical use of *mean*, we do not want pronominals to be infinitely linguistically ambiguous. As formal semanticists claim, there is a certain sense in which these expressions are ‘variable(s)’, though such a formulation tells us little either about the nature of the semantics of pronominals and the actual information encoded or represented, or the processes by which they are resolved. Heim & Kratzer (1998: 274-5 n.) for example have this to say:

If pronouns are listed in the lexicon at all, they are listed there without an index and as semantically vacuous items.

They, and many others, talk in general terms about assigning to the pronoun ‘the most salient individual that allows the hearer to make the most sense of the utterance’, but say little about either the processes by which that is accomplished, or how they define salience.9 It is precisely these underlying processes of reference assignment that concern me here, and what input to those processes linguistic features like gender might have. The idea of individuality turns out to be an important one too when thinking about concepts, as Powell (1998) argues. For him, the crucial question is whether or not we believe that a given concept is a ‘representation of an individual’ (Powell 1998: 13).10 He draws a distinction between *individual concepts* (those which we believe correspond to an individual in the world), and *general concepts* (those which we do not believe to uniquely represent such an individual). On this schema, each individual concept will contain one or more general concepts, making up a ‘dossier’ of information.11 To illustrate, a speaker might have an individual concept of ‘my best friend’, which would presumably be made up of a range of different sorts of information gained both by direct contact with that person, and otherwise (reports of other people etc.), and contain general concepts such as ‘friend’ and ‘best’ (and, most likely, the general concept ‘best friend’). This notion will turn out to be both intuitive and useful.

9 Salience is, of course, an extremely complex issue, and one that has puzzled psychologists and linguists alike. Intuitively, the idea is clear, but its definition and integration into any framework has proved extremely problematic (see Ariel 1990, Gundel et al. 1993, Almor 1996). Breheny, for example, in a paper on anaphoric pronouns, argues that pragmatic approaches while being on the right track, ‘are of questionable value unless a coherent story about salience or accessibility is provided’ (forthcoming: 5). It is interesting to note that many of the critics of Relevance Theory take this lack of an overt formulation for salience as counting against the paradigm, while Deirdre Wilson (personal communication) has indicated that Relevance Theory was neither designed to provide such a formulation, nor does it have need of one. A combination of general relevance theoretic principles and the comprehension procedure should do the job for us anyway.

10 This notion of individuality is clearly not confined to animate individuals, but is a ‘catch-all’ term intended to incorporate all items to which a speaker might refer, from plants and CD players to kangaroos and people.

11 Recanati’s conception distinguishes between ‘egocentric’ concepts (‘temporary dossiers dominated by non-descriptive (perceptual) information’, Powell 1998: 12), serving to register information gained in a certain way (i.e. primarily perceptually), and ‘encyclopaedic concepts’, seen as much more ‘stable, long term dossiers of predominantly descriptive information’ (*ibid.*).
3. Procedures and Pronouns

So, what might these procedural meanings for pronouns look like? I am going to make some suggestions here in meta-linguistic terms, alongside some arguments and examples. Firstly, let us consider the pronoun *je*. Using the idea of ‘individual concepts’ just introduced, and taking Wilson & Sperber's initial (1993) formulation (‘an instruction to the hearer to identify the referent of the pronoun by first identifying the speaker of the utterance’) as a starting point, the encoded procedure for *je* might look something like ‘find an individual concept of the speaker’. It would then be up to the pragmatic component to apply general principles of relevance and the application of the standard relevance theoretic comprehension procedure to arrive at the intended referent (most likely). 12 This procedure is characterised by Carston (2002: 143) as follows:

(a) Consider interpretations (disambiguations, reference assignments, enrichments, contextual assumptions, etc.) in order of accessibility (i.e. follow a path of least effort in computing cognitive effects).

(b) Stop when the expected level of relevance is reached.

Essentially, rather than being direct signals, utterances in general are seen as pieces of evidence about the speaker's meaning, which needs to be inferred by the hearer.

But how does such a conception help us deal with gendered pronouns such as English *he* and *she*, and French *il* and *elle*. Kaplan would probably see the semantics of English *he* as directly constraining reference to a male entity, but not appearing in the proposition expressed. However, Larson & Segal (1995: 214) argue that we should ‘treat gender as semantically inert’ in English, and consider it as providing only pragmatic guidance to the interpretation of such forms. They cite the situation of a speaker pointing to King's College London and uttering the following sentence:

(3) She is going to be closed over Christmas.

While the utterance is clearly anomalous in some way, it seems to be the case that the speaker has succeeded in fixing the referent of the pronoun through his overt gesticulation, and we do not seem to want to claim that the pronoun *she* could not possibly refer to King's. But, neither is the utterance straightforwardly false. Powell (1998) supports this conclusion using the case of Dr. James Barry, a prominent 19th century doctor, who was discovered after his death to have been a woman. Imagine the situation where Amy knows the truth, but her friend Ollie does not:

(4) Amy: When he was laid out after he died, they discovered that he was actually a woman.

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12 One of the other advantages of this sort of approach is that it can account for instances of misunderstanding, miscommunication, error and sloppiness through considerations of relevance and the application of the comprehension procedure.
This example shows that the natural way to refer to this individual is using a pronoun with some sort of ‘maleness’ feature, despite the fact that the referent of that pronoun is actually female. (Substituting she gives a rather odd result, making the fixing of the referent on the part of the hearer extremely difficult.) In short, it looks rather like such gender features on English pronouns are not categorical, but rather are interpretative aids, or instructions to the hearer as to the best way to resolve the reference of the pronoun as intended by the speaker, i.e. they look distinctly procedural. Adopting such an approach would seem to give us a very natural way of integrating these ideas into the theory, and of accounting for such problematic data.

So, the procedural formulation for English he might look something like this:

*find an individual concept with the feature ‘male’*

Thus, presented with an utterance containing the pronoun he, Ollie can assume that Amy intended him to use some property of maleness in his search for the intended referent of the pronoun. He is also justified in narrowing the range of his search to individual concepts, whether pre-existing or formed ad hoc, containing the information ‘x is male’ (i.e. the range of concepts he takes to be concepts of male individuals). The oddness of the variant of the above example using she is also straightforwardly accounted for in this picture by standard relevance theoretic principles. Such a speaker would be presenting her hearer with the property of femaleness as an interpretative signal, so through the presumption of relevance, justifying a search of individual concepts of whatever sort containing the feature ‘female’ on the part of the hearer. However, Amy's intended referent for the pronoun contains the information ‘x is male’ at this point in the mind of the hearer, resulting in gratuitous processing effort on their part, and so failure of optimal relevance, and probably of the process of pronoun resolution itself.

However, where does such a picture leave us with regard to languages that exhibit phenomena of grammatical gender? English, while exhibiting tripartite differentiation in pronominal gender, at least in the 3rd person singular, does not manifest adjectival gender agreement in any significant way, and inanimate nouns are unmarked for gender. A language like French does not lend itself to the English type analysis very well at all. French gives a choice between only two pronouns (masculine ~ feminine), adjectival agreement for gender is mandatory, and all nouns are overtly gendered.

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13 Features like animacy look rather like this too.
14 Of course, such categories, and any properties that may be within them, are linguistic constructs.
15 One might argue that they are simply neuter, but this debate does not affect the argument here.
16 While this gendering does show up on articles, it would also be true to say that overt marking of gender normally only appears in agreement patterns on words other than the noun whose gender is in question. (Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this observation.)
3.1. Gender Systems

We seem to have need of some background here about gender systems in languages, and about the French gender system in particular, a good starting point being Hockett's (1958: 231) definition of gender:

Genders are classes of nouns [recognised by being] reflected in the behaviour of associated words

This underlines the fundamentally classificatory nature of gender systems in language, but, in its quest for generality, it fails to mention semantics. That there is some link, however slight, between grammatical and semantic gender is virtually irrefutable, given that male and female, masculine and feminine go hand in hand across a wide variety of the world's languages. The issue is how far this semantic side of the debate goes, which at one level is primarily a language-specific rather than a general issue. Many languages incorporate systems by which gender is assigned according to the meaning of a noun, either in strict semantic terms, or according to principles of exclusion (where a positive assignment rule is accompanied by an elsewhere condition). The fact that the English word *gender* derives from the Old French *gendre* meaning ‘kind’ or ‘sort’ (and from Latin GENVS before that) indicates that while gender classifications often have some similarity to real-world distinctions of sex, such an association, while often important, is rarely sufficient. Indeed, as Corbett (1991) states, French is generally regarded as possessing one of the most opaque gender systems in the world's languages, assignment not being generally predictable on semantic or morphological grounds. However, Tucker et al. (1977) propose a gender assignment system for French, primarily based on phonological criteria, and more specifically on word-final phones, or pairs of phones. They claim that laying aside the semantic and morphological assignment rules and treating them as exceptions (though exceptions that take precedence), the gender of about 85% of French nouns can be predicted. Interestingly, they also cite experimental data to support their hypothesis, which indicates that deaf children who learn to speak French do not learn to assign nouns to gender, for if the rules are phonological, such data is not available to those language learners (Tucker et al. 1977: 59). This particular area of debate pinpoints the central question of what grammatical gender is, and whether it is calculated by speakers on the hoof, or forms part of lexical representation in some way. It is this cognitive side that I want to look into: the representational status of gender. Whether work is conducted on pronominal forms and extended to other lexical items, or vice versa, the issue is the same.

17 Dravidian languages such as Tamil, for example (Corbett 1991: 8).
18 Diyari is like this, where nouns denoting females are feminine, and nouns in the semantic residue are masculine (Corbett 1991: 13).
19 Of course, this is not to say that French does not have semantic or morphological assignment rules, characterised thus by Tucker et al. (1977):

**Semantic assignment rules**

1. Sex-differentiable nouns denoting males are masculine.
2. Sex-differentiable nouns denoting females are feminine.

**Morphological assignment**

1. Compound nouns formed from a verb plus some other element are masculine.
3.2. The French Situation

Let us take example (3) above, about King's College, and consider its French equivalent:

(5) *Elle sera fermée pour Noël.*

In such an utterance with the corresponding gesture as described above, the pronominal would most likely be unproblematically interpreted as referring to the university, *(l'université, f.)*. However, if we substitute the masculine pronoun *il*, the hearer is left looking for a potential referent. The key difference here seems to be that *il* cannot refer to King's. The hearer could potentially make sense of the utterance by fixing the referent of the pronoun and its accompanying gesticulation as *le batiment/l'immeuble* (‘building’, m.), and by extension take the utterance describing the closure of the building to entail the closure of the university, but that is not the same situation as the claim we were considering earlier, that the pronoun is not excluded from referring to King's. Of course, this latter case is comparable to the English one in another way: use of the pronoun *il* would result in the forcing of gratuitous processing effort on the part of the hearer, and so fail the test of optimal relevance. However, we should not let that distract us from the conclusion to be drawn here, that we are looking at a fundamentally different situation: it seems that the pronoun cannot be interpreted as referring to King's, and that we have a clear opposition in need of explanation.

There is an increasing body of psychological and psycholinguistic work on the subject of gender that suggests that grammatical gender may actually affect meaning for speakers of a particular language, i.e. that mental representations may be influenced by abstract linguistic (and indeed language-specific) notions such as grammatical gender. Efforts to assess this weaker, less deterministic view of the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, (the question ‘does language shape thought?’), have proved extremely problematic and produced wildly varying conclusions in different studies. In terms of specific work on gender, some early studies in the field such as Jakobson (1966) and Sera et al. (1994), though perhaps methodologically flawed, seem to indicate that there may be some truth in the idea of gender having some semantic reflex. Days of the weeks were consistently personified according to their grammatical gender by Russian speakers (Jakobson 1966), and Spanish speakers similarly classified pictured objects according to whether the word for the object depicted was masculine or feminine (Sera et al. 1994). However, such results from monolingual tests have been questioned in terms of their cross-linguistic applicability, and neither is it clear that the effects of experience with a particular language on thought, can be extended to mental processes in any wider sense.

Boroditsky et al. (2003) aim to address this shortcoming by trying to observe ‘a crosslinguistic difference on some more covert measure in a non-language-specific task’ (2003: 67). They report a (2002) experiment conducted entirely in English, in which Spanish and German speakers were taught proper names for objects in English, and had

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21 Compare Slobin (1996) and Li & Gleitman (2002) for example.
their memory for these names tested. (The example they give is of an apple being called *Patrick.* ) The objects chosen were selected so as to have opposing grammatical genders in the two languages, and the name assignment controlled so as to be either consistent or inconsistent with the grammatical gender of the object's name in the native language of the participant. As they predicted, memory for gender-consistent pairs was better than for inconsistent pairs for both sets of speakers: participants showed opposite memory biases. A control group of native English speakers however showed no such bias, performing as well as the Spanish and German speakers on gender consistent items, and significantly better on inconsistent ones. How are we to interpret such results? Are such interference phenomena indicative of something fundamental going on at the level of mental representation of gender? Boroditsky et al. (2003: 69) certainly think so:

> Since both groups performed the task in English, it appears that the semantic representation of gender (once it has been established) is not language specific. Objects do appear to have conceptual gender, and this gender is consistent with the grammatical gender assigned by language.

The conclusion I particularly want to pick up on here is the idea of conceptual gender. As I stated above, Relevance Theory takes the reasonably uncontroversial view of the mind as involving representations of some kind which are manipulated by the mental computational apparatus:22 a position often couched in terms of concepts. As Aitchison (1994) states, whether or not we want to accept an abstract layer of concepts as separate from word meaning, it is generally assumed that words are linked to things in the world via concepts, though it is far from clear what might ‘count’ as such a concept. Most nouns clearly have some sort of concept associated with them, as is evidenced by the accessibility of definitions for such lexical items:23

**faucon** n.m. 1. *Oiseau rapace diurne, au bec court et crochu et aux ailes pointues.*24

*Le Petit Robert 1993 s.v. facon*

Speakers of French obviously have a concept FAUCON,25 but it is much less clear that they have a concept IL in the same way at all. The ‘meaning’ of *il* in a context depends on who *il* refers to. What I am interested in here is the process by which speakers work out this referent (clearly a cognitive process in some sense), and the role of linguistic and non-linguistic cues in that process.

As I argued above, we seem to want to ascribe procedural meaning to such pronominal elements, meaning which plays the role of aiding resolution by providing evidence to point the hearer towards the intended referent for that pronoun. However, the conclusion that seems to be presenting itself from the evidence discussed is that in

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22 An approach developed by Fodor (e.g. 1983) and others.
23 See also the discussion above regarding mental accessibility and conceptual vs. procedural meaning.
24 ‘*Hawk* n.m. 1. Diurnal bird of prey with a short, hooked beak and pointed wings.’
25 I adopt the general convention of using block capitals to refer to mental concepts rather than linguistic items.
languages where grammatical gender exists (and has a surface reflex etc.), we seem to have a different situation from that described above for pronouns in English. Gender looks conceptual rather than procedural in these languages, a conclusion which would force us to revise our suggestion for what a French pronominal representation might look like. We have a distinctly more Kaplanian picture emerging here, where gender does seem categorical (unlike in English), with the resulting ungrammaticality rather than pragmatic infelicity in cases like that described above in examples (3) and (5). This is supported by the accessibility facts that I discussed earlier: while we can say little about the ‘meaning’ of il, the one thing we can be clear about is the gender (whether natural or grammatical) of the individual being referred to. The crucial difference between languages like French which have grammatical gender and those like English which do not, is that the linguistic interpretation system does not utilise the gender differentiation that does exist in the latter case precisely because it is not implemented across that language, and has no linguistic reflex. The formulation I would put forward for the procedural meaning of French pronominals is thus ‘find an individual concept’. The categorical gender feature thus plays a significantly different role in the process of interpretation in languages exhibiting grammatical gender from those which do not. Thinking in developmental terms for a moment, a child acquiring English will note gender differences and the meaningful distinctions to which they apply in the world (with the odd inanimate exception), but has no reason (or need) to take this any further. By contrast, a child acquiring French has no a priori reason to believe that grammatical gender oppositions do not indicate meaningful distinctions (despite the fact that to a significant extent they do not), given the fact that they have an overt linguistic reflex, just as phenomena like number do. And indeed, this conception of native speakers acquiring some system of conceptual gender which fits their native language is also supported by the claims advanced by Tucker et al. (1977) that there is such a system.

So, how are we to square this circle regarding the notion of pronominal gender, if we accept the conclusions of Boroditsky et al. that gender has some conceptual content, and given the clear difference between pronouns and most other common nouns? Well, it seems to me that we need to look at the representation of such elements in the theory as presented above. One of Powell's claims (2002: 24) is that indexicals ‘encode their status as individual concept communicators’, as well as some sort of property that plays the pragmatic role described in interpretation. It would seem to me that the most sensible conclusion to draw from this given our current theory and the cross-linguistic data would be to consider pronouns not as empty lexical items, (as Heim & Kratzer 1998 claim), but as pro-concepts, carrying some information to direct the hearer to the intended referent (procedural meaning), but where that referent seems to amount to something akin to Kaplanian ‘content’. In that sense, we might see them as the ultimate variable, dependant largely on context and pragmatic utterance interpretation strategies for their instantiation. Indeed, there is a pre-existing relevance theoretic construct which seems to have significant common ground with this idea — that of the concept schema (Carston 2002). The underlying issue that Carston is trying to address in proposing this approach is the nature of word meaning, the prevailing wisdom generally being that concepts encoded by lexical items provide a starting point for a pragmatic process, eventually resulting in a an
interpreted concept which differs (to a greater or lesser extent) from the lexical concept. She questions this idea of encoded concepts actually being fully-fledged concepts at all, proposing a picture whereby concept schemas act as pointers to a conceptual space, ‘on the basis of which, on every occasion of their use, an actual concept […] is pragmatically inferred’ (Carston 2002: 360).

Intuitively, this is precisely the sort of situation we have been discussing with pronominal elements, their context dependence, and the importance of pragmatic inference in their interpretation. The fact that Carston developed this approach in work on underdetermination, particularly in adjectivals, also provides us with a template for integration of conceptual material into such concept schemas. If the word heureux ‘happy’ encodes a particular concept HEUREUX which should provide communicative access to a wide range of other more specific concepts (relating to varying levels of bonheur ‘happiness’), that lexically encoded concept HEUREUX will be more general and abstract than any individual use of the word, while providing the bedrock upon which processes of pragmatic enrichment can build in order to create a more specific concept that satisfies expectations of relevance in a particular context, and that can be integrated into a hearer's representation of a speaker's thoughts. On this account, pronouns would operate in precisely the same way. For native speakers of those languages which exhibit grammatical gender, gender would appear as an abstract conceptual component of the underdetermined underlying representation, or concept schema, alongside the procedural meaning, making a complex semantics, while in those languages which do not exhibit such grammaticalised gender phenomena, pronominal semantics would look somewhat simpler. The role of gender in interpretation in the former cases would therefore be fundamentally different from that of the procedural meaning discussed above, but integrated alongside it in the semantic representation. Such an analysis would account not only for the fact that unlike in a language like English, the French pronominal in example (5) cannot be interpreted as referring to l'université, but also the psycholinguistic evidence presented by Boroditsky et al. (2003). In essence, what we are looking at is a linguistic constraint in such languages, and one that often has a surface realisation in things like agreement phenomena; in essence, a typological difference between languages like French and those like English. The fact that integration of pronominal elements into a much more general picture of the underlying semantics of lexical items is also straightforward, a claim that could not be made for many (if not most) theories of the semantics of pronominals, seems to be the icing on the cake. Pronouns no longer look like the oddball exceptions they have long been considered, but more like crucial threads in the fabric of an integrated linguistic system.

Conclusion

I have tried to show in this paper that if one takes a cognitive view on matters relating to the interpretation of pronominals, an interesting typological distinction emerges between those languages which have and utilise grammatical gender and those which do not. If
pronominals are taken to encode an element of procedural meaning which serves as evidence to guide the hearer towards the speaker's intended referent, the resultant system seems to provide an intuitive and plausible account of the general process of pronominal interpretation, (a fundamentally pragmatic, inferential process), as well giving an insight into the nature of pronominal representation and its sub-parts. The idea of gender as a conceptual element of underlying representation in languages like French also integrates into the idea of pronouns as concept schemas, needing substantial inferential processing for their resolution, and provides a much more uniform template for lexical representation that integrates pronouns into the larger linguistic system.

References


Paul Hedley


Perfect Pedigree
The ancestry of the Aromanian conditional

Martin Maiden

1. The Anomaly and its Interpretations

This study is concerned with an anomalous development in the inflectional history of the Aromanian1 verb, and its historical interpretation. I challenge the view that the anomaly reveals retention of an archaic morphological feature lost in all other Daco-Romance varieties, and suggest that it is a matter of common Daco-Romance inheritance, modified by some relatively unremarkable local innovations.

The oldest attestations of Daco-Romance, written in Romania in the sixteenth century, show the following synthetic tense-forms inherited from Latin (table 1):

Table 1: Synthetic tense-forms from Latin to old Romanian

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Old Romanian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>present imperfective indicative</td>
<td>present indicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICIT, FACIT</td>
<td>zice, face</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present imperfective subjunctive</td>
<td>subjunctive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICAT, FACIAT</td>
<td>zică, facă</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past imperfective</td>
<td>imperfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DICEBAT, FACIEBAT</td>
<td>zicea, făcea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>present perfective</td>
<td>preterite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIXIT, FECIT</td>
<td>zise, fece</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>past perfective (pluperfect) subjunctive</td>
<td>pluperfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIXISSET, FECISSET</td>
<td>zisese, fecese</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>perfective subjunctive and future perfective</td>
<td>conditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIXERIT, FECERIT</td>
<td>zisere, fecere</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Aromanian (also known as ‘Macedo-Romanian’, or ‘Vlach’) is spoken by half a million people, mainly in parts of northern Greece, Albania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Bulgaria. It constitutes the second most populous variety of the ‘Daco-Romance’ branch of the Romance languages, the others being: Daco-Romanian (with about 25 million speakers, mainly in Romania and Republic of Moldova), Istro-Romanian (spoken by at most 1500 souls in the Istrian peninsula of Croatia), and Megleno-Romanian (with some 5000 speakers principally in areas of Greece and FYR Macedonia to the north of the Gulf of Salonika).
The conditional is generally held\(^2\) to derive from the Latin perfective subjunctive and/or future perfective, which were already partially identical in form in Latin. It was used in old Romanian (cf. Ivnăescu 1980: 155f.) in the protasis of those conditional sentences whose apodosis contained a verb in the future, imperative, or present subjunctive, and it expressed the condition that will have to obtain in order for some other event to occur (‘if X should occur, then Y’). This function persists in Istro-Romanian (cf. Pușcariu 1926: 260; Kovačec 1971: 142), and in Aromanian (Capidan 1932: 471, 546-8).

To designate the formerly perfective tense-forms, which across all Romance languages retain strong formal similarities to this day, I use the acronym ‘PYTA’, taken from the Spanish grammatical label ‘perfecto y tiempos afines’. No modern Daco-Romance variety retains all three original Daco-Romance PYTA tense-forms (they have usually been replaced by various kinds of analytic structures). Istro-Romanian preserves only the old conditional; Megleno-Romanian has only the preterite; modern Romanian, and some Daco-Romanian dialects, preserve the preterite\(^3\) and pluperfect (e.g. Romanian zise, zisese), the conditional falling into desuetude by the mid seventeenth century (cf. Frâncu 1997: 139f.). Aromanian preserves the preterite (retaining obsolete vestiges of the old synthetic pluperfect — cf. Capidan 1906: 229; Wace & Thompson 1914: 253). Southern Aromanian dialects, in particular, also have the conditional (cf. Capidan 1932: 471-3), but its origin is moot. The Aromanian examples in table 2, from the verbs ‘do’ and ‘say’, are taken from Papahagi (1974):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1sg</th>
<th>2sg</th>
<th>3sg</th>
<th>1pl</th>
<th>2pl</th>
<th>3pl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pres.</td>
<td>fak</td>
<td>'fatsi'</td>
<td>'fatsi'</td>
<td>'fatsim'</td>
<td>'fatsits'</td>
<td>fak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzik</td>
<td>'dzitsi'</td>
<td>'dzitsi'</td>
<td>'dzitsim'</td>
<td>'dzitsits'</td>
<td>dzik</td>
</tr>
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<td>Impf.</td>
<td>føts'e'am</td>
<td>føts'e'aj</td>
<td>føts'e'a</td>
<td>føts'e'am</td>
<td>føts'e'ats</td>
<td>føts'e'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzitse'am</td>
<td>dzitse'aj</td>
<td>dzitse'a</td>
<td>dzitse'am</td>
<td>dzitse'ats</td>
<td>dzitse'a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pret.</td>
<td>'fetši0u'</td>
<td>fe'atsiʃi</td>
<td>fe'atsi</td>
<td>fe'atsim</td>
<td>fe'atsit</td>
<td>fe'atsirọ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>'dzıʃu'</td>
<td>'dzisifị'</td>
<td>'dzisi'</td>
<td>'dzisim'</td>
<td>'dzisit'</td>
<td>'dzisirọ'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cond.</td>
<td>føts'e'arim</td>
<td>føts'e'ariʃi</td>
<td>føts'e'are</td>
<td>føts'e'arim</td>
<td>føts'e'arit</td>
<td>føts'e'are</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dzitse'arim</td>
<td>dzitse'ariʃi</td>
<td>dzitse'are</td>
<td>dzitse'arim</td>
<td>dzitse'arit</td>
<td>dzitse'are</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^2\) I see no justification for Ivnăescu's peremptory assertion (1980: 158 n. 2) that those who think that the perfect subjunctive is the origin of this form ‘are wrong’. What is more likely to be involved is a fusion of the two tense-forms.

\(^3\) The preterite is nowadays restricted to literary registers of the standard language, but persists in various dialects, mainly of south-western Romania: see Moise (1977, 1978), Vulpe (1977), Grecu (1980), Beltechi (1994-95: 104).
The preterite continues the Latin perfect, and also continues the special root-allomorph which in many Latin verbs (especially of the third conjugation) characterized perfective verb-forms. The roots ōņē̄̄f eş- / ē̄̄f āts- and ōņē̄̄f dō̄̄s- / dō̄̄s- continue, respectively, Latin perfective FEC- and DIX-. The conditional, however, displays a reflex of the non-perfective roots, FAC- and DIC- (present also in the imperfect). At first blush this may seem a fairly banal development. Surely all there is to be said is that the (originally) perfective root has been analogically replaced in the conditional, but not in the preterite? This development is anomalous in that in all other Daco-Romance languages, indeed all other Romance languages (cf. Maiden 2000, 2001), if an originally perfective root allomorph (henceforth a ‘PYTA root’) survives in any one of the formerly perfective tense-forms, then it survives in all the others. Correspondingly, if any analogical change affects this root in one of the PYTA tense-forms, it affects it in in all of the others. Thus Romanian has the PYTA root equally (abstracting away from certain purely phonological variations) in preterite and pluperfect (e.g. a coace ‘to bake’, coapse ‘it baked’, copsese ‘it had baked’), while the analogical elimination of the old PYTA root fec- (for a face ‘to do’) affects preterite and pluperfect alike: fece, fecese > făcu, făcuse.

Although the principle of ‘coherence’ of the PYTA root across all formerly perfective tense-forms is apparently not explicitly stated in the Romance linguistic literature before Maiden (2000), it seems to be tacitly presupposed in various linguists' reaction to this anomaly, leading some to assume a ‘non-perfective’ etymology (see also the survey in Capidan 1932: 473). Ivănescu (1980: 160) states squarely that the Aromanian conditional form is derived from the Latin imperfect subjunctive (e.g. FACERET, DICERET), not from the future perfect/perfect subjunctive, arguing not only from morphology but, principally, from the fact that the Aromanian conditional has not only the ‘future restrictive’ sense of the Istro-Romanian and old Romanian conditional, but also a ‘present irrealis’ (or ‘present counterfactual’) meaning of the type ‘if he were here, we’d see him’, associated with the Latin imperfect subjunctive. In Ivănescu's view, Aromanian uniquely conserves a reflex of the Latin imperfect subjunctive, which has assumed the functions of the old conditional.

The problem with resurrecting the imperfect subjunctive is that it replaces one anomaly with a greater one. Aromanian now appears curiously deviant not only from other Daco-Romanian varieties but from most of Romance, by conserving an archaic

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4 There are a few residual exceptions, e.g. preterite ūf etc. ‘I was’ vs. conditional ūfurim etc. or he’arim etc., preterite ‘dēdu etc. ‘I gave’ vs. conditional dād’arim or ‘darim (see Papahagi 1974: 61f., 66f.).
6 Papahagi (1974: 67) speaks, instead, of fusion of the forms of the Latin imperfect subjunctive with those of the perfect subjunctive.
7 Philippide (1927: 430) states that Leca Morariu (in an 1888 study) derived conditional forms with the ‘PYTA’ root from Latin perfect subjunctive and future perfect, but conditionals lacking the PYTA root from imperfect subjunctives.
8 Ivănescu (ibid.) ‘... a avut loc o contopire a celor două forme de ireal şi viitor într-o singură formă verbală, care a păstrat formă imperfectului conjunctivului latin şi ambele sensuri, pe cind în dacoromână avem înălţarea formei şi sensului de ireal, rămânînd numai sensul de viitor’ (‘There has occurred a fusion of the two forms, irrealis and future, into a single verb-form, which has preserved the form of the Latin imperfect subjunctive and both its senses, whilst in Daco-Romanian we have removal of the irrealis form and the irrealis sense, with only the future sense remaining.’).
morphological feature of which there is virtually no trace anywhere else. In fact the only certain example in Romance is in Sardinian (Wagner 1939: 8-11). Clearly Aromanian is anomalous in respect of its conditional, but what kind of anomaly is really involved? I shall argue that what is involved is not a unique vein of morphological conservatism, but a relatively superficial local innovation on a form which is part of the well-attested common morphological stock of Daco-Romance.

2. Arguments Against Survival of the Imperfect Subjunctive

The argument from preservation of the imperfect subjunctive ‘feels wrong’, because it goes against what one observes if one compares the rest of the inflectional morphology of the four Daco-Romance varieties, namely that they are highly ‘cohesive’, even surprisingly so, given that they probably split apart a thousand years ago. It is hard to find any archaic feature which survives in only one attested variety, and it is hard to find any major innovation (other than those attributable to localized contact with other languages) unique to only one attested variety.

As an example of conservation of archaism, one might think of the remnants of the Latin pluperfect subjunctive, continued as a pluperfect indicative but now limited to southern and eastern Daco-Romanian dialects. Yet the form also survived in older forms of Aromanian (Papahagi 1974: 64). Istro-Romanian alone uncontroversially preserves the old conditional, but the same form is also attested in old Romanian. A feature of Daco-Romance which does not seem to me to have received anything like the attention it deserves is the occurrence of innovations — some of them apparently recent — which unexpectedly cross major dialect boundaries. For example, Aromanian has famously, and somewhat mysteriously, developed a morphological distinction (cf. Kramer 1986: 236) between an invariant form of the past participle, with the ‘feminine’ ending -ā, used in all analytic tense-forms, and the morphologically variable form (agreeing in number and gender with the subject), used in passives. But the same distinction occurs in some Megleno-Romanian varieties (cf. Atanasov 2002: 232-4), and an apparent primitive stage

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9 Zörner (2003: 217-19) discusses other possible remnants of the imperfect subjunctive in Gallo-Romance, but the evidence is far from convincing. Zörner does not show that any of the forms cited could not plausibly be derived either from Romance conditionals or from Latin pluperfect indicatives. See also Rohlfš (1968: 306-8). The Portuguese inflected infinitive, despite its superficial resemblance to the Latin imperfect subjunctive, is probably no more than an infinitive with enclitic person and number endings. Bartoli (1906: 404) mentions the possibility that the Vegliote future-conditional might derive from the Latin imperfect subjunctive, but rejects this hypothesis on the grounds that the only other example of such a survival is in far away Sardinia. With the possible exception of the verb ‘be’, the Vegliote future-conditional does not show any PYTA roots, but future-conditional is the only verb-form which continues a Latin perfective, so the analogical influence of the majority, non-perfective, forms may reasonably be invoked — without appeal to an underlying imperfect subjunctive form. As Bartoli somewhat censoriously puts it (405): ‘Die Ausgleichung mag teilweise der depravierten absterbenden Sprache zugeschrieben werden’ (‘The levelling must be ascribed to the corrupt nature of the dying language.’). The lack of PYTA roots in these verb forms actually leads Tekavče (1976-77) to ascribed the Vegliote future not to Latin perfectives, but to the Romance type historically comprising infinitive + auxiliary ‘have’.

10 Caragiu-Marioeanu (1969: 270 n. 4) also seems to take the line that the root of the Aromanian conditional is a recent, local, innovation, on the grounds of lack of parallels in other branches of Daco-Romance.
of it is to be found in dialects of north-west Romania, where the invariably feminine past participle occurs in analytic tense-forms formed with auxiliary ‘be’, but not when the auxiliary is ‘have’ (cf. Teaha 1961: 102). An innovation whose development within Daco-Romanian has been extensively charted, by Gheție and Teodorescu (1965, 1966), is generalization of the 3pl inflection -u into the 3pl of the imperfect tense (e.g. 3sg cânta ~ 3pl cânta > cânta ~ cântau). The phenomenon apparently originated in the Banat, perhaps in the late sixteenth century, and probably on the analogy of some present tense verbs such as auxiliary ‘have’ (3pl au). It subsequently spreads, patchily, to other parts of Romania. The first attestation in the literary language dates from the end of the eighteenth century. It is no surprise that two non-Daco-Romanian varieties do not participate in the innovation, but it is striking that a third, Megleno-Romanian, apparently quite isolated from Daco-Romanian, should have followed the Daco-Romanian development (cf. Capidan 1925: 162f.; Atanasov 2002: 240). I do not know how one explains this similarity, but it contributes strongly to the general impression of a type of linguistic cohesiveness where dialects do not ‘go it alone’ morphologically — and have probably had more contact and mutual influence over the centuries than is usually assumed.

Of course it is impossible conclusively to refute the hypothesis that Aromanian has inherited the Latin imperfect subjunctive form, but various facts make such an inheritance improbable. We need to look first at details of inflectional morphology, and specifically the desinences. Briefly, Daco-Romance possesses a set of inflectional desinences for person and number which are specific and unique to the originally perfective tense-forms. Each of the relevant endings appears to have originated in just one of those tense-forms, but any subsequent analogical spread to other tenses is virtually always limited to formerly perfective forms. The most salient case involves the third person plural preterite ending -ră, originally unique to the preterite, whose analogical extension in Daco-Romanian is limited to the other surviving ex-perfective form, the synthetic pluperfect (cf. old Romanian ajunseră ‘they arrived’, ajunsese ‘they had arrived’ > modern Romanian ajunseră, ajunseseră). Extensions of -ră to other verb forms such as the imperfect or the past participle can be shown to be rare and erratic exceptions that prove the rule (Maiden, in preparation, gives a detailed account). The history of -ră does not directly concern me here, but the second person inflections do. In Aromanian the endings of the second person, like that of the preterite, are singular -și and, usually, plural -t, and not -i and -ți as in other tenses. The same endings appear, indeed, in the obsolete synthetic pluperfect forms (cf. Capidan 1932: 463; Papahagi 1974: 60, 64). For example, table 3:

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11 Ștefan (1978: 41 n. 1) observes this fact, without commenting on its significance.

12 See Capidan (1932: 471-3) and Caragiu-Marioșeanu (1968: 126 n. 27) for variation between -t vs -ți in the Aromanian conditional. The preterite always has -t.
Table 3: Second person desinences in the Aromanian verb

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1sg</th>
<th>2sg</th>
<th>3sg</th>
<th>1pl</th>
<th>2pl</th>
<th>3pl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pres.</td>
<td>'portu</td>
<td>'portși</td>
<td>'pșarta</td>
<td>pu'rtam</td>
<td>pur'tatsi</td>
<td>'pșarta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impf.</td>
<td>pur'tam</td>
<td>pur'tați</td>
<td>pur'ta</td>
<td>pur'tam</td>
<td>pur'tatsi</td>
<td>pur'ta</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pret.</td>
<td>pur'tăți</td>
<td>pu'tată</td>
<td>pu'to</td>
<td>pur'tam</td>
<td>pur'tat</td>
<td>pur'taro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cond.</td>
<td>pur'tarim</td>
<td>purtarîți</td>
<td>purtar</td>
<td>purtarim</td>
<td>purtarit</td>
<td>pur'tari</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Plpf.</td>
<td>pu'tarim</td>
<td>pur'tasîți</td>
<td>pur'tase</td>
<td>pur'tasim</td>
<td>pur'tasit</td>
<td>pur'tase</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That the conditional shares distinctive endings with the preterite (and pluperfect) is strongly suggestive of a ‘common origin’ with these tense-forms, in that preterite and pluperfect uncontroversially derive from a Latin perfective tense-form. Daco-Romanian texts of the sixteenth century (cf. Densușianu 1938: 216-21) consistently show -t(u) in the preterite, the pluperfect and the conditional, i.e. in all and only the old Romanian tense-forms that derive from Latin perfectives. Almost without exception, a survey of modern Daco-Romanian dialects reveals that -t(u) occurs only in originally perfective tense-forms. The conditional is lost in modern Daco-Romanian, and relatively few dialects in fact preserve more than one original perfective tense-form, but a number of localities still fairly consistently show -t(u) in both preterite and pluperfect:

1. Turțucaia (ALR I): cântărătu ‘you sang’, cântăsețu ‘you had sung’; fusérătu ‘you were’, fusèsețu ‘you had been

2. Valea Lungă-Cricov (ALR II): cântărătu, cântăserătu, (but also fusérăți, fusèserăți)

3. Radovanu (ALR I) jucărăt ‘you played’, jucăserăt ‘you had played’

4. Certege (ALR): făcărătu ‘you did’, făcăsețu ‘you had done’

5. Almaș (ALR I): văzût ‘you saw’, văzūseț ‘you had seen’; făcût ‘you did’, făcūseț ‘you had done’

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13 The sole possible exceptions I have discovered are uncertain. Pop's data (ALR I) for the imperfect in Jdioara (point 79) and Colincăuți (point 398) have 2pl ved’et (question 2040) and făcet (question 2092). But these forms probably reflect both a tendency to confuse the two tense-forms, and a widely observable fluctuation between tense-forms which the highly unnatural requirement of ‘conjugating’ verb-forms can often be seen to provoke in uneducated informants. Some of the Aromanian dialects of Albania and Macedonia surveyed by Neiescu (1997, maps 102 and 103), show a 2pl of the type videătu, but this is likely in Neiescu's view (personal communication) to reflect a general tendency in these dialects to fuse imperfect indicative and preterite tense-forms.

14 Turțucaia lies in Bulgaria, and the ALR II data for this locality remained unpublished for political reasons. My thanks to Ion Mării and the staff of Institutul de lingvistică și filologie “Sextil Pușcariu”, for giving me access to them. The data for Munții Apuseni are taken from as yet unpublished materials from NALR Transilvania and NALR Crișana.
The origins of -t(tu) are an abiding enigma, and there is certainly no direct Latin antecedent. What virtually all attempted explanations share is the belief that it originated as a preterite inflection. Rosetti (1964: 131) and Rothe (1957: 92), following Densuşianu (1938: 221),\textsuperscript{15} postulate a development: DIXISTIS > *ziseste > *ziste (with syncope of [e]) > zisetu (on the model of 1pl zisemu). The appeal to syncope is ad hoc (cf. Graur 1968: 228), and does not explain why the 1pl should exercise an analogical influence only in this tense. Graur (1940: 208)\textsuperscript{16} proposes that on the basis of 1pl CANTAVIMVS, DIXIMVS, etc. there emerged analogical *CANTAVITVS, *DIXITVS, etc., whence cântatu, zisetu, but does not explain why this did not also happen in the present or imperfect. My own suggestion (see Maiden, in preparation) is that a reflex of Latin -STIS could have given way to -tu at an early date, on the model both of 1pl -mu, and of the probable original 3pl preterite inflection *-ru.\textsuperscript{17}

**Latin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PORTA(VI)MVS</th>
<th>&gt; *portamu</th>
<th>&gt; purtam(u)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PORTA(VI)STIS</td>
<td>&gt; *portasti</td>
<td>&gt; purtat(u)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTA(VE)RVNT</td>
<td>&gt; *portaru</td>
<td>*purtru</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In short, the fact that the other two plural endings in the preterite ended in ‘consonant + u’, encouraged the creation of -tu in the 2pl. In fact Meyer(-Lübke) (1885: 224; 1895: §267) appears to make rather similar suggestions.\textsuperscript{18} If this explanation is correct, the only tense form in which the relevant circumstances would have been met is the preterite. The evidence of certain modern dialects\textsuperscript{19} of Munții Apuseni perhaps preserves this original state of affairs, in that -t is systematically found in the preterite, but not in the pluperfect, which has -t:

(6) Valea Caselor (NALR Transilvania point 331): cumpărărat ‘you bought’, cumpărăset ‘you had bought’; avúrat ‘you had’, avúset ‘you had had’; stătúrat ‘you stood’, stătúset ‘you had stood’; cosirat ‘you reaped’, cosíset ‘you had

\textsuperscript{15} Şiadbei (1930: 338-42) and Densuşianu (ibid.) critically review some other attempted explanations. Comments on Şiadbei’s own, rather convoluted, explanation (1930: 342f.), which invokes avoidance of homophony and Slav influences, will appear in Maiden (in preparation).

\textsuperscript{16} Caragiu-Marioiu (1969: 264) seems to share this view.

\textsuperscript{17} I have to recognize that *-ru is not directly attested in Daco-Romance, the ending apparently having been replaced at an early date by -ră (perhaps influenced by a lost remnant of the Latin pluperfect indicative ending -RANT?). However that may be, the etymological source -RVNT predicts Romanian *-ru, and -ru(n) or -ro(n) is exactly what occurs in numerous other Romance varieties, such as Italo-Romance, Sardinian and Ibero-Romance. So postulating a form *-ru in the protolanguage is hardly outrageous. Interestingly, there is an example in *Psaltirea Scheiană of substitution of -ru (a 1sg ending of the old Romanian conditional), by -ră (cf. Ivănescu 1980: 155).

\textsuperscript{18} Old Campidanese (cf. Wagner 1939: 11-21) had a similar development, extending the 3pl preterite ending to the 1pl, so that -ru replaces original 1pl -mu. There are no data for the 2pl.

\textsuperscript{19} These data come from still unpublished materials of Noul Atlas Lingvistic Român pe Regiuni, Transilvania and Noul Atlas Lingvistic Român pe Regiuni, Crişana. I am grateful to Ion Mării and Doina Chiş for affording me access to them. Rather than attempt to reproduce (and possibly thereby traduce) the special phonetic script of the original, I have approximated them by using Romanian orthography, which is adequate for my purposes.
reaped’; vândurăt ‘you sold’, vândúset ‘you had sold’; cusürăt ‘you sewed’, cusúrăt ‘you had sewn’; fusărăt ‘you were’, fusése ‘you had been’

(7) Almaş (NALR Crişana point 117): văzút ‘you saw’, văzúsăt ‘you had seen’; tuşit ‘you coughed’, tuşisăt ‘you had coughed’; luát ‘you took’, luásăt ‘you had taken’; dădút ‘you gave’, dădisăt ‘you had given’; stătút ‘you stood’, stătúsaţ ‘you had stood’; avút ‘you had’, avusăsăt ‘you had had’.

What matters here is that all opinions, and all the evidence, point to the preterite as the source of -t(u). And all the evidence from Daco-Romanian dialects is that if -t(u) was analogically extended into other tenses, those tenses were always ones which continued Latin perfectives. If we place Aromanian in the wider Daco-Romance context, then the presence of -t as second person plural inflection is a clear indicator that the conditional is an original perfective tense form,20 cognate with the Istro-Romanian and old Daco-Romanian conditional, and not a remnant of the Latin imperfect subjunctive.

In some but not all Aromanian dialects, the 2sg conditional shares with the 2sg preterite the ending -şi.21 According to Capidan (1932: 472) this type is characteristic especially of the Albanian varieties and of Samarina in the Pindus mountains. The obsolete synthetic pluperfect forms (Capidan 1906: 206; Papahagi 1974: 60) also show -şi. Like -t(u) the origins of -ş(i) are murky. But like -t(u), -ş(i) appears in Daco-Romance dialects in some or all of the originally perfective tense-forms and never, so far as I can ascertain, outside these forms. The phonologically regular reflexes of Latin past perfective CANTA(VI)STIS and the pluperfect subjunctive CANTA(VI)SSES should be **cântaşti and **cântașă respectively (in fact, the form predicted for the pluperfect is actually the one that occurs in the preterite).22 The ending -ş(i) appears in all Daco-Romance dialects in the preterite, while most Romanian dialects have -ei (or -ăi) in the pluperfect (cf. ALR II map 2017; Avram 1973), -şi being common only in south-east Romania. There is a dearth of evidence to illuminate the historical development of -şi (cf. Avram 1973: 490 n. 20): Avram believes that the pluperfect in -ei is older, -şi having been analogically extended from the preterite (cf. also Melnik 1977: 117); in my own view (cf. also Şiadbei 1930: 335; Densuşianu 1938: 221; Rosetti 1964: 131), -şi is more likely to have been introduced from the pluperfect into the preterite, given that it is the expected outcome of the pluperfect. Whatever the exact mechanism,23 -şi clearly originates in one of the originally perfective forms, and its analogical extension is restricted to other formerly perfective forms. In fact,

20 See also Caragiu-Marioțeanu (1969: 271 n. 5).
21 Other varieties have -i, apparently under the influence of the 1sg and 3sg forms. See Caragiu-Marioțeanu (1968: 126).
23 The detailed mechanism is problematic. I propose:
   i. Original pluperfect in -şi (cântaşă)
   ii. Analogical introduction of -şi into the preterite (cântaşă)
   iii. Analogical introduction into the 2sg of the morpheme -se- characteristic of all other forms of the pluperfect (e.g., 3sg cântase, 1pl cântasem) (whence cântăseşă)
   iii. Subsequent (or simultaneous?) analogical introduction of the -i, characteristic of most 2sg endings (whence cântasei).
Aromanian is the only Daco-Romance variety in which -şi is attested in the conditional as well as the preterite and pluperfect.

Finally, I have rather neglected the mainstay of Ivănescu's case, which was that the Aromanian conditional, like the Latin imperfect subjunctive, had present counterfactual meaning. But I see no need to postulate continuity with the Latin form. Slippage between future and present time-reference is a recurrent feature of Romance languages, as of many others (cf. Heine & Kuteva 2002: 142f.): compare the Italian future tense form canterà (itself composed historically from an infinitive plus present tense auxiliary), which often, perhaps usually, functions in the modern language as a ‘conjectural’ present (‘maybe he's singing’), or indeed the restriction in the recent history of Italian of the synthetic conditional form (canterebbe) from future-in-the-past reference, to expression purely of non-past modality. That the Aromanian conditional should acquire a present counterfactual value is not difficult to understand if we bear in mind that the conditional as used with future-time reference in the apodoses of if-constructions already carries an implication of counterfactuality with respect to the time of utterance (‘if I get rich one day, I shall donate my entire fortune to the study of linguistics at the University of Oxford’ clearly implies that I am not rich at present). Indeed, the Aromanian texts published by Papahagi (1905) contain various examples where the conditional is interestingly ambiguous between future, and present counterfactual, meaning, e.g. s-puteárîm s-me-ascâp şi de aestă, tûti bûnili vrea s-le-am pri loc ‘if I could escape from this too, I would have all the good things on the earth’, where the sense, in context, seems to be equally ‘if I were able now’ and ‘if I should manage to’.

Ivănescu also seems to believe that the general Daco-Romance synthetic conditional, unlike the Aromanian form, could not have ‘irrealis’ meaning. But it appears to me that any verb-form with future reference, and especially one whose function is to express a condition that will have to have been fulfilled before some event can occur, necessarily lies outside the realm of the ‘realis’. But how important is the ‘present irrealis’ meaning of the Aromanian conditional, in fact? There is no necessary contradiction between Philippide's assertion (1927: 427) that this meaning of the conditional is ‘very rare’, and Capidan's (1932: 471) native-speaker judgement that the ‘basic meaning’ of this verb-form is ‘condiţionalul’, by which he clearly means ‘present counterfactual’. For Capidan may be referring to types and Philippide to tokens. The morphological conditional is the only

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24 Philippide (1927: 418) classifies this type of conditional as ‘potential’.
25 It is interesting to compare Aromanian with Dalmatian. The Latin future perfect appears to have survived in Dalmatian as a simple future (Bartoli 1906: 404), but there are various examples of the same form being used with counterfactual (in fact, past counterfactual) value. Thus (Bartoli 1906: 9-10): se ju vedâr [future] praima, ju te dûre [future] sul ciol glossed in Italian as ‘se avessi visto prima ti avrei sculacciato’ (‘if I had seen (you) first, I'd have spanked you’). However, Bartoli believes that the future form represents a fusion of the Latin future perfect and pluperfect indicative e.g., (CANTA(VE)RO + CANTA(VE)RAM > kantuora ‘I will sing’ and ‘I would sing’). Since use of the old pluperfect indicative as a conditional is attested elsewhere in Romance, and since use of the conditional in the protasis of counterfactuals is also not uncommon (e.g., in Romanian), it may be that this counterfactual use of the future-tense form reflects its double origin and dual function (cf. also Bartoli 1906: 406).
means of expressing such a meaning that Capidan (1932: 455f.) gives, yet of the examples which both scholars cite from Aromanian texts (respectively 59 and 37, with some overlap), the overwhelming majority are of the kind also found in old Romanian and modern Istro-Romanian: ‘if X should happen, then Y will happen’. I find only three cases that seem to me definitely to have present counterfactual meaning, and where future meaning must be excluded (all from Papahagi 1905):

(8)  
\[
\text{si șteări tine cum n'i se-are aurță bâna aëstă}
\]
if you knew how hateful this life has become to me

(9)  
\[
s-fiurim io tu loclu a lui 99 de bărțate vrea s-lu hidzearim tu loc
\]
if I were in his place, I would thrust him 99 fathoms into the ground

(10)  
\[
S-avearim ninga vîr ndoi, poate vrea mi satur
\]
if I had a couple more, perhaps I would have enough

The problem with deriving the Aromanian conditional from the Latin imperfect subjunctive on semantic grounds is, then, that the majority of tokens of this conditional appear to be of the same kind as the old Romanian and Istro-Romanian conditional, where derivation from a perfective is not in dispute. Nor is it disputed that a conditional form of perfective origin existed, and still exists vestigially, in Aromanian. Is it not therefore odd that Aromanian speakers should have renounced the morphological conditional form associated with ‘future’ meaning, in favour of an alleged relic of the ‘counterfactual’ imperfect subjunctive, if the future meaning predominates in usage?

3. Explaining the Anomaly

My argument against regarding Aromanian as exceptionally preserving a remnant of the Latin imperfect subjunctive has been in part that deep morphological divergences between the four major Daco-Romance varieties are uncharacteristic, but principally that, from a comparative Daco-Romance perspective, the morphology of the Aromanian conditional shows strong signs of having been an originally perfective form, presumably the same as the Istro-Romanian and old Daco-Romanian conditionals. The fact remains that the Aromanian conditional is morphologically deviant, because it apparently contradicts the principle, valid not just for Daco-Romance but for Romance in general (cf. Maiden 2000, 2001), that if the special perfective root allomorph survives in one of the ex-perfective

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26 Philippide (1927: 422) gives two examples where the imperfect indicative expresses present counterfactual meaning.

27 Philippide (1927: 427-30) and Capidan (1932: 546-8). Most of their examples are from Papahagi (1905).

28 Both scholars sometimes use Romanian conditionals (which can have present counterfactual meaning) in their glosses. For example S-yineari Araplu, di viu va s-ti mică translated by Capidan as ‘dacă ar veni Arapul, te-ar mînca de viu’, literally ‘if the Arab would come, he'd eat you alive’, but the apodosis is definitely future, and the meaning must be ‘if the Arab comes/should come, he'll eat you alive’.

29 The second verb, vrea s-lu hidzearim, contains a future-in-the-past auxiliary from the verb ‘want’ followed by a conditional. It is a feature of Aromanian that future auxiliaries can be followed by verbs in any tense-form. The sense is possibly ‘I would want to have thrust ….’.
tense-forms, then it survives in all others. What seems to have happened in Aromanian is that the non-PYTA root has been introduced analogically just into the conditional, but not into the preterite. For many, this will be a satisfactory conclusion, and one that involves a far less dramatic deviation from other Daco-Romance varieties than the notion that Aromanian preserves the Latin imperfect subjunctive. But I confess to having an axe to grind: the experience of examining data from thousands of Romance varieties, from the Middle Ages to the present, and from Lisbon to Bucharest, has impressed on me the remarkable consistency with which ex-perfective root allomorphs are identical in form and distribution across the tense-forms in which they occur, despite the lack of any synchronic factor which determines such coherence. This is a fact which I regard as being of considerable theoretical interest (cf. Maiden ibid.), in that it provides strong diachronic support for Aronoff’s notion of the ‘morphome’, an entity involving recurrent and stable distributional patterns across cells of inflectional paradigms which, synchronically, are determined neither by phonology nor by morphosyntactic function. I do not propose to explore these theoretical implications here, but it should be clear that Aromanian, while not a fatal counterexample, since nothing crucially depends on all Romance languages conforming to this pattern, is a fly in the ointment. What follows is a suggestion as to how it could be removed without outrageous special pleading, but this requires us to shift our attention briefly to Italy and Spain.

The most obvious apparent counterexample to my generalization about the ‘coherence’ of PYTA roots across ex-perfective tense-forms in Romance is thrown up by Italo-Romance. Italian, for example, notoriously has the PYTA root in the preterite (derived from the Latin perfect), but not in the imperfect subjunctive (derived from the Latin pluperfect subjunctive). Thus table 4:

Table 4: Apparent asymmetry in the distribution of Italian PYTA roots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Italian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIXI</td>
<td>&gt; díssi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIXISSEM</td>
<td>dicéssi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECI</td>
<td>&gt; féci</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FECISSEM</td>
<td>facéssi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HABVI</td>
<td>&gt; ébbi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HABVISSEM</td>
<td>avéssi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Maiden (2000), however, I demonstrate with data from modern Italian and modern and medieval Italo-Romance dialects that the principle of coherence is perfectly respected in Italo-Romance, with the simple difference that the PYTA root has been reanalysed (or ‘hypercharacterized’) as occurring uniquely in association with unstressed inflectional endings (as witness the alternation between preterite 1sg féci and 2sg facésti; or the difference between modern Italian 1pl facémmo but archaic/dialectal fécimo). The imperfect subjunctive normally has stressed endings, so the PYTA root has accordingly disappeared from it, but in the few cases where the imperfect subjunctive does not have a
stressed ending, the PYTA root duly survives (e.g. fóssi). What I want to claim is that the same reanalysis has happened in Aromanian.

Now it may seem outrageous, after I have protested long and loud that Aromanian is not significantly divergent from the rest of Daco-Romance, to plead that in this one respect it is actually like Italo-Romance. And it may appear downright perverse to attempt to answer this possible accusation of inconsistency, in turn, by saying that Aromanian is also rather like certain western Ibero-Romance dialects. But my reasoning is as follows. It has long been a belief among Romance linguists (cf. Buchholtz 1889: 134; Tekavčić 1980: 298) that the particular type of patterning of the PYTA root found in Italo-Romance is unique to Italy. But in fact, far away from any suspicion of Italo-Romance influence, and apparently at a recent historical period, Spanish dialects of the Montes de Pas region have developed the same patterning. Penny (1969: 132) shows that:

hay tendencia a no conservar más formas que las que llevan el acento sobre el tema (únicas verdaderas fuertes, personas Yo y Él). Éstas se conservan con bastante vitalidad, mientras que en las demás personas son muy frecuentes las formas con tema ‘débil’. Sin embargo, aun en las personas Yo y Él se oyen a veces formas analógicas.30

Table 5: The PYTA root in the dialect of the Montes de Pas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1sg</th>
<th>2sg</th>
<th>3sg</th>
<th>1pl</th>
<th>2pl</th>
<th>3pl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'dixə</td>
<td>(d)iθistə</td>
<td>'dixu</td>
<td>(d)iθimus</td>
<td>(d)iθistəs</td>
<td>(d)iθjeiŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'kisə</td>
<td>ki'ristə</td>
<td>'kisu</td>
<td>ki'rimus</td>
<td>ki'ristəs</td>
<td>ki'rjeiŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'pusə</td>
<td>pu'nistə</td>
<td>'pusu</td>
<td>pu'nimus</td>
<td>pu'nistəs</td>
<td>pu'njeiŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'ιθə</td>
<td>aθistə</td>
<td>'eθu / 'ιθu</td>
<td>aθimus</td>
<td>aθistəs</td>
<td>aθjeiŋ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'supə</td>
<td>saβistə</td>
<td>'supu</td>
<td>saβimus</td>
<td>saβistəs</td>
<td>saβjeiŋ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analogical elimination seems to hold also (Penny 1969: 136) for the (arhizotonic) imperfect subjunctive. What appears to have happened, independently and at a considerable remove of space and time, is that speakers in Italy and Spain noticed that there is always at least one cell of the paradigm in which the PYTA root precedes an unstressed ending (and bear in mind that in Romance unstressed verb endings are rare outside the present tense, and limited to ex-perfective verb-forms). This characteristic has been made a defining characteristic of the PYTA root, leading to its elimination wherever there is not an unstressed ending. If this development can occur twice, independently,31

30 ‘There is a tendency to keep only the forms stressed on the root (the only genuinely strong forms, first person singular and third person singular). These forms are fairly well preserved, whilst in the other persons forms with a ‘weak’ root are very frequent. However, even in the first person singular and third person singular, analogical forms are sometimes heard.’

31 Incidentally, in the Daco-Romanian domain, Densusianu (1915: 49) states that at Hobiceni-Uricani (Haţeg) old people still said fęći féce féceră, with the PYTA root, but only in the 1sg 3sg 3pl, which may
Perfect Pedigree: the ancestry of the Aromanian conditional

why should it not occur three times — in Aromanian as well? For in Aromanian\(^{32}\) the conditionals are always stressed on the inflectional ending, and this includes the few attested remnants with the PYTA root (e.g. dade'arim), whereas the preterites with PYTA roots are always stressed on that root. A further detail of the morphology of the Aromanian preterite tends to support my hypothesis. The preterite second person singular inflection comprises a stressed thematic vowel + -\(\text{i}\) in nearly all Romanian dialects (e.g. old Romanian \(\text{fecész}\), Megleno-Romanian \(\text{fă'se}\)); if this were the case also in Aromanian, my claim would be violated, in that we would have a PYTA root followed by a stressed ending. But precisely — and uniquely — in Aromanian, the 2sg preterite \(\text{fēaťiśi}\) (etc.) bears an unstressed ending. Papahagi (1974: 75) observes that the older form with the stress on the ending is still attested, but Capidan (1932: 462f.) implies that the root-stressed forms are generally more common. This is certainly the case in the Pindus dialects around Samarina, which are the main strongholds of the Aromanian conditional (Wace & Thompson 1914: 252f.).

To conclude, the Latin imperfect subjunctive is probably a red herring in explaining the Aromanian conditional. This tense-form's development is generally consistent with an origin in the Latin future perfect / perfect subjunctive, and the anomalous morphological behaviour of the root may well be the result of a local, but by no means unique, morphological reanalysis.

References

\(\text{ALR I} = \text{Atlasul lingvistic român.}\) (unpublished data gathered by Sever Pop).


\(^{32}\) As also in Istro-Romanian (cf. Pușcariu 1926: 187).
Martin Maiden


Perfect Pedigree: the ancestry of the Aromanian conditional


NALR Crișana = Noul Atlas Lingvistic pe Regiuni. Crișana. [unpublished materials]


NALR Transilvania = Noul Atlas Lingvistic pe Regiuni. Transilvania. [unpublished materials]


The Debate on Linguistic Sexism in Italian
A language planning process

Nikola Milic

It is a commonplace in the linguistic literature that language change consists in language-internal mechanisms (sound change, analogy, syntactic change) and external factors (language contact). However, language can also be subject to deliberate change or efforts made in order to ‘influence the behavior of others with respect to the acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes’ (Cooper 1989: 183). This is loosely described as language planning. Here I provide the typological analysis of one form of the language planning from the most recent history of Italian, the debate on linguistic sexism, and the effects it produces on the marking of grammatical gender. The sample corpus for my analysis is drawn from Italian used in business contexts as documented in business web-sites. I aim at creating a typology of the changes in the marking of grammatical gender that this debate succeeds or fails in bringing about, as witnessed in my selected corpus. I should stress that, where I present feminist views on topics such as linguistic determinism, markedness or the nature of grammatical gender systems, I am not looking at the linguistic merits or flaws of these views, but whether the debate they may have brought about has led to any observable language change. My ultimate objective is to determine whether and to what extent overall linguistic structure responds to a form of linguistic prescriptivism by creating a typology of changes in the structure of Italian that this language reform achieves or fails to achieve.

1. The Debate on Linguistic Sexism

All languages undergo changes over the course of time. These changes take place unexpectedly and usually unconsciously. However, some language change is related to the users’ evaluations of the language they use, and differentiation between the forms which are ‘better’, ‘more appropriate’ or ‘more correct’ and those which are not. Language change produced in this way is conscious and is a result of deliberate attempts to ‘change the language behavior of a group of people’,¹ either to foster innovation or to preserve the existing state of the language in question. The concept of ‘language planning’ or ‘prescriptivism’ becomes useful for the analysis and explanation of such a language change.² Language planning focuses on ‘problem-solving and is characterised by the

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¹ Thorburn (1971: 254).
² Prescriptivism is endemic in Italy, linked with the perennial Questione della lingua, namely which form of Italo-Romance should be prescribed as paradigmatic for the written cultural discourse. It goes back to the sixteenth century (Pietro Bembo's language reform) when the diffusion of printing in the peninsula, where a multitude of varieties was in use, called for a decision and some form of standardization; the revival of the Questione della lingua, once the gap between the codified literary language and the language spoken by Italians widened, was seen in the prescriptions put forward by Alessandro Manzoni in the nineteenth century, while the twentieth century in Italy saw Fascist language reform as well as, in more recent history,
formulation and evaluation of alternatives for solving language problems to find the best (or optimal, most efficient) decision. As Jernudd & Das Gupta (1971: 211) observe, this process may not be an idealistic or exclusively linguistic one, but also a political or government-authorised activity for solving perceived language problems in a particular society, such as those discussed under WHAT below.

One of the examples of language planning is the debate on linguistic sexism. I intend to discuss this debate by means of a current sociolinguistic framework for analysing language planning (Cooper 1989: 31ff.), which can be usefully summarised in the following question: Who plans what for whom and how?

WHO

The debate on linguistic sexism, broadly defined as biased representations of either sex in language at the level of system and/or use, was spurred by the American feminist movement in the 1960s and 1970s, when studies on language and gender increasingly became the object of feminist interest. In its intellectual approach feminism was critical of the patterns of use of gender (grammatical, semantic, referential) in the domain of human reference for communicating gendered/sexed messages. Gender was seen as a communicative parameter which, when appropriately used, contributes towards the maintenance of an individual's social identity, but causes irritation and stimulates the feelings of inferiority when used inappropriately. The goal for American feminists was complete liberation of women from socially imposed limitations on their full social identity.

WHAT

American feminists aimed at changing sexist language, language that ‘expresses stereotyped attitudes and expectations or assumes the inherent superiority of the male sex over the females’. ‘Linguists speaking from a feminist position have exposed the masculine bias prevalent in many dialectological, sociodialectological as well as sociolinguistic studies of people's language behaviours and use (e.g. Brouwer et al. 1978, Coates 1998, Coates and Cameron 1989, Key 1975):’

- unmarked, i.e. generic, masculine (i.e. the use of grammatically masculine form to designate both sexes, e.g. chairman, postman, he),
- pejorative semantic connotations attached to words referring exclusively to women (e.g. authoress, chairwoman),

the hugely popular political correctness reform. For general discussion of the Questione della lingua, see Migliorini (1960), Vitale (1978).

4 Thorn & Henley (1975: 223).
• semantic polarisation of some expressions for women (e.g. It. professore (masc.) ‘male university professor’ vs. professoressa (fem.) ‘school teacher’, not ‘female university professor’),

• asymmetry of titles referring to marital status for men and women (e.g. Mr. vs. Miss/Mrs.),

• morphosyntactic markedness of feminine in the languages which display morphosyntactic variability for grammatical gender (e.g. It. masc. dottore vs. fem. dottoressa).

According to this argument, sexist language reinforces the image of females as exceptions, marked. Thus, reducing ‘bias’ in language would serve to reduce sex discrimination. In other words, social behaviour, they argued, can be influenced by the changes in the linguistic structure. This view relies on what is known as the Sapir–Whorf hypothesis, according to which the relationship between language and society, mostly limited to grammar, is such that it is through language that we construe reality.6

FOR WHOM

Feminist language reform was aimed at communication networks in a given speech community. In the form of guidelines for self-regulation, it was intended primarily for publishers, journalists, teachers, legislative and administrative bodies which had professional interest in language, ‘groups which are key agencies in influencing or regulating the language behaviour of the speech community at large’.7 The promotion of non-sexist linguistic solutions by these élite members of the communicative network could help eradicate socially constructed sex-bias, in the light of the aforementioned view commonly held by feminist linguists, that the perception of social reality is constructed through language.

HOW

Feminists, fighting for a ‘greater linguistic, social and political equality of the sexes’,8 put forward the language reform with the aim of replacing what was considered linguistically

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6 One must note that it would be inaccurate to talk about ‘the’ feminist academic position on the issue of linguistic determinism, the question being how far concepts which happen to be linguistically coded determine our thinking; there are several feminist positions, some of which are not to be described as (even weakly) Whorfian (e.g. Yaguello 1978, expressing doubts whether changing language would be sufficient to suppress sexist mentality) while others treat sexism not as an inherent formal feature of languages but something contextually generated, be that context a sentence, a culture, or an utterance (e.g. Cameron 1998). The differences in the feminist academic positions are of geographical origin, theoretical and political stance. Recently, a new theory of language and gender has been evoked, ultimately based on biologically or socially constructed essentialism (Butler 1990), or based on the redefinition of gender as a demographic category (Cameron 1996).


sexist with non-sexist expressions: ‘In any social movement, when changes are effected, the language sooner or later reflects the changes. Our approach is different. Instead of passively noting the change, we are changing language patterns to actively effect the changes.’ Feminist language reform was based on ‘the authoritarian promotion of élite varieties as norms of correctness’, usually inserted in manuals which were then distributed to the influential members in the communicative network. These manuals were written in the NO–YES style, showing how to replace what was considered linguistically sexist: e.g. replace terms such as mankind, manpower, chairman with humanity/humankind, personnel, chairperson; avoid the unmarked he by pluralizing the referent (since they is sex-indefinite), or replacing it with a noun etc.

2. Feminist Language Reform in Italy

A wide public debate on gender issues and linguistic sexism was pioneered in Italy with the publication of Alma Sabatini’s Il sessismo nella lingua italiana in 1987. Sabatini’s work was modelled upon similar publications from the US (Miller & Swift 1976) and France (Yaguello 1978). She accepted in her study the Whorfian premise that language is a social and cultural institution, which encodes culture's priorities and values: ‘l’analisi di un dato linguistico formale può darci insights sulla organizzazione sociale, la quale a sua volta ci illumina sulla organizzazione linguistica’. Because Italian society is androcentric, she argued, there exist ‘… nozioni stereotipate, riduttive e restrittive della immagine della donna, [e] … il reiterato e pervasivo concetto base della centralità e universalità dell'uomo e della marginalità e parzialità della donna’.

The issue which received most criticism from Sabatini is that of the unmarked use of the masculine to incorporate feminine, by which, according to Sabatini, women suffer the greatest linguistic discrimination as it makes them ‘il gruppo inferiore, il gruppo devianza, invisibile, non esistente’. The system of grammatical gender in Italian follows a binary distinction between masculine and feminine, among which masculine is unmarked in the great majority of instances while feminine is marked for the reason that it is endowed with a phonologically more substantial mark (e.g. a suffix, modifier or the like) than the (corresponding) masculine form. Sabatini openly considered the aspect of markedness in the system of grammatical gender as one of the proofs of bias in the language. She objected

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9 Miller & Swift (1976: 11).
11 The debate on linguistic sexism appeared in Italy a decade after similar initiatives were raised in France and the US, as the Italian feminists were initially (at the beginning of the feminist movement in the 1970s) preoccupied with more urgent practical issues that needed to be resolved: legalisation of abortion, professional and legal equality of the sexes, etc.
12 Sabatini (1987: 21): ‘An analysis of formal linguistic data can give us insights into social organisation, which in its turn sheds light upon linguistic organisation.’
13 Ibid.: ‘stereotyped notions of the image of women, which are reductive and restrictive, of a woman, [and] … the repeated and pervasive concept of the centrality and universality of men and of the marginality and partiality of women’
14 Sabatini (1987: 21): ‘the inferior group, deviant, invisible, non-existent’
15 See also Maiden (1995: 105-10).
to the lack of unmarked feminine forms for female referents (corresponding to, e.g., *architetto* ‘architect’ with its masculine form and gender). In addition, she criticised the patterns of morphological or syntactic markedness of feminines: morphological, seen in the pattern *dottore* [MASC] ~ *dottoresa* [FEM] (‘doctor’), in which feminine is indicated by means of the phonologically more substantial suffix -essa which, except in *dottoresa*, *studentessa* (‘student’) and *professoressa* (‘professor’), also frequently bears derogatory and belittling connotations;\(^{16}\) syntactic, seen in the pattern *giudice* [MASC] ~ *donna giudice* [FEM] (‘judge’), where the modifier *donna* is crucial in specifying the sex of the referent in question. Sabatini suggested that the phenomenon of markedness in the system of grammatical gender should be abolished, and that this should be accomplished by neutralisation. The correct, non-sexist pattern, according to Sabatini, for these examples would be: *architetto* ~ *architetta*, *dottore* ~ *dottora* or *dottoressa*, *il giudice* ~ *la giudice*. This pattern achieves parity of phonological substance in the marking of the two grammatical genders: it employs vowel modulation (applying equally to both genders) instead of additional suffixation (applying only to the feminine) for the first two, while for *giudice* the definite article is used as the syntactic modifier for both genders rather than there being a modifier (*donna*) only in the feminine.

Sabatini went on to identify linguistic sexism in the sphere of language use: the use of adjectives *fragile* (‘fragile’), *dolce* (‘sweet’), *bello* (‘nice’), *delicato* (‘delicate’) etc., or diminutives mostly when referring to women, semantic/pragmatic stereotyping of women (e.g. *la donna con due figli* ‘the women with two children’ et sim.), and the use of women's marital titles as referential/nominal (e.g. *il signor Rossi e la sua signora* ‘Mr. Rossi and his wife/Mrs. Rossi’).

This first study on gender bias in Italian also contained a concrete set of suggestions on how to avoid linguistic sexism in Italian, *Raccomandazioni per un uso non sessista della lingua italiana* (1986). This was the result of a government-sponsored initiative published under the auspices of the *Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri*, among other publications promoted by the *Commissione per le Pari Opportunità*. The reason for the government's involvement was the fact that law 9/12/1977 n.903 on *Parità tra uomini e donne in materia di lavoro* forbade any form of discrimination based on sex in the selection of employees, according to which even indirect (e.g. linguistic) discrimination against a candidate of a particular sex was outlawed. Therefore, the government, which had introduced the legislation, needed to be involved in finding legally acceptable solutions, among other things, to the question of occupational titles in job offers and advertisements, in order to stop the reinforcement of the perceived prejudices concerning the inferiority of women. Much of this reform was concerned with changing the types of morphosyntactic formalisation of grammatical gender in Italian. This was related to Sabatini's (and the general feminist) view that systems of grammatical gender have a semantic core;\(^{17}\) in that grammatical gender is accessible to the rules of semantic interpretation. All other phenomena in Italian generated by grammatical gender, such as markedness, agreement...

\(^{16}\) See Migliorini (1960: 713) and Lepschy & Lepschy (1988: 404).

and derivation were also considered semantically motivated. Hence, the patterns of morphological and syntactic unmarkedness of masculine/markedness of feminine (e.g. *gallo* ‘cock’ — *gallina* ‘hen’, *il serpente* ‘snake’ — *il serpente femmina*, *il figlio e la figlia sono arrivati* [MASC PL] ‘the son and the daughter have arrived’), were considered symbolic, representing females as exceptions to the male-dominated pattern. According to Sabatini, in order to eliminate unfavourable linguistic treatment of women in Italian, which may be against the law, people need to modify their grammar and language usage by following prescribed acceptable rules, i.e. *Raccomandazioni*. Here I discuss how Sabatini suggested the structural sexism in Italian ought to be reformed with respect to the relationship between markedness in the system of grammatical gender and the question of professional titles for women.

2.1. Markedness in the System of Grammatical Gender

Sabatini’s criticisms of formal and semantic markedness in the system of grammatical gender in Italian has been discussed under §2 above. Sabatini suggested that the phenomenon of formal markedness should be abolished through neutralisation. For example, the pattern *deputato* ‘male deputy’ — *deputatessa* ‘female deputy’, in which feminine is morphologically marked with the suffix -essa, which often bears derogatory connotations, ought to be replaced with *deputato* — *deputata*, with a phonologically unmarked modulatory vowel instead of the marked -essa. Other examples of ‘correct’ pairs are: *uccisore* (‘male killer’) — *uccisora* (‘female killer’), *avvocato* — *avvocata*, *lo* — *la* *studente* (‘student’), *il* — *la* *portavoce* (‘spokesman — spokeswoman’), *dottore* — *dottora/dottrice* etc. In addition, Sabatini prescribed that the masculine gender resolution of conjoined noun phrases should be avoided, especially if the majority of referents are females: *il figlio e la figlia sono arrivati* ought to be replaced with *il figlio è arrivato*, {è arrivata} anche la figlia; instead of *Carla, Maria, Francesca, Giacomo e Sandra sono arrivati* [MASC PL] (‘Carla, Maria, Francesca, James and Sandra have arrived’) one should use *Carla, Maria, Francesca, Giacomo e Sandra sono arrivate* [FEM PL]. In instances in which the ratio males/females is evenly balanced or impossible to determine, agreement with the last noun in the string is recommended: *ragazzi e ragazz

Semantically unmarked lexical items which happen to be masculine in form or in their other meanings should be replaced with neutral terms: the use of *persona* (‘person’) or *individuo* (‘individual’) in place of generic *uomo* e.g., *i diritti umani* (‘human rights’), *caccia all'individuo/alla persona* (‘hunt for an individual/person’), *la persona/l'individuo della strada* (‘beggar’); *il popolo romano* (‘the Roman people’) instead of *i Romani* (‘the Romans [MASC]’); *fratelli e sorelle* (‘brothers and sisters’) instead of *fratelli; i giovani*

\[18\] For a detailed contemporary linguistic overview of the system of grammatical gender, see Adger (2002), Brugmann (1897), Fodor (1959), Hjelmslev (1959), Kuryłowicz (1964), Martinet (1956), Meillet (1921).

\[19\] The law, however, is relevant principally to certain professional and bureaucratic use of language; it does not proscribe sexist language in general.
2.2. Professional Titles

Until about five decades ago, feminine forms of titles were neither used nor created for professions which women did not perform as commonly as men. Social changes which began to bring economic equality for women overwhelmingly favoured neutralisation in professional titles. Whether the neutralisation served to imply unconsciously that women appropriated important jobs (with their masculine designations), or to eliminate the objectionable habit of signalling the sex of the holder of a job, the consequences of this practice had been (a) ‘prestige’ of masculine agentives, particularly of those referring to a position of importance or higher social prestige: *professoressa* would designate a woman teacher in a secondary school, while *professore* designated a woman professor at a university; (b) lack of grammatically and/or lexically symmetrical forms for feminine agentives (e.g. *architetto*, *magistrato* ‘magistrate’); and (c) semantic polarisation, when feminine forms do exist but tend to refer to a lesser job or are formed with the suffix -*essa* bearing pejorative/jocular connotations (e.g. *avvocatessa*, *presidentessa*).

Sabatini devoted great attention to the discussion of forms of professional titles for women because it was not clear why women should accept masculine designations with unmarked value but distinctive in form when feminine counterparts already existed in the language or could easily be created given the flexibility of the Italian derivational morphology. She argued that men felt it quite natural to be designated by feminine nouns (e.g. *sentinella* ‘sentinel’, *guardia* ‘guard’) when the terms do not have a masculine counterpart, but they felt uncomfortable being designated by feminine nouns which traditionally refer to women if the equivalent masculine designations existed (e.g. *levatrice* ‘midwife’, *mondina* ‘field-worker’ instead of *levatore*, *mondino*) or in cases where the unmarked form would be the feminine one: *infermiera* ‘nurse’, *lavandaia* ‘washer’, *sartina* ‘dressmaker’ etc. In addition, Sabatini criticised the asymmetric use of the modifier *donna* with masculine epicene nouns, which she deemed sexist because *uomo* is not employed with feminine epicsenes (e.g. modulatory *il casalingo* ‘domestic man’ instead of *la casalinga uomo* or *l'uomo casalinga*).

Sabatini argued that feminisation should be used in the professional titles for women, even at the cost of introducing new ones on the basis of etymological or analogical criteria, but that the suffix -*essa* should be altogether avoided in the formation of new agentives because of its frequent derogatory, belittling implications. So the system would consist of the following symmetric pairs:

(a) masc. -*tore* ~ fem. -*trice*: e.g. *ambasciatrice* ‘ambassador’, *amministratrice* ‘administrator’, *direttrice* ‘director’, *senatrice* ‘senator’, *pretrice* ‘magistrate’ besides *pretora*, *questrice* ‘superintendent’ besides *questora*;

d'ambo i sessi/giovani (‘the young of both sexes’) in place of *i giovani* (‘the young [MASC]’) etc.
(b) fem. -a for:
   (i) masc. in -o: e.g. architetta, avvocata, capitana ‘captain’, chirurga ‘surgeon’,
       critica ‘critic’, ministra ‘minister’, deputata, soldata ‘soldier’ (instead of forms in
       -essa);
   (ii) masc. in -ario/-arie: e.g. segretaria ‘secretary’, infermiera;
   (iii) masc. in -sore has feminine equivalents as -sora, -d-itrice according to
       etymology: e.g. difensora ‘defence lawyer’, professora (instead of -essa),
       successora, succeditrice ‘successor’;

(c) designation of feminine in common gender nouns should be accomplished by
    means of determiner selection: la presidente ‘president’, la studente, la poeta
    ‘poetess’, la profeta ‘prophetess’ etc.

3. The Use of Grammatical Gender in the Italian Language of Business

In this section I intend to evaluate the effects which the debate on linguistic sexism has
produced on the marking of grammatical gender in the business Italian a decade and a half
after the publication of Il sessismo by looking at the ways in which grammatical gender is
used in the expressions of female-specific, male-specific and sex-indefinite reference in my
selected corpus. I chose the written language of business as my sample corpus because the
language of business is not a ‘language’ sui generis, but rather a contextually sensitive
register used for the specific purpose of carrying out business activities by people who
interpret them as such. Any aspect of linguistic behaviour in business written interactions
— lexical, and syntactic, together with the use of particular codes or styles — is subjugated
 to the users’ orientations to context. This orientation has consequences for the ‘shape, form,
trajectory, content or character of the business register’ in general (‘procedural
consequentiality’). Such consequentiality may be positive, in that certain language
practices, which might be inhibited in, say, a legal context may be promoted in business
contexts (e.g. jargon vocabulary). Alternatively, it may be negative in the reverse sense that
certain language practices may be strongly avoided in particular business contexts
(subjective, impressionistic reference).

The formal character of the language used in business has been widely recognised
of the participants (business people), the section of the institution they represent (analysis,
marketing or production), and specific aspects of the local context, namely the goal they
are pursuing, enforce technical constraints in the business context. Associated with these
various elements of the formal, conventional business context are tacit and learnt practices
of avoiding references which might potentially be perceived as subjective, unusual,
incomprehensible, irksome or discomforting (by comparison with the tacitly assumed
background). However, more recently business communications are rapidly becoming

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20 In the sequence -d-itrice, on the basis of etymology the -d- belongs to the root rather than the suffix: e.g.
   successore < *succeed-sore and hence succeditrice ← succeed-ere.
responsive to processes of social change and are discursively subject to considerations of
task, efficiency, political correctness, and so on. Most recent studies (Sacks et al. 1974,
Drew & Heritage 1992) show that business interactions, either oral or written, may exhibit
less uniformity than previously reported: lexical choices are more diverse, syntactic
sequences are more variable.

In addition, in Italy, recently there have been fresh government initiatives put forward
in favour of non-sexist institutional language. In 1997 the Raccomandazioni were inserted
in a style manual for public administration which aimed at simplifying the notoriously
elaborate Italian bureaucratic language. The POLITE (Pari Opportunità e Libri di Testo)
project was launched in 2000. Promoted by the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri –
Dipartimento Pari Opportunità and supported by the European Commission, it aims at
changing traditional portrayal of the sexes, class and race divisions in educational
textbooks across the curriculum, for its linguistic aspect drawing on many suggestions
made by Sabatini. The major publishing body in Italy, Associazione Italiana Editori, has
adhered to this project.

3.1. Corpus and Sources

In order to analyse the principles of grammatical gender-marking in the language of
business, I collected data from the electronic versions of business reports and business
information, available at the following URLs: www.milanofinanza.it, www.wallstreetitalia.com, and www.soldionline.it. These business sources cover a wide
range of topics related to business. One of the most common genres is bespoke market
reports and analyses of trends in businesses. The reports, whether in the form of brief
snapshots or in-depth analysis of the current state of the market concerned, are specifically
tailored to the needs of business people and the goals they are pursuing. Written for
business people, these reports provide a network of related ventures and initiatives, some
of which are designed to make clients learn more about the current status of the industry in
question, others to provide new, technology-driven strategies to increase the economic
impact of the clients in Italy. These web-sites provide their clients with current business
news and information, and the expertise in business strategy and cutting-edge technologies
necessary to stay ahead of the competition. The corpus, collected from the sources between
9 August and 9 October 2003, consists of professional titles and sexed agentives. It is
defined as follows: approximately 18,700 words, out of which 74 are professional titles
and agentives expressing female-/male-specific and/or sex-indefinite reference (58 are
lexically distinct): e.g. commissaria [FEM] (‘commissary’), ministro [MASC], impiegati
[MASC + FEM] (‘employees’). The total number of occurrences of all agentives is 287.

I analyse my collected data in the following domains:

(1) the possible ways of expressing male-/female-specific and sex-indefinite reference;

(2) professional titles for women: whether contemporary business Italian employs
feminisation in agentives, i.e. use of a distinctive feminine form to designate
women as opposed to men, suggested by Sabatini (e.g. *ministra, commissaria*), or neutralisation, i.e. use of an unmarked masculine (e.g. *ministro, commissario*); and finally

(3) the effect (if any) of the debate on linguistic sexism on grammatical gender-marking, including the morphological marking of feminine.

3.2. Sex Specification

Here I present statistics relating to the use of grammatical gender marking sex-specification. In the cases where the sex-reference is definite, the agentives were followed by the personal names of the referent in question. The only exception to this rule is the use of *esperta* for a female referent, which was not accompanied by the personal name of the referent in question due to the fact that the person wanted to remain anonymous. By contrast, sex-indefinite reference is identified by not being accompanied by the personal names of the referents in my corpus. The distribution of my corpus across different sex-reference categories is as follows:

Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>female sex-reference</th>
<th>male sex-reference</th>
<th>sex-indefinite reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>types</td>
<td>13 (17.57%)</td>
<td>24 (32.43%)</td>
<td>37 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occurrences</td>
<td>36 (12.54%)</td>
<td>57 (19.87%)</td>
<td>194 (67.59%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.1. Female Sex-reference

As shown in Table 1, the female sex-reference is the least frequent in the business sources I examined. This is a consequence of the fact that women in Italy do not occupy corporate positions as commonly and regularly as men: a recent survey conducted by the European Database (1998) has shown that 0.6% of senior management in Italy are women, and that 32.80% of women in Italy are in full-time employment. 36 occurrences, which is the total of female sex-reference, refer to only 18 different women, as compared to 57 occurrences of male sex-reference referring to 49 different men. Female sex-reference is expressed in the professional titles and agentives in my corpus overwhelmingly by feminisation, by means of which the feminine is marked either morphologically (e.g. *dottoressa, senatrice, commissaria, difensora, segretaria, sottosegretaria* ‘under-secretary’, *vicesegretaria* ‘vice-secretary’, *esperta* ‘expert’) or syntactically through agreement (e.g. *la consigliere* ‘adviser’, *la portavoce, la stilista* ‘stylist’). Neutralisation (i.e. the use of the masculine to refer to a woman) is found in only one case, *il presidente. Presidentessa* or *la presidente*, prescribed by Sabatini, is not in use probably because in Italy women are presidents of some sort only very rarely, a fact which prevents the users of Italian from employing either morphological or syntactic feminisation for this title (i.e. either *presidentessa* or *la presidente*). The following table presents the total number of types and their occurrences used in the feminine and masculine to express female sex-reference (e.g. *la consigliere/il presidente*-type):
Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>feminine</th>
<th>masculine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>types</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occurrences</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2. Male Sex-reference

Agentives referring to men are employed in the masculine (Table 3): e.g. *amministratore*, *direttore*, *dottore*, *senatore*, *il presidente*, *commissario*, *ministro* etc.

Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>feminine</th>
<th>masculine</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>types</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occurrences</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.3. Sex-indefinite Reference

The category of sex-indefinite reference contains types and occurrences which refer to a group containing both sexes, identified by close examination of the context in which the examples occur. Sex-indefinite reference is by far the most frequent of the categories in my corpus. Sex-indefinite types comprise 50% of the whole corpus, while the total number of occurrences makes up nearly 68%. Sex-indefinite reference is overwhelmingly expressed by the generic masculine: e.g. *amministratori* ‘administrators’, *gli analisti* ‘analysts’, *consumatori* ‘consumers’, *cittadini* ‘citizens’, *dipendenti* ‘employees’, *rappresentanti* ‘representatives’ *elettori* ‘voters’, *esperti* ‘experts’ etc. This is not in line with Sabatini’s prescriptions. However, there is another possible way, albeit rare in my corpus, of expressing sex-indefinite reference. These alternative expressions of sex-indefinite reference, which are in line with Sabatini’s prescriptions, are found in my corpus in fixed formulae: e.g. (1) *persone* + Modifier: *persone danneggiate* for *danneggiati* [MASC PL] ‘the injured’, *persone assicurate* for *assicurati* [MASC PL] ‘the insured’, *persone in industria/in questo settore di lavoro* for *lavoratori* ‘workers’, *persone che hanno a cuore l’etica* for *etici* ‘the ethical’; (2) *clientela* ‘clientèle’ instead of *il cliente/i clienti* ‘clients, customers’.

Given the size of my corpus, and limitations of time, it is difficult to determine whether and to what extent (if any) the employment of these lexical items reflects a true link between linguistic and political/ideological awareness. One can argue that this type of use of *persone* and *clientela* are typical of legal register: closer examination of the context in which these words are used in my corpus shows the overlap between legal and business terminology. However, further research on the use of these alternative sex-indefinite usages is needed.
Table 4 summarises the ratio between the zero-masculine and alternatives in the corpus of sex-indefinite reference:

Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>generic masculine</th>
<th>alternatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>types</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>occurrences</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Conclusions

It is certain that my data show a degree of change in the use of grammatically gendered items in my corpus in comparison with Sabatini's general findings from her corpus in 1986/7. My corpus and Sabatini's are comparable, as Sabatini included in her investigation the language of business, as documented in the daily papers and periodicals she analysed (Il Messaggero, Il Tempo, Il Corriere della Sera, Il Giornale, Il Paese Sera, Il Mattino, Espresso, Gente, Anna and Amica). It seems plausible that the diachronic difference witnessed in my corpus has been brought about by the deliberate and conscious adoption of Sabatini's reform, together with heightened awareness of the issue of linguistic sexism and political (in)correctness. By comparing Sabatini's corpus and mine, it can be argued that grammatical gender is more accessible to rules of semantic interpretation, in that in titles and agentives it reflects closely a referent's sex. This is particularly important for female sex-reference, where feminisation is overwhelmingly the commonest morpho-syntactic tool of expressing female sex-reference. Some feminine titles, which were reported previously not to be in use in spite of their grammaticality, such as commissaria, senatrice, la consigliere, esperta and difensora, are employed in the feminine, thus marking a change in line with Sabatini's prescriptions. Some feminine titles are not semantically polarised as reported by Sabatini: e.g. segretaria, vicesegretaria and sottosegretaria which are feminised when meaning ‘a woman who presides over an administrative body’ and equally when meaning ‘female secretary (office worker)’, thus not conforming to the pattern of referring to women in positions of higher social prestige with the masculine. As far as the morphological coding of the feminine is concerned, the agentives are feminised in the spirit of the morphological codings already available in language: the suffix -essa, which Sabatini argued should be avoided in the formation of new titles, is still found in dottoressa (which was, however, established before Sabatini's time), and the common-gender nouns, such as consigliere, mark feminine only syntactically with the use of the feminine article rather than additionally through word-final modulation, as Sabatini suggested in her Raccomandazioni (i.e. la consigliere, not la consiglierina). Also, in my corpus, Sabatini's prescription against sex-indefinite reference realised by the use of the unmarked masculine to incorporate referents of both sexes has not taken root, as it is possible to find sex-indefinite reference in my corpus expressed by the use of the masculine. The contextually conditioned masculine used for this purpose contrasts with the masculine used for the male sex-reference only. The use of persona + modifier and clientela, the former of which contrasts with the unmarked masculine agentives such as assicurati, danneggiati, lavoratori
The Debate on Linguistic Sexism in Italian

and the latter of which potentially contrasts with *clienti*, might be seen as adoption of Sabatini's prescriptions on how one should avoid gender markedness. However, these occurrences are too infrequent to be definitely categorised. Also, they may represent an import from legal terminology, given the legalistic context in which they appear. In any case, further research in this direction is necessary.

It seems that grammatical gender-marking in the contemporary Italian language of business really has been influenced by the debate on linguistic sexism and various other institutional initiatives. All detectable change show use of existing forms but with altered distribution, i.e. speakers do not invent new forms. Hence, grammatical gender reflects closely the referents' sex in titles, but this overwhelming match between the referent's sex and grammatical gender is formalised through already existing gender-marking patterns, and not through innovative non-sexist principles. This could also be a trend towards change in the traditional grammatical gender-marking, but a change which has not yet been fully conventionalised. Thus the effect of Sabatini's actual prescriptions is limited.

It should be noted, however, that Sabatini's prescriptions were originally intended to encourage wider public debate on the possible morphosyntactic implementation of non-sexist linguistic principles. Sabatini's sudden death a year after the publication of *Il Sessismo* prevented her from developing her linguistic recommendations further. Either way, Sabatini did manage to indicate a general direction for overall linguistic change in this regard. Moreover, as F. Sabatini (no relation of A. Sabatini), the then President of the *Accademia della Crusca*, wrote in his introductory article of support in *Il Sessismo*, some linguistic change was considered as the inevitable result of international influences: by 1987, the system of global communication and the power of national regulatory agencies were already so pervasive that it seemed natural to expect that Italian would sooner or later be influenced by the changes taking place elsewhere (e.g. cross-linguistic contact via the media, EU regulations with local effects etc.).

However, in order to reach firmer conclusions about the effects of this type of politically motivated language reform, there is an obvious need for a more extensive inquiry consisting of the comparison between modern texts and those of similar content from the mid 1980s in order to reach firmer conclusions. Also, my findings about the apparent impact that the debate on linguistic sexism has produced in the system of grammatical gender-marking in Italian need to be placed in a broader context of feminist interventions on language which happened in the history of other languages. For example, Cooper (1984) analysed a corpus of 525,000 words of running written text sampled from American publications, including daily newspapers and mass-circulation magazines from 1971-1979. His corpus showed a dramatic decline in the rate of androcentric generics (*man*, *man*-compounds, *he* and its inflected forms), which fell from 12.3 per 5,000 words in 1971 to 4.3 per 5,000 in 1979, with successive declines registered for each of the surveyed years in between. For example, the largest decline was in the use of *man*, for which the 1979 rate was only 16% of the 1971 rate, while the *man*-compounds had the smallest decline. Like my study, Cooper had no access to the changes taking place in speech, where the ratio of changes could have been different. At any rate, the existence of a
feminist language-planning campaign, promoted as a part of a battle for women's liberation, 'shows us that social movements have linguistic consequences, whether or not such consequences influence non-linguistic behavior. It has, in any event, proven easier to change written usage than to change the practices and attitudes which subordinate women'\(^{22}\) (e.g. women in Italy still have lower wages than men in the same job). The question then becomes to what extent any linguistic change is contributing to overall behavioural change, and whether that speaks against the original reasoning behind the Feminist Language Reform, namely that a change of language could or would eradicate sexist behaviour.

References


\(^{22}\) Cooper (1989: 20).


APPENDIX

This appendix consists of lexically distinct types and their occurrences across the sex-reference categories in which they appear in order to shed light on the textual frequency and productivity of the particular types. I list them alphabetically, having firstly separated the professional titles from other terms with human reference.

Professional titles

(a) Native words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>types</th>
<th>occurrences</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>female</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>sex-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reference</td>
<td>reference</td>
<td>indefinite</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>amministratore, -i</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analisti ‘analysts’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistenti [di volo] ‘flight attendants’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>banchieri ‘bankers’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coltivatori ‘farmers’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commercianti ‘traders’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commissario, -a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>il/la consigliere</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>coordinatore ‘co-ordinator’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>difensore, -a</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>direttore</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dottore, -essa</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economisti ‘economists’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finanziere ‘financier’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>giornalista ‘journalist’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>giudice, -i</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>industriali ‘industrialists’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ingegnere ‘engineer’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>magistrati</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<td>il/la portavoce</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>sindicalista ‘union representative’</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sottosegretario, -a</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lo/la stilista</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vicesegretario, -a</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Loanwords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>types</th>
<th>occurrences</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>male</td>
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<tr>
<td>manager</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>trader</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other terms with human reference

(a) Native words

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<th>occurrences</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>reference</td>
<td>reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ambientalisti ‘environmentalists’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>americani ‘Americans’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[radio] ascoltatori ‘[radio] listeners’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cittadini</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cliente, -i</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>clientela</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>colleghi ‘colleagues’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>consumatore, -i ‘consumer’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diessina ‘adherent of the DS party’</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dipendenti ‘dependants’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elletori ‘voters’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>esperta, o/-i</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>europei ‘Europeans’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fondamentalisti ‘fundamentalists’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>impiegati</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>imprenditore, -i ‘entrepreneur’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lavoratore, -i ‘worker’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>osservatori ‘observers’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pensionati ‘pensioners’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>persona</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rappresentanti</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siciliani ‘Sicilians’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>turisti ‘tourists'</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>uomini</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vincitore ‘winner’</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(b) Loanwords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>types</th>
<th>occurrences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>female reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>leader</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Nominative–Accusative Opposition
between Latin and Gallo-Romance
A study in refunctionalization

John Charles Smith

0. Introduction

It is well known that noun declension was greatly simplified between Latin and Gallo-
Romance (French and Occitan), with the relatively rich case-system of the former being
replaced by a binary opposition between nominative and oblique in early stages of the
latter, before disappearing completely. However, although modern Gallo-Romance
languages no longer have a nominal case-system, the morphology which used to encode
the nominative–accusative distinction has in some instances been retained, but now
serves as the exponent of some other opposition.

In Smith (1999), I presented data regarding the fate of the accusative and dative
forms of the Latin first- and second-person singular pronouns. I claimed that, where the
functional opposition (i.e., the distinction of case) was lost, but the formal opposition
which used to express it was maintained with a new function (the process which Lass
1990, borrowing a term from evolutionary biology, refers to as ‘exaptation’), the
refunctionalization was not random (as Lass implies it should be), but rather conformed
to a principle of ‘core-to-core’ mapping. In this view, an opposition may be evacuated
of its concrete functional content (its exponence), but a residual, more abstract,
dichotomy will remain — an identity which, however diminished, is not yet (to use
Lass's word) ‘junk’. This identity may be defined in terms of frequency, markedness, or
some other factor. If the opposition is refunctionalized, its refunctionalization will be
guided by the residual dichotomy. The present paper represents a continuation of this
broad research programme, and examines various ways in which the opposition
between nominative and accusative/oblique has been refunctionalized in Gallo-
Romance, drawing examples from both French and Occitan. The original distinction
has come to encode, *inter alia*, the following dichotomies: subject vs. complement or
adjunct; verbal subject vs. complement of verb (regardless of the type of complement,
such as direct or indirect object); pronoun vs. noun; proper name vs. common noun;
human referent vs. non-human referent; animate referent vs. inanimate referent; more
active or involved participant vs. less active or involved participant. I claim that all
these examples of refunctionalization conform to the same basic principle: the original
nominative comes to encode the more agentive member of the opposition, whilst the
original accusative comes to encode the less agentive one, and that this process is in
keeping with the notion that morphological refunctionalization involves a process of
‘core-to-core’ mapping.
1. The Gallo-Romance Case-system

Alone amongst the Romance languages, the Gallo-Romance varieties — French and Occitan — maintained a nominal case-system deriving from the distinction between the nominative and the accusative of Latin. This paper does not aim to give a detailed account and analysis of the Latin and Old Gallo-Romance case-systems, and will merely survey the data which relate to the arguments about refunctionalization. The case-system of Latin is presented in Kühner & Stegmann (1914: i.252-487) and Hofmann & Szantyr (1965: 21-151). Its fate in later stages of the language is outlined by Väänänen (1981: 110-15) and Herman (2000: 49-63). Succinct descriptions of the Old French system are given by Pope (1934: 310-14) and Zink (1997: 27-38), whilst Old Occitan is dealt with by Jensen (1976) and Skårup (1997: 61-72). A detailed conspectus of Old French declension is provided by Nyrop (1924: 174-209), and an extensive discussion of the forms and functions of the Old French cases has recently been undertaken by Buridant (2001: 62-104). A comparable, although briefer, treatment of form and function in the case-system of Old Occitan can be found in Jensen (1994: 2-18).

The two tables opposite summarize the data for French (and, mutatis mutandis, Occitan) which will be relevant to the arguments in this paper. Table 1 gives the declension of Latin second-declension nouns and adjectives, Table 2 that of the imparisyllabic subset of the Latin third declension. The case-system did not survive in the other Latin noun-classes. The small fourth and fifth declensions generally merged with the larger second and first declensions, respectively. First-declension nouns

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1 Romanian has maintained a nominal case-system up to the present day, but it does not reflect the nominative–accusative opposition; rather, there is a split between a form encoding both nominative and accusative and another which encodes the genitive and the dative. A vocative is also found, although this is at least partly the result of Slavonic influence, rather than a continuation of the Latin vocative. For a description of the Romanian case-system, see Mallinson (1986: 205-7, 223-4). For the view that a nominative–accusative distinction may have survived into preliterary Italian, see Maiden (2000). It is occasionally claimed that the Romance oblique forms may, in some circumstances, be derived from the Latin ablative, but the Latin accusative is generally accepted as the etymon of the oblique case-form; discussion can be found in Väänänen (1981: 116-17).

2 These and other standard works on the language claim that Latin had six cases: nominative, vocative, accusative, genitive, dative, ablative (as presented in Tables 1 and 2), together with a rarely-used locative. It is doubtful to what extent the vocative is a true case — see the arguments in Hjelmslev (1935: passim) and Blake (2001: 8), who points out:

Vocatives do not appear as dependents in constructions, but rather they stand outside constructions or are inserted parenthetically […]. They are unlike other cases in that they do not mark the relation of dependents to heads. For these reasons vocatives have not always been considered cases […]. In Ancient Greek and Latin the vocative's claim to being a case is structural. The vocative is a word-final suffix like the recognised case suffixes. However, modified forms of nouns used as forms of address also occur in languages that do not have case inflection. In Yapese (Austronesian), for instance, there is no morphological case marking on nouns, but personal names have special forms used for address. There is no reason to consider that these modifications of names constitute a vocative case […].

3 Latin orthography did not show stress; however, in Table 2 (and thereafter, where relevant), the stress on nouns with an imparisyllabic declension has been marked for ease of exposition.
Table 1:
Latin second-declension nouns (generally masculine) and masculine adjectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Old French</th>
<th>Modern French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(singular)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominative</td>
<td>MVRVS</td>
<td>nominative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[vocative]</td>
<td>MVRE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accusative</td>
<td>MVRVM</td>
<td>oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genitive</td>
<td>MVRI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dative</td>
<td>MVRO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ablative</td>
<td>MVRO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(plural)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominative</td>
<td>MVRI</td>
<td>nominative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[vocative]</td>
<td>MVRI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accusative</td>
<td>MVROS</td>
<td>oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genitive</td>
<td>MVROVM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dative</td>
<td>MVROS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ablative</td>
<td>MVRO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2:
Imparisyllabics (subset of third declension)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Old French</th>
<th>Modern French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(singular)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominative</td>
<td>IMPERÁTOR</td>
<td>nominative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[vocative]</td>
<td>IMPERÁTOR</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accusative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓREM</td>
<td>oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genitive</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRIS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ablative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(plural)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nominative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRES</td>
<td>nominative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[vocative]</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accusative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRES</td>
<td>oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>genitive</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRVM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRIBVS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ablative</td>
<td>IMPERATÓRIBVS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The form empere(d)o(u)r, without -s, is clearly analogical — see discussion
(mostly feminine), most feminine adjectives, and many third-declension nouns lost all case distinctions in the transition to Old French and Old Occitan. Occasionally, a non-etymological -s was added to some parasyllabic third-declension masculine singulars to create a nominative case on the analogy of second-declension forms such as murs — thus, alongside Old French pere, Old Occitan paire < Latin PATER ‘father’, we find Old French peres, Old Occitan paires; and this analogy is even extended to some imparisyllabic nouns, as attested by forms such as Old French emper(e)dres, Old Occitan emperaires. In both Old French and Old Occitan, a nominative plural without -s is normal in the masculine imparisyllabic declension and in some other masculine nouns of the third declension; there is much debate over whether these forms can be traced back to postulated Latin nominative plurals such as *IMPERATÓRI, remodelled on the basis of the second declension (see Table 1), or whether, like the development in the singular just discussed, they are due to the later analogy of the predominant case-marking pattern of masculine nouns; for a survey, see Harris (1966). There are also some instances of imparisyllabic declensions, both masculine and feminine, which cannot be traced directly back to Latin.

In most nouns, the morphophonemic realization of the case-system was nugatory; in most feminines it was non-existent. The fact that the only inflectional ending was -s, that it served as a case-inflection in only a subset of masculine nouns, and that, even here, it could mark either case (nominative in the singular, oblique in the plural), ensured hesitation and confusion through most of the Old French and Old Occitan periods, and led to the ultimate demise of the system. In French and in some varieties of Occitan, the progressive disappearance of final [s] left the inflection as a purely orthographical device and may have sealed its fate. The existence in both languages of a small imparisyllabic declension, in which the exponence of morphological case (albeit only in the singular) rested on something more substantial, did not prevent the system from collapsing. Bédier (1927: 248) in a celebrated barb, claims:

Si l'on met à part les plus anciens textes, ceux du IXe et du Xe siècle, comme Sainte Eulalie ou Saint Léger, les règles de la déclinaison n'apparaissent dans toute leur pureté que dans les grammaires modernes de l'ancien français.4

However, northern French authors and scribes, at least, show some consistency in case usage into the very late fourteenth century and occasionally even beyond, although Zink (1990: 30) plausibly suggests that the nominal case-system had disappeared from spoken French as early as 1250. For detailed discussion, see Schösler (1984). Similar considerations apply to Occitan, although nominal case may have survived slightly longer in this language — see Ronjat (1937: 4-5) and Jensen (1976: 123-37; 1994: 17-18).

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4 ‘If we set aside the oldest texts, those which date from the ninth and tenth centuries, such as Sainte Eulalie and Saint Léger, the rules governing declension manifest themselves in their purest form only in modern grammars of Old French.’
2. Modern Outcomes

The form of a noun (or adjective) in modern French and Occitan is generally derived from the oblique case of the mediæval language (probably because this was the more frequently used case — see Foulet 1930: 32-4); but occasionally the nominative is the case which provides the modern form. The following is a (far from exhaustive) list of examples from French:

- **peintre** < nom. *PÍNCTOR ‘painter’
  (*peinteur < acc. *PINCTÓREM)
- **prêtre** < nom. PRÉSBYTER ‘priest’
  (*provoire < acc. PRESBYTERVM)
- **ancêtre** < nom. ANTECÉSSOR ‘ancestor’
  (*ancesseur < acc. ANTECESSÓREM)
- **sœur** < nom. SÓROR ‘sister’
  (*sereur < acc. SORÓREM)
- **traître** < nom. TRÁDITOR ‘traitor’
  (*traiteur < acc. TRADITÓREM)
- **fils** < nom. FILIVS ‘son’
  (*fil < acc. FILIVM)

Personal proper names may also be derived from the Latin nominative. We find examples not only in third-declension imparisyllabics:

- **Sartre** < nom. SÁRTOR ‘tailor’
  (*Sarteur < acc. SARTÓREM)

but in the second declension, too:

- **Charles** < nom. CAROLVS
  (\(^6\)Charle < acc. CAROLVM)
- **Georges** < nom. GEORGIVS
  (\(^6\)George < acc. GEORGIVM)
- **Louis** < nom. LVDOVICVS
  (*Loui < acc. LVDOVICVM)

However, this development is not systematic — names such as the following are derived from the Latin accusative/Old French oblique:

- **Pierre** < acc. PETRVM
  (*Pierres < nom. PETRVS)
- **Martin** < acc. MARTINVM
  (*Martins < nom. MARTINVS)
- **Étienne** < acc. STEPHANVM
  (*Étiennes < nom. STEPHANVS)

There are nominative survivals in Occitan, as well, although, because of the less standardized and more fragmented nature of the modern language, these are often rather localized, and it is consequently more difficult to make generalizations. Examples and discussion can be found in Ronjat (1937: 4-6) and Rohlfs (1977: 175).

As a rule, animate nouns are more likely than inanimate nouns to appear as the subject of a sentence and hence to occur in the nominative case; inanimates are less likely to assume this role. This fact may explain the developments noted above, although it is then difficult to see why only a small subset of animate nouns should have survived in the nominative. In any case, even animate nouns are generally more likely to occur in the oblique case than in the nominative; as Foulet (1930: 32) points out, a clause normally has only one subject, but may contain a large number of complements.

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5 The oblique form survives in the name of the rue des Prouvaires, in the 1\(^{st}\) arrondissement of Paris.
6 The forms Charle and George are occasionally found in literary usage, especially in verse for reasons of scansion. See Nyrop (1924: 205-206).
and adjuncts. It has been suggested (for example, by Zink 1997: 37) that the frequency of vocative use of certain animate common nouns and proper names may have favoured the survival of the nominative case-form (which was commonly used as a form of address); although, once again, it is not easy to establish principles which might account for the subset of nouns which continue this form. And, although grammars of Old French and Old Occitan generally state that the nominative was the case used as a form of address (see, for instance, Buridant 2001: 54), the oblique case was also frequent in this function (as noted by Foulet 1930: 8 and Ménard 1994: 20, amongst others, for French, and Jensen 1976: 126-9; 1994: 6-7 for Occitan). For general discussion of animacy and frequency as factors influencing the evolution of case-systems, see Winter (1971: 55-61); for specific discussion of the survival of the nominative in French, see Mańczak (1969) and Spence (1971).

3. Survival of Both Case-forms with Refunctionalization

3.1. Intramorphological Refunctionalization

The evolution of the case-system between Latin and Gallo-Romance is usually presented as a reduction in the number of forms (see, for instance, Pope 1934: 302-3 for French, and Anglade 1921: 215 for Occitan). However, assuming that the number of grammatical functions remains approximately constant, it also represents a refunctionalization, in as much as there are now fewer forms to express a similar range of functions. Specifically, the Latin nominative yields an Old Gallo-Romance case, likewise known as the nominative, which fulfils the functions of the Latin nominative and vocative (the disappearance of the distinct vocative form, which in Latin existed only in masculine nouns of the second declension, and its replacement by the nominative form was already well under way in Latin — see Väänänen 1981: 111); whilst the Latin accusative form gives rise to an oblique case, which subsumes the functions of the four remaining cases ( accusative, genitive, dative, ablative), and which is not infrequently used as a form of address. In other words, the former nominative comes to encode an external argument (i.e., a subject), whilst the former accusative comes to encode an internal argument or adjunct (the complement of a verb, be it direct object or indirect object, a measure phrase, the complement of a preposition, the possessor, etc.), and both forms are found as vocatives — a function which arguably lies outside the case-system (see note 2, above).

Although this paper is essentially concerned with nominal case, we should note an interesting development in the first- and second-person singular pronominal subsystems of some Gallo-Romance varieties, such as Picard, a northern dialect of French, where the nominative assumes (or retains) the role of verbal subject, the accusative comes to

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7 As these authorities make clear, the oblique case is used as a form of address in many texts which observe a scrupulous division of labour between nominative and oblique elsewhere in their syntax.
8 The conventional French terms for the nominative and oblique cases are ‘cas sujet’ and ‘cas régime’, respectively.
represent any complement of the verb, and a form deriving from the Latin dative — the so-called ‘disjunctive’ pronoun — is used in an ‘elsewhere’ function (most commonly as the complement of a preposition). This represents both a partial extension and a partial contraction of the role of the Latin accusative (which, for instance, could not encode an indirect object, but which could serve as the complement of a preposition).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Picard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘I, me’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. EGO</td>
<td>&gt; je</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. ME</td>
<td>&gt; me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(dat. MI(HI))</td>
<td>&gt; mi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Gossen (1970: 123-5). However, the refunctionalizations of the Latin case-system which will be the chief concern of this paper are lexical rather than paradigmatic. It is to these lexicalizations that I now turn.

3.2. Lexicalization

There are a number of lexicalizations of the nominative–accusative opposition — that is, instances in which each of the case-forms has survived, but as a separate lexical item. (It might be noted in passing that, within a typology of refunctionalization, such a development may be seen as the antithesis of suppletion, in which items with different lexical etyma come to form part of the same paradigm.) Some examples of this process are discussed below.9

3.2.1. French on vs. homme; Occitan om vs. ome

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>French, Occitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘man’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. HOMO</td>
<td>&gt; Fr. on, Occ. on, om</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. HOMINEM</td>
<td>&gt; Fr. homme, Occ. ome</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Nyrop (1924: 208-9), Ronjat (1937: 6). The refunctionalization here is not simply a lexicalization; it also involves a categorial split. Of the two case-forms of the original Latin noun, the accusative continues to encode a noun, whilst the original nominative now serves as the exponent of the indefinite subject pronoun. Despite the close contact between the two languages, this development appears to be an independent parallel evolution in Occitan rather than an influence from French (see Jensen 1994: 154-5).

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9 Note that, for reasons of space and clarity, the format adopted for the presentation of the data represents a simplification, and should not be read as implying that the Latin nominative and accusative forms yield the modern Gallo-Romance items directly; there is, of course, an intervening stage in which we find an opposition between a Gallo-Romance nominative form derived from the Latin nominative and a Gallo-Romance oblique form derived from the Latin accusative. Data cited from Occitan varieties are uniformly referred to as ‘Occitan’, regardless of the label used in the source of the data (which is often ‘Provençal’, lato sensu), with the exception of ‘Gascon’, which has the sanction of usage in reference to a distinct variety, and so has been retained as a separate term. However, the spelling of the Occitan examples is that given in the source from which they are taken; no attempt has been made to standardize or normalize orthography.
3.2.2. French Gilles vs. gille

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nom. ÆGIDIVS &gt; Gilles [personal proper name]</td>
<td>eponym, common noun: ‘carnival clown’, ‘simpleton’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. ÆGIDIVM &gt; gille</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See *TLF*, s.v. *gille* (IX, 244). In this example, the nominative remains in the function of proper (fore)name, whilst a common noun with human reference is derived eponymically from the accusative.

3.2.3. Occitan Gasc vs. gascoun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Occitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nom. VASCO &gt; Gasc [personal proper name]</td>
<td>‘Gascon’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. VASCONEM &gt; gascoun</td>
<td>‘Gascon’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Ronjat (1937: 6). Here, it is the accusative which continues the original meaning of ‘person (or language) from Gascony’. The nominative, on the other hand, gives rise to a family name, presumably via metonymy.

3.2.4. Occitan Bret, bret vs. bretoun

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Occitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nom. BRITTO &gt; Bret [personal proper name]</td>
<td>‘stammerer, stutterer’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. BRITTONEM &gt; bret</td>
<td>‘Breton’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Ronjat (1937: 6). Once again, the accusative continues the original meaning — in this instance, ‘person (or language) from Brittany’ — whilst the nominative gives rise to a metonymic family name. This development is exactly analogous to the *Gasc* vs. *gascoun* development discussed in the previous section. However, in this case there is an additional development, in that the nominative also gives rise to a common noun meaning ‘stammerer’ or ‘stutterer’, presumably by way of a metaphor equating foreign speech with linguistic ignorance or incompetence (in much the same way as the word for ‘German’ in Slavonic languages is cognate with the word meaning ‘dumb’ or ‘mute’ — see, for instance, Vasmer 1971: 62, s.v. *нёмец*). A semantic characterization of the difference between the two common nouns might include some reference to the role of agentivity in the definition of each: a stammerer or stutterer is recognizable as such on the basis of a specific action or activity, whilst the notions of nationality or ethnicity involved in being Breton are defined more statically, or even passively, primarily in terms of set-membership. Correspondingly, one may speak of taking action
to ‘cure’, or ‘curb’, or ‘correct’ a stammer; these concepts are inapplicable to ethnicity, even in the case of people who seek to deny their origins.

3.2.5. Occitan *dra(c) vs. dragoun*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Occitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘serpent, dragon’</td>
<td>‘imp, sprite, goblin’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. DRACO = dra(c)</td>
<td>‘dragon’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. DRACONEM = dragoun</td>
<td>‘dragon’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Ronjat (1937: 6). Here, the original nominative undergoes a metonymic shift and comes to refer to a mythical being with human characteristics, whilst the accusative retains the approximate meaning of the original item, yielding the name of a likewise mythical animal.

3.2.6. French Jacques vs. ja(c)que

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[personal proper name]</td>
<td>[personal proper name]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. IACOBVS = Jacques</td>
<td>‘peasant’, ‘bumpkin’; ‘jay’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. IACOBVM = ja(c)que</td>
<td>‘jerkin’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See TLF, s.v. jacques (X, 627), jaque, jacque (X, 653). This lexicalization has similarities with the Gilles vs. gille development discussed in §3.2.2, except that there is an eponymic split. Whilst the nominative is once again the origin of the proper (fore)name, it also yields two types of animate eponym: human (‘peasant’, and, by metonymic extension, ‘bumpkin’), and non-human (the ornithonym ‘jay’). The accusative, on the other hand, gives rise to an inanimate eponym, also derived metonymically (‘jerkin’ — a garment traditionally worn by peasants).

3.2.7. Occitan cassaire vs. cassadou

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Occitan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘hunter’</td>
<td>‘hunter’ (professional or in general), ‘hunter's hide’, ‘hoop-driver’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. *CAPTIATOR = cassaire</td>
<td>‘hunter’ (professional or in general), ‘hunter's hide’, ‘hoop-driver’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. *CAPTIATOREM = cassadou</td>
<td>‘hunter’ (professional), ‘hunter's hide’, ‘hoop-driver’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Mistral 1932, s.v. cassaire, cassadou (I, 486). Although both the original nominative and the original accusative yield nouns with human reference, the latter additionally gives rise to inanimate nouns denoting equipment used by hunters and coopers.
3.2.8. Gascon arrès vs. arrén

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>Gascon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘thing’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. RES</td>
<td>arrès</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. REM</td>
<td>arré, arrén</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See Rohlfs (1977: 175), Palay (1961: 58, 66). Here, the lexicalization is accompanied by a change of category, but there is no categorial split, in as much as each of the original cases of the Latin noun comes to serve as a pronoun in Gascon. The original nominative yields an animate pronoun, whilst the original accusative gives rise to an inanimate pronoun.

3.2.9. French chantre vs. chanteur

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Latin</th>
<th>French</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘singer’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nom. CANTOR</td>
<td>chantre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>acc. CANTOREM</td>
<td>chanteur</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

See TLF, s.v. chantre (V, 517), chanteur (V, 514). In this example, the nominative and accusative forms of the same common noun have given rise to two lexically distinct common nouns. The nominative maps on to a semantically more agentive noun and the accusative maps on to a semantically less agentive noun. Specifically, we may distinguish here between individual and group control. When an individual chanteur is singing alone, he controls both his own voice and the overall sound; these are the same. When a chanteur is singing as part of a group, he controls his own voice, but has little control over the sound of the ensemble. The chantre, on the other hand, controls the choir or the congregation; he is responsible for the overall sound in a way that an individual chanteur in an ensemble is not and cannot be. It is in this sense that the chantre is clearly a more involved participant than the chanteur. A picture of a chantre as more agentive than a chanteur also emerges clearly from the extended use of the former term to refer to a leading figure who serves as the mouthpiece of a cause or country — see TLF, s.v. chantre (V, 517).

4. Discussion

In a celebrated paper, Silverstein (1976) discusses the phenomenon of ‘split ergativity’, whereby, in a number of languages (including many spoken in Australia and the Americas), some types of NP behave accusatively (that is, they exhibit the nominative vs. accusative case-marking found in accusative languages, in which intransitive and transitive subjects pattern together), whilst others behave ergatively (that is, they exhibit the ergative vs. absolutive case-marking found in ergative languages, in which intransitive subjects pattern with direct objects). After surveying the data, he concludes that an item is more likely to exhibit nominative vs. accusative case-marking the higher its position on the following hierarchy (Silverstein 1976: 122):
first- and second-person pronouns
  > third-person pronouns
    > proper names
      > nouns with human reference
        > non-human animate nouns
          > inanimate nouns

On this issue, see also Dixon (1994: 83-97), who remarks that Silverstein's hierarchy ‘relates to the fact that certain kinds of NPs are very likely to be the controller of an event, others less likely, others most unlikely’ (ibid.: 84). Silverstein's analysis is synchronic rather than diachronic, and the languages he examines are typologically, as well as geographically, remote from Gallo-Romance. None the less, he is concerned with the relation of agency and animacy to case-marking, and the categories he establishes are, I suggest, highly relevant to the data under discussion in this paper. It has been observed that considerations of agency and animacy were relevant factors in the disappearance of the Old Gallo-Romance case-system — Schøsler (2001: 174), for instance, observes that proper nouns lose the distinction of case before other items in Old French (see also Ménard 1994: 20, and, for a similar development in Old Occitan, Jensen 1976: 127); whilst Buridant (2001: 77) notes that the -s inflection is ‘la marque par excellence du sujet déterminé animé en position d’agent’, 10 and that nominative case marking disappears earlier from items which do not fulfil these criteria. I suggest that these factors are also at work in the refunctionalization of the system, and that Silverstein's hierarchy provides a framework within which to view the changes involved. This paper has shown that, when the opposition between nominative and accusative/oblique has been refunctionalized in Gallo-Romance, it has come to encode, inter alia, the following dichotomies:

subject vs. complement/adjunct
  (nominative vs. oblique, see §3.1 above)

verbal subject vs. verbal complement (regardless of type)
  (compare Picard je vs. me, §3.1 above)

pronoun vs. noun
  (compare French on vs. homme, Occitan on, om vs. ome, §3.2.1 above)

proper name vs. common noun
  (compare French Gilles vs. gille, §3.2.2 above,
    Occitan Gasc vs. gascoun, §3.2.3 above,
    Occitan Bret vs. bretoun, §3.2.4 above)11

10 ‘… above all, the characteristic marker of an animate subject with determined reference in the role of agent’ (the context and Buridant’s subsequent discussion make it clear that the subjects he is talking about have determined reference rather than necessarily being accompanied by a determiner).

11 Note that the original nominative provides the etymon for the proper name in all these cases, regardless of whether the proper name itself constitutes the original meaning of the item or is derived metonymically from an original common noun.
human (or parahuman) referent vs. non-human referent
(compare Occitan *dra(c)* vs. *dragoun*, §3.2.5 above)

animate referent vs. inanimate referent
(compare French *Jacques* vs. *ja(c)que*, §3.2.6 above,
Occitan *cassaire* vs *cassadou*, §3.2.7 above,
Gascon *arrés* vs. *arré/arrén*, §3.2.8 above)

more active or involved participant vs. less active or involved participant
(compare Occitan *bret* vs. *bretoun*, §3.2.4 above,
French *chantre* vs. *chanteur*, §3.2.9 above)

When the refunctionalization results in a subject–complement split, as in the examples
of intramorphological refunctionalization given in §3.1, the nominative provides the
subject form and the accusative the complement form. Such a development is rather
unsurprising, as, at one level, it represents continuity: the more agentive case continues
to encode the more agentive function.\(^{12}\) I suggest that a similar principle is at work in
cases of lexicalization. When lexicalization of the opposition between nominative and
accusative/oblique yields items which can be related to different positions on
Silverstein's hierarchy, the original nominative serves as the exponent of the item or
group of items which is higher on the scale. The ‘cut-off’ point may vary (a fact which
is itself of interest); but there are no counter-examples to this principle. When
lexicalization yields results which lie outside or beyond Silverstein's hierarchy (as is the
case with *bret* vs. *bretoun* or *chantre* vs. *chanteur*), the hierarchy nonetheless provides
a pointer to the analysis of the change: the original nominative comes to encode the
participant with greater involvement in or control over some action.

5. Conclusion

This paper is very much a preliminary report; much work remains to be done. In
particular, only a small number of case-refunctionalizations has been examined; it
remains to be seen whether other instances of this phenomenon would reinforce or
weaken the hypothesis presented here, or simply shed no light on it.\(^{13}\) However, we

\(^{12}\) Here and the discussion which follows, it is important to recognize the distinction between grammatical
functions, such as ‘subject’, and semantic or thematic roles, such as ‘agent’. In claiming that the nominative is
‘the more agentive case’, I am not of course implying that all or even most nominatives encode agents.
The nominative is the normal case of the subject, that which is predicated of the subject, and items in
apposition to either. Subjects are often (but by no means always) agents; agents are characteristically (but
not always) subjects — a point made succinctly by Pinkster (1990: 16). However, given that agents are
prototypically subjects and that the nominative is the prototypical case of the subject, whilst other cases
code agents rarely, if at all, then it is clear that the nominative is more agentive than any other case, in
both Latin and Gallo-Romance.

\(^{13}\) Other plausible examples of the lexicalization of the original opposition between nominative and
accusative/oblique can be found; but many are problematic. Some cannot obviously (or at least
uncontroversially) be traced back to a Latin distinction; and, in some cases, one member of the pair has
undergone an irregular development — whether ‘learned’ or ‘popular’ — which the other has not, or may
even be a loan-word from another variety. For French, see Nyrop (1924: 205-9); for Occitan, see Ronjat
(1937: 5-7, 373-7) (and, for Gascon, Rohlfs 1977: 175); and compare Mańczak (1969) and Spence (1971).
may reach the following tentative conclusion. All the examples of refunctionalization studied appear to conform to the same basic principle: the original nominative case-form consistently comes to encode the more agentive member of the opposition, whilst the original accusative or oblique case-form comes to encode the less agentive one. In other words, although the opposition is refunctionalized, the basic distinction between a more agentive item and a less agentive item is retained. This process is in keeping with the proposal made in Smith (1999) that morphological refunctionalization involves a process of ‘core-to-core’ mapping.

References


Non-restrictive Adjective Interpretation and Association with Focus

Robert Truswell

1. Introduction

The possibility in Romance in certain circumstances of a ‘non-restrictive’ interpretation of attributive adjectives, known in French as an épithète de nature, is frequently acknowledged in the literature (see e.g. Waugh 1977, Forsgren 1978, Goes 1999). Although authors have generally (and correctly) related this use of attributive adjectives to its ‘poetic’ or ‘emphatic’ function, the specific syntactic and semantic mechanisms through which this effect is available are not generally discussed.

The link between les épithètes de nature and presupposition has long been asserted by non-generative grammarians, as Waugh's, Forsgren's, and Goes' summaries of the history of study of this construction show. For example, Marouzeau (1922, reproduced by Forsgren 1978: 44) claims that the meaning of an adjective in its normal post-nominal position is ‘non pas accepté, mais présenté comme appartenant à son substantif’,¹ the difference between some element of meaning being accepted or presented apparently corresponding to the modern distinction between presupposition and assertion. Meanwhile, Roubaud (1786, reproduced by Forsgren 1978: 48) writes as follows:

Lorsque vous dites un savant homme, vous supposez que cet homme est savant; & lorsque vous dites un homme savant, vous assurez qu'il l'est. Dans le premier cas, vous lui donnez la qualification par laquelle il est distingué; dans le second, celle par laquelle vous voulez le faire distinguer. Là, la science est hors de doute; ici, vous voulez la faire connoître.²

Again, this would appear to parallel the modern distinction between presupposition and assertion. However, such descriptions of épithètes de nature, with the semantic contribution of the adjective apparently already recoverable from the meaning of the noun or from real-world knowledge, raise the question of exactly what the function of a non-restrictive adjective is. The claim of this paper is that the possibility of a non-restrictive interpretation of attributive adjectives can be explained by adapting established theories of association with focus (e.g. Rooth 1992, Rizzi 1997) to the noun phrase.

The remainder of this paper will be structured as follows: in §2 I will illustrate the non-restrictive use of attributive adjectives in French, and point out similarities and differences to other uses of adjectives; in §3, I will describe current syntactic and semantic

¹ ‘not accepted, but rather presented, as belonging to its substantive’
² ‘When you say ‘un savant homme’, you suppose that this man is erudite; and when you say ‘un homme savant’, you assert that he is. In the first case, you attribute to him the qualification which distinguishes him; in the second, the qualification by which you wish to distinguish him. There, his erudition is beyond doubt; here, you wish to make it known.’
theories of association with focus, mainly with reference to English, and explore the possibility of extending these theories to the noun phrase; and in §4 I will attempt to show that similarities between non-restrictive and focused uses of adjectives can be captured by a simple extension to standard theories of association with focus. Some extensions of this analysis to closely related constructions will be discussed in §5.

2. Non-restrictive Adjective Use

The phenomenon of non-restrictive interpretation of adjectives is illustrated by the contrast between the use of adjectives in the following examples: 3

(1a) i. ce plat pays ‘this country, which is flat’
   ii. ce pays plat ‘this flat country’

(1b) i. ma verte prairie ‘my meadow, which is green’
   ii. ma prairie verte ‘my green meadow’

(1c) i. la catholique Irlande ‘Ireland, which is catholic’
   ii. l’Irlande catholique ‘the catholic (part of) Ireland’

Two salient characteristics unite the non-restrictive constructions (in the i. examples). Firstly, the adjective is pre-nominal, whereas it is found post-nominally in the restrictive ii. examples. And secondly, in each case, the noun phrase is constructed with a definite determiner. I claim that both of these, while not essential, are standard characteristics of the non-restrictive adjective construction. Although it is possible to find non-restrictive interpretations of post-nominal adjectives, as in the following Spanish example, I believe that this is a different, reduced relative, construction, which I will not analyse here.

(2) La carrera, accidentada, fue suspendida.
    The race, which was calamitous, was suspended.
    (Gutiérrez-Rexach & Mallen 2001: 118)

Also, we shall see that while replacing the definite determiner with an indefinite determiner does not always result in ungrammaticality, it frequently gives rise to a clear shift in the interpretation of the adjective:

(3) de #(très) plat pays ‘#(very) flat countries’

We see here that a modification of (1a) i., replacing a definite with an indefinite determiner, no longer has a readily available non-restrictive interpretation (instead, the AdjP functions to restrict the reference of the noun to objects which possess the property of

3 In the English translations, I have resorted to using non-restrictive relative clauses when translating non-restrictive adjectives, for the sake of clarity. Although non-restrictive use of adjectives is possible in English, as discussed in §5.3, the more fixed word order can obscure the contrast on the page. This is not necessarily meant to imply a relative-clause-based analysis of attributive adjective constructions, however.
being flat to a high degree), and arguably requires modification of *plat* by *très* ‘very’, to be fully acceptable.

One immediate question is what the links are between this construction, and other occurrences in pre-nominal position of adjectives predominantly placed post-nominally,\(^4\) as in the following example:

(4a) *Nous vous souhaitons un agréable voyage.*

We hope you have a pleasant journey.

(4b) *Nous vous souhaitons un voyage agréable.*

We hope you have a pleasant journey.

In terms of meaning, there is little to choose between these two examples, the first of which is used on a Eurostar announcement. However, *agréable* is predominantly used post-nominally, in the order (4b). My claim, to be formalised later, is that the possibility of using *agréable* pre-nominally in (4a) is related to the circumstances in which (4a) is uttered: everyone who hears this statement is on a train, with the intention of going on a journey. This much is part of the common ground. The new content of (4a) is that the speaker hopes this journey will be pleasant. The announcer, in uttering (4a), focuses the adjective by positioning it pre-nominally, and presupposes the content of the noun.

Consider an alternative scenario. A contestant has won a prize on a game show. Exactly which prize he has won will be determined by his choosing one of several envelopes in the presenter's hand. The prizes could be anything: money, a new car, travel. The presenter asks the contestant what he hopes is in the envelope he picks, and the contestant replies that he could use a holiday. The presenter could then utter something like (4b) quite unremarkably, with a meaning along the lines of ‘we hope you win a nice holiday’.\(^5\) (4a) would be less normal, however: it cannot readily be interpreted in the same way as (4b), but only (if at all) along the lines of ‘we hope you win a really good holiday’, with strong emphasis on the adjective (which, in turn, is more natural if preceded by the

---

\(^4\) I will not address in this article the much-discussed issue of the correct analysis of the minority of adjectives, such as *grand* ‘big’, *bon* ‘good’, and “modal” adjectives such as *faux* ‘fake’, which occur pre-nominally by default. Equally, most of the proposals in this article do not hold true for relational adjectives (in other words, denominal adjectives, where the noun from which they are derived stands in some relation to the head noun), as in the following examples:

i. *la limousine présidentielle* ‘the presidential limousine’

ii. *la chaleur solaire* ‘warmth from the sun’

Such adjectives have very different possibilities. They resist both being placed pre-nominally and being modified by *très*, either operation leading to a clear shift in the interpretation of the adjective, so that it is no longer relational, in the above sense:

iii. *la présidentielle limousine* ‘the limousine, which has the qualities normally associated with the president's car’

iv. *la limousine très présidentielle* ‘the limousine, which has a great deal of the qualities normally associated with the president's car’

This class of adjectives falls outside the scope of this article, for reasons of space.

\(^5\) I accept that this would not be the most natural-sounding utterance. However, as a minimal pair, it hopefully illustrates the point despite being somewhat clunky.
degree modifier *très*, which is claimed by Goes 1999 to favour pre-nominal position independently of the function of the adjective).\(^6\)

The principal difference between the original, Eurostar-based scenario, and this, game-show-based, scenario, for our purposes, is that the fact that the addressees are going on a journey can be taken as part of the common ground in the original scenario, whereas the contestant in the game show scenario may not win a trip as a prize – he could win money, or a new fridge, instead. In other words, the difference is that, in the second scenario, the proposition that the addressee is going on a journey cannot felicitously be presupposed. This difference in the context of utterance influences the relationship between the possible positions of the adjective, and the available interpretations of the adjective, relative to the noun, in those positions.

The central claim of this paper is that exceptional pre-nominal uses, such as (4a), of normally post-nominal adjectives may often be cases of a focus–presupposition structure, and that the different possibilities of interpretation of an adjective within that structure, as non-restrictive, emphatic, or contrastive, for example, depend largely on the semantic characteristics and discourse properties of the noun phrase as a whole within which the focused adjective is embedded. Fleshing out this claim will require several assumptions concerning the syntax and semantics of the focus–presupposition structure within the noun phrase, and concerning the semantics of different types of noun phrase. To these ends, I turn in the following section to the task of adapting theories of association with focus, generally designed with clausal semantics in mind, to the noun phrase.

3. Focus in the Noun Phrase

3.1. Alternative Semantics

The theory of focus which I will adopt in essence here is that of Rooth (1992), a version of Alternative Semantics. The fundamental assumption of this theory is that an element bearing focus has, in addition to its ordinary semantic value, a *focus semantic value*, consisting of the set of appropriately typed alternatives to the ordinary semantic value. At the level at which focus is interpreted, then, a focus-sensitive operator can be represented as a function of both the ordinary semantic value \([\alpha]^0\), and the focus semantic value \([\alpha]^f\) (equivalent to the set of alternatives to \(\alpha\)). The exact interpretation of a phrase containing a focused element will therefore be a function of the larger construction in which the focus-bearing phrase is embedded, and a pragmatically determined alternative set \(\text{ALT}(\alpha)\), a subset of the focus semantic value, among other factors.

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\(^6\) Richard Ashdowne (p.c.) raises the issue of whether the pre-nominal position of *agréable* in (4a) could be related to *un agréable voyage* taking on some of the function of the formulaic and pragmatically weak *un bon voyage*. While this may well be the case, the issue still remains of why *agréable* is less acceptable pre-nominally in this second scenario.
I will illustrate with the standard example of the focus-sensitive adverb *only*, drawing heavily on Rooth (1992). Let us assume the following notation:

(5) Ordinary semantic value of \([\alpha]_f\) is \([[\alpha]]^0\).
    Focus semantic value of \([\alpha]_f\) is \([[\alpha]]^f\).
    The pragmatically fixed alternative set, a subset of \([[\alpha]]^f\), is \(\text{ALT}(\alpha)\).

We can then represent the meaning of *only* as follows:

(6) \([[\text{only } VP]] = \lambda x. [[\text{VP}]]^0(x) \land \forall P \in \text{ALT}(\text{VP}). P(x) \rightarrow P \equiv \text{VP} \)

At the level where *only* is merged, the focus feature on some component of VP is interpreted, so the meaning of *only* VP is a function of the meaning of *only*, of the ordinary semantic value \([[\text{VP}]]^0\), and of the pragmatically fixed alternative set \(\text{ALT}(\text{VP})\). In the standard case, illustrated in (7) below, this alternative set is a set of properties obtained by replacing the focused subconstituent of VP with other relevant, appropriately typed, elements. In this way, the focus introduced at the NP level is interpreted at the larger, VP level, as *only* is the element which determines the relationship between the ordinary semantic value and the members of the alternative set. *Only* asserts the ordinary semantic value, and, furthermore, asserts that it is the sole member of the alternative set which can be truthfully asserted. This leads to representations such as the following:

(7) \([[\text{only introduce Bill to } [\text{Sue}]_f]] =
    \lambda x. \text{introduce}(x,b,s) \land \forall y \in \text{ALT}(s). \text{introduce}(x,b,y) \rightarrow y \equiv s
    \text{where } \text{ALT}(s) = \{\text{Jane, Tony, Elizabeth, ...}\} \)

Other examples of focus are not interpreted by any one overt element at the level of interpretation but instead are licensed by the construction as a whole. This is the case with contrastive focus, illustrated by Rooth with the following example:

(8) ‘An [American]_f farmer was talking to a [Canadian]_f farmer.’

A contrastive interpretation of the two focused constituents in this sentence is available only if a presupposition is satisfied that the ordinary semantic value of each of these constituents is a member of the alternative set of the other. Unlike the case of *only* above, where focus affects truth conditions, then, a contrastive interpretation of focus is only available if certain presuppositions are satisfied. It is still a live issue exactly why focus sometimes affects truth-conditions (as with *only*) and sometimes adds presuppositions instead (see Rooth 1992: 110-12 for some suggestions). However, it seems undeniable that a focus feature is not interpreted identically in all instances (although all interpretations of a focus feature have the unifying characteristic of reference to an alternative set, as well as, in English, prosodic similarities), and that many interpretations of a focus feature are only available if certain presuppositions are satisfied. I will claim below that this is the case with certain patterns of focus use within the noun phrase. This is, in fact, my reason for adopting this theory of focus (rather than, say, the Structured Meanings theory of Krifka 1991, 1992, which attempts to calculate the ordinary and focus semantic values of a phrase more deterministically by recourse to LF movement of a focused constituent to create an
operator–variable structure): as noted in the introduction, the presuppositional element of *les épithètes de nature* has long been remarked upon, and Rooth assumes that the ‘background’ (the alternative set relative to which focus is interpreted) is not determined in the compositional semantics, but rather presupposed, as it is clear that there are certain cases where the background of the construction is not structurally determined. Rooth (1992: 109) discusses the following example:

(9) ‘People who [grow]$_F$ rice generally only [eat]$_F$ rice.’

This is a symmetrical contrastive focus construction, as in (8) above, with *grow* and *eat* contrasting with each other. However, *eat* is also in the VP over which *only* quantifies. If focus were related to LF raising, we would expect the alternatives to ‘[eat]$_F$ rice’ to be a set of other things which could be done to rice, and the meaning of ‘only [eat]$_F$ rice’ would be roughly as follows:7

\[ \lambda x. \text{eat}(x, \text{rice}) \land \forall P \in \text{ALT(eat)}. \text{P}(x, \text{rice}) \rightarrow \text{P} \equiv \text{eat} \]

This would be universally false, as we know from (9) that the people in question also grow rice. However, it is possible for (9) to be truthfully uttered. This is because we interpret *only* as quantifying over different types of things to eat, rather than over different things to do to rice. This is directly at odds with the location of the phonological realisation of focus, however: LF raising of focused *eat* would create a structure such as $\lambda P \forall x. \text{P}(x, \text{rice})$. In this case, the background to a focused phrase cannot always be determined by LF raising of the focused constituent, and the non-compositional nature of the Alternative Semantics analysis must be maintained.

One puzzling feature of the Alternative Semantics approach of Rooth (1992: 90-3) is that Rooth requires that $\text{ALT(}\alpha\text{)}$ contains both $\alpha$ and at least one element distinct from $\alpha$. Although this requirement is fulfilled by standard cases of association with focus, such as those discussed above, it is not clear that there is any theoretical reason why focus, in general, should require an element in the alternative set to be distinct from the ordinary semantic value. Although it is hard to see how anything else could be the case when we concentrate on clausal focus, my claim is that focus of attributive adjectives in the noun phrase represents a case where the alternative set need not contain any elements distinct from the ordinary semantic value, and that this is what lies behind the availability of non-restrictive adjective interpretations. To defend this position, I will first argue for the possibility of a noun phrase-internal focus position.

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7 This account is not helped by the possibility that *rice* in (9) also bears a focus feature, and that prosodic constraints prevent the phonological realisation of focus on *rice* in addition to *eat*. Even if this is so, an account of focus based on LF raising would have to assume that *eat* in (9) raised, leaving a variable, and so the interpretation of *only eat rice* as quantifying over properties of the form $\lambda x \lambda y. \text{eat}(y, x)$ should not be available.
3.2. Evidence for Focus in Noun Phrases

Truswell (2004) provides evidence from searches on www.google.com that two classes of English attributive adjectives, with subsective and intersective semantics respectively, are freely ordered within themselves, but are generally rigidly ordered relative to each other, so subsective adjectives occur further from the noun than intersective adjectives. This is shown by the following data:

- Free relative ordering of intersective adjectives referring to material, origin, colour, shape and ‘similarity’:
  
  (11a) wooden French wine crates – French wooden carriage clock
  (11b) wooden red clock – red wooden shoes
  (11c) wooden feline effigy – canine wooden cutouts
  (11d) wooden circular pedestal – circular wooden platform
  (11e) French red wine – dark green French marble
  (11f) French feline press – feline French road movie
  (11g) French circular occasional table – circular French desk
  (11h) green feline eyes – feline green eyes
  (11i) circular red patch – red circular collector's seal
  (11j) grotesque circular feline mask – feline oval pupils

- Free relative ordering of subsective adjectives referring to size and novelty:
  
  (12) new big idea – big new world

- Subsective adjectives dominate intersective adjectives:
  
  (13a) big wooden bird – new wooden floors
  (13b) big French bronze sculpture – new French strikes
  (13c) big red dog – new red dress
  (13d) big feline corpse – new feline tracks
  (13e) big circular barbells – new circular platform

- Intersective adjectives do not generally dominate subsective adjectives:
  
  (14a) wooden big office desks – wooden new doll's house accessory
  (14b) the French big bazaar – French new ambassador

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8 Intersective adjectives are those, such as colour, shape, and nationality terms, whose semantic contribution approximates to conjunction, or set intersection. So red clock means something like \( \lambda x. \text{red}(x) \wedge \text{clock}(x) \). The same is not true of subsective adjectives, such as terms denoting size and age. A big bird is probably not big in comparison to a big planet. As the meaning of subsective adjectives such as big is determined relative to a comparison class, the interpretation cannot be straightforwardly modelled as conjunction. It appears instead that such adjectives determine a subset of the extension of the nominal property, hence the term subsective.
It is equally clear, however, that the deviant intersective > subsective order is acceptable, providing certain conditions are met. Specifically, the intersective adjective must bear heavy stress, and the group consisting of the subsective adjective and the noun must be already salient in the discourse context, as the following examples show:

(15a) I drive a big black car.
(15b) ??I drive a black big car.
(15c) #I drive a BLACK big car. [when big cars are not a salient part of the discourse context]
(15d) ?All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a black big car. [no stress on black]
(15e) All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a BLACK big car.

Here, we see the standard order (15a) and the unacceptability under normal circumstances of the opposite order (15b). (15c-d) show that the opposite order continues to be unacceptable if big car doesn't refer to a salient Kind in the discourse context, and black doesn't bear heavy stress. However, (15e) shows that this order is acceptable if both of these criteria are met.

Of course, both of these criteria are usually assumed to be part of the definition of focus, as well. The simplest assumption would then be that this is not coincidental, and that these exceptional orderings of multiple attributive adjectives represent instances of focus within the noun phrase. I will flesh out this proposal in the following section, sketching the mechanisms behind focus of attributive adjectives.

3.3. The Workings of Noun-Phrase-Internal Focus

Roberts (1998) proposes a view of focus such that an expression containing focus is felicitous only if the set of propositions corresponding to the ordinary semantic value of the expression with the focused element replaced by the different members of the focus alternative set, is congruent to the set of possible alternative answers to the question under discussion at that time. So a simple case of a focused element in a clause with a focus alternative set, as in (16), is felicitous only if the question under discussion at the time is as in (17):

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9 Here, and in (14d) below, intersective > subsective order is, exceptionally, grammatical, because the subsective adjective is part of a fixed idiom. Elsewhere in (14), the grammaticality judgements are subjective and impressionistic. There appears, however, to be general agreement that all non-idiomatic examples are degraded to some extent.
(16) … but JOHN, I like.
   \[\text{ALT}(\text{John}) = \{\text{Bill}, \text{Mary}, \text{Nigel}, \ldots\}\]

(17) Who do you like?

Given the hypothesis that examples such as (15e) represent cases of noun phrase-internal focus, we would expect from Roberts (1998) that, for this phrase to be felicitous, the question under discussion must be as follows:

(18) What kind of big car?

This suggests that noun phrase-internal focus represents a relation between two Kinds, in the sense of Carlson (1977): a Kind (in (15e), big cars) which must be already salient in the discourse, and another Kind (in (15e), big cars which are also black) which is a subkind of the first kind, where \textit{subkind} could be defined as follows:

\[
\text{k}_1 \text{ is a subkind of } \text{k}_2 \text{ iff } \forall x. x \text{ is an object } \rightarrow (\text{R}(x, \text{k}_1) \rightarrow \text{R}(x, \text{k}_2))
\]

where \text{R} is a ‘realisation relation’ (as in Carlson 1977, Zamparelli 2000), and ‘objects’ are individuals or stages, as opposed to Kinds, in Carlson's ontology.

Evidence for this position can be adduced from the admissibility of utterances such as the following:

(20) All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a \textit{black one}.

Zamparelli (2000) argues that \textit{one} is a pro-Kind (or pro-KIP in his terminology), and its antecedent here would be \textit{big cars}. In that case, \textit{big car} must represent a Kind in (15e).

Furthermore, it seems that \textit{black big car} is a Kind in (15e). Circumstantial evidence for this is that a \textit{singular} noun phrase can serve as antecedent for a pronoun \textit{them}, functioning as a bare \textit{plural} naming the Kind in question. This is shown by the following:

(21) I've got a \textit{labrador}, I love \textit{them}, they're just so nondescript and doggy.

Parallel continuations of (15e) are possible, however:

(22) All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a \textit{black big car}, I love \textit{them}, they strike fear into the hearts of all that see them.

In that case, it appears that both \textit{big car} and \textit{black big car} represent Kinds in (15e), and that \textit{black big car} is a subkind of \textit{big car}, as defined in (19).

Syntactically, a classic treatment of focus (following, e.g., Chomsky 1976, Krifka 1991, 1992, Rizzi 1997) has assumed that it represents a case of A'-movement, either covertly or overtly, with a phrase bearing a [+F] feature raising into a local Spec–head
agreement/checking configuration with a Focus head. If this is the correct analysis, then both options are available in the case of adjectival focus, as the following examples show:

(23a) All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a **BLACK** big car. [Focused element is fronted.]

(23b) All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a big **BLACK** car. [Focused element *in situ*]

I will assume that the overt part of the movement-based account of focalisation constructions is correct: it seems fairly uncontroversial that, clausally at least, such examples of focalisation have all the major characteristics of A’-movement, linking a position related to argument structure to a *criterial position*, in the sense of Rizzi (2004), that is, a position related to properties of information structure, etc. While it may be less obvious that this is the correct account in the case of the noun phrase, where notions such as ‘argument structure’ are more tenuous, and particularly in the case of attributive adjectives, when the correct analysis of adjunction in general is still very much a live issue, the basic semantic and prosodic similarities between clausal focus and examples such as (23) warrant proposing syntactic similarity too, as far as possible.

If focalisation is A’-movement to a specifier position, then one immediate consequence is that we expect focused elements to appear on the left of the noun phrase or the clause. This follows from the observation that, while head–complement order may or may not be parametrised (see, for example, Kayne 1994 and Ernst 2002, for opposing views on the matter), the vast majority of currently available linguistic data can reasonably be analysed using only leftward specifiers. Universally leftward specifiers are supported by Kayne (1994), because there are no languages which place the verb in penultimate position, mirroring V2 languages, for example. If rightward specifiers were available, this would be unexpected. If specifiers are universally on the left, then movement of a phrase to [Spec, Foc] should also place this phrase to the left of its sister, regardless of where it originated.

In terms of focus in the noun phrase, then, we expect cases of languages where normally post-nominal adjectives appear pre-nominally, because they have moved to a specifier position: whatever determines the normal position of an adjective should have no bearing on the pre-nominal position of an AdjP moved to [Spec, Foc].

This account of focus means that the discourse conditions on the focus construction can only be defined in non-constituent terms. Consider (23a). The syntactic structure of the noun phrase in this example is plausibly as follows:

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10 Rooth (1992) and Pulman (1997) give reasons to believe that at least the covert part of the analysis is problematic, as the background to an *in-situ* focused element is not necessarily equivalent to the remnant which would be left by LF movement, and non-constituents can be targeted by focus *in-situ*. However, the more relevant construction for discussion of French non-restrictive adjectives is the one with overt fronting of the focused constituents, where the movement-based analysis is less controversial, so I ignore these issues here.
On the analysis presented above, the two Kinds in this construction are *big car* and *big black car*, and *big car* must already be salient in the discourse context for the focus construction to be felicitously used. However, this is not easily definable in compositional structural terms: in any standard compositional model, the Kind *big car* is never constructed. Instead, it is presupposed to be present in the discourse context. The requirements therefore exhibit what Rooth calls ‘a certain kind of non-locality … typical of presupposition’ (Rooth 1992: 93).

Generalising across examples, what we are interested in is the following kind of noun phrase structure:  

(25) 

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11 (25) represents a minimal view of the determiner functional system. Increasingly, the consensus (as in Lyons 1999, Zamparelli 2000 and Borer 2005) is that D should be decomposed into at least two functional heads, either separating definiteness from cardinality, or strong from weak determiners, the latter in either case being the location of the indefinite article. Should such a position prove to be correct, it would be quite compatible with the results of this paper, which will show that the type of determiner influences the interpretation of a focus phrase embedded beneath it, while remaining largely agnostic about the syntactic structure of such configurations.
This structure includes the KIP, or Kind Phrase, layer, argued for in Zamparelli (2000). This can be thought of as the level where Carlsonian Kinds are formed, and the level for which English one, French en and Italian ne (with very different distributions) are pro-forms. Noun phrase-internal focus concerns the relationship between the Kind denoted at the KIP level, before merger of Foc\(^0\) and movement of the AdjP into a local agreement configuration, and the Kind denoted by the remnant, once the AdjP has raised. The assimilation of the structure in (25) to other structurally similar cases such as clausal focus, with which cases such as (23) share so many characteristics, including this ‘non-locality’, would appear to be plausible.

It seems, then, that the syntactic and semantic circumstantial evidence all points to adjectival focus in English presupposing the presence in the discourse context of a Kind corresponding to the background of the focus construction, and introducing a new Kind, a subkind of the original Kind. The availability of focus constructions in French, and more generally in Romance, is widely acknowledged. We may reasonably expect, then, a similar construction to be available in French. The question for the following section is the role of focus in the various interpretations of pre-nominal adjectives in French.

4. Focus and French Pre-nominal Adjectives

We now have a ready-made explanation for the availability of pre-nominal agréable in (4a). Everything is in conformity with the felicity conditions of the focus–presupposition structure: voyage is correctly presupposed to be salient in the discourse context, because the phrase was uttered on a Eurostar train. The focus is on the subkind agréable voyage, which contrasts with other types of journey (mediocre, awful, etc.). As with the case of a BLACK big car above, the phrase is indefinite, and the focused adjective restricts the denotation of the noun to a proper subkind.

We can also allow for the admissibility of (3) only with très, as this contributes to the emphasis on the AdjP as a whole. The model of adjectival focus presented in §3 seems, then, to handle the major cases of normally post-nominal adjectives unexpectedly found pre-nominally in indefinite noun phrases, quite easily.

Turning to definite noun phrases, we find many more examples of non-restrictive interpretations of fronted adjectives than with indefinite noun phrases. I believe that this arises from a likely incompatibility between the pragmatic and semantic mechanisms behind definiteness and those behind contrastive focus, in particular. Specifically, definite noun phrases presuppose a certain identifiability (that is, discourse salience and/or discourse uniqueness) of their referent: the following is infelicitous if either there is no salient referent for the noun phrase in the discourse context (26a), or there are salient referents, but they are not unique (26b). The same examples with indefinite determiners are unproblematic, because there are no discourse salience or discourse uniqueness constraints on the occurrence of indefinite noun phrases (26c-d):
(26) *J'étais dans un bar assez bien connu hier soir...*
   I was in a fairly well-known bar last night ...

(26a) *#Le girafe est entré. ‘The giraffe entered.’*

(26b) *#L’homme est entré. ‘The man entered.’*

(26c) *Un girafe est entré. ‘A giraffe entered.’*

(26d) *Un homme est entré. ‘A man entered.’*

On the other hand, contrastive focus involves selecting an alternative from among several different salient possibilities:

(27) …*mais JEAN, j’aime. ‘…But JOHN, I like’*

   → I don’t like any of the salient alternatives to John, i.e. any members of 
   \[ALT(John).\]

Two highly limiting, and almost mutually exclusive, conditions would then need to be met for a definite noun phrase to include a contrastively focused adjective. It would have to simultaneously satisfy the presupposition of identifiability that comes with definiteness, and the presupposition, from the contrastive focus, that the alternative set contains some element distinct from the ordinary semantic value of the phrase. This is not to claim that these types of presupposition are fundamentally incompatible: indeed, I will argue in §5.2 below that both may be satisfied in the case of constructions with definite noun phrases containing null nominals. However, it is clear that, in many cases, focus cannot be interpreted contrastively for this reason.

One possibility is that a non-restrictive interpretation of a focused adjective arises precisely when there is no element distinct from the ordinary semantic value of the noun phrase in the focus alternative set. A non-restrictive interpretation then arises when every object which realises the Kind denoted by the background, also necessarily realises the subkind denoted by the noun phrase as a whole. This is equivalent to presupposing that the intension of the focused adjective necessarily forms part of the intension of the noun phrase, or that an object realising the intension of the noun phrase could not do other than realise the intension of the adjective too.

Consider, for example, (1b) i. Here, *verte* is placed pre-nominally, in contrast to its standard post-nominal position. If this is indeed due to focusing of *verte*, then this cannot have a contrastive interpretation relative to *prairie*, as meadows are, more or less by definition, green. Instead, the relationship between focused *verte*, the alternative set, and *prairie*, is that any other subkind of *prairie* in the alternative set will still have the property of being green. In other words, greenness is presented as an inherent property of meadows.

The time has come to formalise this intuition. Firstly, I will elaborate on my understanding of the KIP layer in the phrase structure trees above. Carlson (1977) introduced the notion of ‘names of KINDS of things’ (Carlson 1977: 3). Even in that
dissertation, it was clear that this notion did not only correspond to bare nouns: Carlson includes examples of Adj–N compounds functioning as Kinds (e.g. ‘Jerry hates small ugly creatures’, Carlson 1977: 22). Today, we could see Zamparelli's proposed KI⁰ head as the functional unit which introduces a Kind. If we can indeed consider Adj–N groups, as well as simple nouns, as Kinds, then it is surely not the case that there is something inherently Kind-like about a given noun, or lexical item. Rather, it seems that Kind-formation is more usefully seen as a matter of functional structure. I will assume for concreteness that a nominal lexical root denotes a \(s, e, t\) property, and that attributive adjectives denote \(\langle s, e, t \rangle, \langle s, e, t \rangle\) functions, the identity type (i.e. a type of the form \(\langle a, a \rangle\)) guaranteeing that the output of these functions remains a property. Highly speculatively, KI⁰ could perhaps be seen as the level at which a property first becomes related to a set of things (recall that Carlson's definition was as the proper name of kinds of things).

Let us assume, again maximising the similarity between clausal and adjectival focus, that a focused adjective is distinguished semantically by having, in addition to its ordinary semantic value, \([\text{Adj}]^0\), a contextually determined alternative set, \(\text{ALT(Adj)}\), of alternative functions from properties to properties. At the level of the Foc⁰ head, where a focus feature is interpreted, the Kind-forming KI⁰ head will already have been merged, if the argumentation concerning the felicity conditions on focused adjectives in §3.3 is on the right track. If, in the course of the derivation of the noun phrase, members of \(\text{ALT(Adj)}\) are operated on in parallel with \([\text{Adj}]^0\), then at the KIP level, the alternative set will give a set of Kinds as alternatives to the Kind formed by using the ordinary semantic value \([\text{Adj}]^0\). The focus feature will then be interpreted as a relation between Kinds. As a notational convention, let \(K_0\) represent the Kind resulting from use of the ordinary semantic value \([\text{Adj}]\), of the focused AdjP, in determining the referent of the noun phrase, and let \(K_1, K_2, K_3\ldots\) represent the Kinds resulting from using members of \(\text{ALT(Adj)}\) in determining the referent of the noun phrase. I will assume that the ordinary semantic value of the KIP introduces a Kind into the universe of discourse. The question is, what does the focus semantic value contribute?

One answer would be that the interpretation of the focus feature introduces a presupposition that whatever predicate \(P\) holds of the ordinary Kind \((K_0)\) does not hold of any Kind in \(\text{ALT(Adj)}\) distinct from the ordinary Kind, or in other words, that any Kind in \(\text{ALT(Adj)}\) of which \(P\) holds is a subkind of \(K_0\). This would mean that the assertions and presuppositions of contrastive and non-restrictive adjectival focus were identical, and that the only difference between the two interpretations of adjectival focus was a condition on the members of the alternative set, such that focus is interpreted contrastively iff the alternative set contains elements distinct from \(K_0\) (i.e. elements that are not subkinds of \(K_0\)), and is interpreted non-restrictively iff the alternative set contains no elements distinct from \(K_0\). In other words, adjectival focus is interpreted non-restrictively if the noun, by definition, has the property denoted by the focused adjective – if the adjectival property is inherent to the nature of the nominal property, or has been inextricably associated with the referent of the nominal by the preceding discourse.
Side-stepping the very thorny issues of the subsequent embedding of these layers underneath determiner heads, and instead simply assuming, for concreteness, a Generalised Quantifier-like representation of the relationship between the Kind and the rest of the clause, we could formalise the relationships between Kinds presupposed by focus as follows:

(28a) **Contrastive focus:**
   i. Asserted: \( \lambda P. P(K_0) \)
   ii. Presupposed: \( \forall K_n \in \text{ALT}(K_{IP}). P(K_n) \rightarrow K_n \) is a subkind of \( K_0 \).
   iii. The contrastive part: \( \exists K_m \in \text{ALT}(K_{IP}). K_m \) is not a subkind of \( K_0 \).

(28b) **Non-restrictive focus:**
   i. Asserted: \( \lambda P. P(K_0) \)
   ii. Presupposed: \( \forall K_n \in \text{ALT}(K_{IP}). P(K_n) \rightarrow K_n \) is a subkind of \( K_0 \).
   iii. The non-restrictive part: \( \forall K_m \in \text{ALT}(K_{IP}). K_m \) is a subkind of \( K_0 \).

In other words, the mechanism underlying the introduction of a Kind into the discourse, and the presuppositional content, of these two types of adjectival focus are identical. What differs is the conditions on the alternative set. And this set, as we know from Rooth (1992), is contextually, rather than structurally, determined.

My further claim is that a significant factor in deciding membership of the alternative set is the choice of determiner. This is hardly a new claim, at least outside of generative circles: it is clearly signalled in the quantitative, corpus-based approach of Forsgren (1978), for example. Forsgren finds that the *épithète de nature* makes up a far greater proportion of the exceptional pre-nominal instances of normally post-nominal adjectives in definite noun phrases than in indefinite noun phrases. Recent accounts of definiteness, such as van der Sandt (1992), relate this property to anaphoricity, characterising a definite noun phrase, roughly, as one presupposing that there is a salient antecedent in the discourse context with which the definite noun phrase can be resolved. This gives us a way to understand the correlation between non-restrictive adjective interpretation and definiteness. If a definite noun phrase is essentially anaphoric, then it comes as no surprise that a focused adjective within the definite noun phrase will generally not be interpreted contrastively: the referent of the noun phrase will have generally been established earlier in the discourse, and so there will often be no salient alternatives to contrast with. As Forsgren (1978: 126) remarks, ‘*il est plus naturel d’accoller une qualité posée comme inhérente à un substantif posée comme connu*’.\(^{13}\) Indefinites, lacking these presuppositions, have the contrastive interpretation of focus much more readily available.

This relationship between definiteness and the interpretation of focus only holds, however, as a one-way implication. It is quite possible, in the appropriate context, for a

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12 These issues are thorny, not least from the point of view of compositionality. The focus mechanisms sketched in this article would require the formalisation of a very delicate relationship between Kind semantics, determiner semantics, and semantics of the clause or whatever the noun phrase is embedded within, to be more complete.

13 ‘it is more natural to place a quality taken to be inherent next to a substantive taken to be already known’
focused adjective in an indefinite noun phrase to be interpreted non-restrictively, so examples such as the following do not have to be interpreted so that dangerous contrasts with timid, helpful, etc:

(29) Edoardo est à Fresnes, soupçonné par ses compatriotes comme [un dangereux communiste].

Edoardo is in Fresnes, suspected by his compatriots of being [a dangerous communist].

(Forsgren 1978: 91)

Instead, the natural interpretation of (29) is that Edoardo is suspected of being dangerous by virtue of his communism, in other words that communists are perceived as inherently dangerous, and so dangereux in the above example is a non-restrictive adjective. The presence of such examples is unproblematic for the sketch of non-restrictive interpretations given above. Indefinites are characterised by the absence of a presupposition of discourse familiarity and uniqueness, but not by a presupposition of absence of discourse familiarity. The case here is one where real-world knowledge is such that the writer (presumably in the West in the 1970s) can presuppose familiarity with the normal stereotypes of communists as dangerous, even if communists have never been mentioned in the discourse before. The comparative rarity of this construction (it would seem from Forsgren's figures that épithètes de nature represent roughly a quarter of all exceptionally preposed adjectives in indefinite noun phrases, where preposed adjectives represent 34% of all adjectives in indefinite noun phrases) would presumably be related to the fact that such a function is often redundant, unless the speaker is highlighting the particular property denoted by the non-restrictive adjective. However, it is generally available. In some types of definite noun phrase, preposed adjectives are rarer, as would be expected if certain options would appear to lead to a clash of presuppositions, as suggested above. However, non-restrictive interpretations make up a higher proportion of the exceptionally preposed adjectives in definite noun phrases.

5. Related Constructions

5.1. Anaphoric Use of the Pre-posed Adjective

The above proposals amount to a claim that a non-restrictive interpretation of exceptionally preposed adjectives is generally available in both indefinite and definite noun phrases. However, two factors make this interpretation of a focused adjective more likely in definite noun phrases. Firstly, a clash between the presuppositions of definiteness and of

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14 A similar point can be made concerning the relationship between the presuppositions which a phrase satisfies, and association with focus. Just because a phrase satisfies the relevant presuppositions, and so could conceivably be focused, does not mean that it necessarily has to be focused. Cases such as these then become formally very close to Jakobsonian markedness: the distinction is not between positive and negative values for a given binary feature, but between presence and absence of a given feature, with absence of the feature corresponding to a lack of specification of a value for that feature, or vagueness between positive and negative values.
contrastive focus make a contrastive reading of adjectival focus unlikely in a definite noun phrase. Secondly, the absence of a presupposition of identifiability of the referent of an indefinite noun phrase means that only an attributive adjective denoting a property presupposed to be universally (or quasi-universally) part of the intension of the noun which it modifies can readily receive a non-restrictive focus interpretation in an indefinite noun phrase, while an adjective within a definite noun phrase can be interpreted non-restrictively if the property denoted by the adjective has been associated with the noun, as used in this instance, earlier in the discourse.

There is a striking construction, noted and discussed by Waugh (1977: 132-5), which represents a special case of this phenomenon of a non-restrictive interpretation of an adjective modifying a noun being available because the property denoted by that adjective has been associated with the referent of that noun, earlier in the discourse. Waugh calls this the ‘anaphoric use of the pre-posed adjective’ (Waugh 1977: 132), illustrated by the following examples:

(30a) *J'ai vu* [un éléphant énorme] … [Cet énorme éléphant] buvait de l'eau.
I saw [an enormous elephant] … [This enormous elephant] was drinking water.

(30b) [Ses phrases] sont [un peu lourdes] et d'un style encore Louis XIII: [ses lourdes phrases], il les manie avec un entrain magnifique.
[His sentences] are [a bit pompous] and in a style which still resembles Louis XIII: but he handles [his pompous sentences] with great flair.

(Waugh 1977)

The distinguishing characteristic of these examples is that each contains two tokens each of the noun and adjective in question, but the structural relationship between the noun and adjective in these two occurrences is different. In the first example, we see a switch from N–Adj order to Adj–N order, and in the second, we see a switch from a predicative relationship between the noun and adjective, in subject and complement position, respectively, of a copular phrase, to an attributive construction.

In either of these cases, the second occurrence of the adjective is clearly non-restrictive. We already know that in (30a) the elephant is enormous, and that in (30b) his sentences are pompous, because we have been explicitly told so. The elephant and the sentences are already salient objects in the discourse and the properties denoted by the adjective have already been explicitly attributed to them. The initially puzzling switch between N–Adj order or a copular construction on the first occurrence, and Adj–N order on the second occurrence, then becomes unremarkably assimilated to the larger body of non-restrictive interpretations of a focused adjective. This also supports the correlation between the availability of this interpretation and definiteness, as, in these examples, the second occurrence of the noun is necessarily within a definite noun phrase. Just as *ma verte prairie* focuses an adjective denoting a property, greenness, which is presupposed to be held by *ma prairie*, so *cet énorme éléphant* focuses a property, enormity, presupposed to be held by *cet éléphant*. The only difference is the way in which this presupposition is satisfied. In the former case, it is based on real-world knowledge of meadows: they are generally green,
and so the presupposition is satisfied. In the latter case, it comes from the structure of the preceding discourse: an elephant has been introduced into the discourse, and we know, from the restrictive modification of the first instance of éléphant by énorme, that this elephant is enormous. We know, then, that this particular instance of an elephant has the property of being enormous, and the presupposition is, once again, satisfied. Seen in this light, the anaphoric pre-posed adjective is simply a special case of the more general phenomenon of non-restrictive adjectival focus.

5.2. The Null Nominal Construction

There is one definite nominal construction in French in which adjectives are used to distinguish between potential referents. This is the null nominal construction, with definite determiner and adjective, but no overt noun:

(31a) — Voulez-vous du vin?
    — Oui, [du rouge], s’il vous plaît.
    Would you like some wine?
    Yes, some of [the red], please.

(31b) Dans un magasin, il y avait des chemises de plusieurs tailles. J’ai acheté [la plus grande].
    In a shop, there were shirts of several sizes. I bought [the biggest].

Of course, the overt form of this construction is significantly different from the cases of pre-nominal focused adjectives discussed above. Considering such examples as (31) as instances of adjectival focus is, then, dubious. However, this example provides evidence of the compatibility between the identifiability presupposition of definiteness and the contrastive function of selecting one element from a range of distinct alternatives. What we see here is that the discourse preceding the null nominal construction acts to set up a range of alternative referents, with different values with respect to one property (size, colour, etc.). The null nominal picks out one element from this range, either a scalar endpoint, as

15 Of course, elephants are generally enormous, and so non-restrictive modification of the initial occurrence of éléphant, along the lines of un dangereux communiste, is also conceivable:

   i. Il y avait une fois [un énorme éléphant] qui buvait de l’eau.
      ‘Once upon a time, there was [an enormous elephant] who was drinking water.’

This touches on a slightly different point, that, because non-restrictive interpretation is dependent upon presupposition rather than entailment, it is always possible to combine the same adjective and noun restrictively instead, even though the restriction will be minimal (or, in practice, non-existent): not all meadows are green, and not all elephants are enormous (baby elephants are a manageable size). Equally, one could argue that Belgium is not a flat country because the Ardennes are a little bit wobbly, and so on. This shows that it is the presentation by the speaker of the adjectival property as inherent to the nominal semantics, and its accommodation by the audience as such, that is crucial to the construction, rather than every single object in the extension of the noun necessarily having the adjectival property. Interpretation of a focused adjective as non-restrictive indicates an unwillingness to consider even the possibility of the member of the extension of the noun which does not possess the property denoted by the adjective. This is also the reason why degraded cases of preposed adjectives are not generally fully ungrammatical, so much as pragmatically odd. These are not the core issues of this paper, which instead hopes to focus on the mechanisms which make this interpretation available in the first place.
identified by a superlative *le plus x* construction, or a specific colour, for example. This, then, is an exceptional case where the presuppositions of the definite article are compatible with a contrastive interpretation: there is an identifiable referent which is salient in the preceding discourse, but this referent contrasts with the other potential referents in the range set up by the preceding discourse. Here, then, exceptionally, a contrastive interpretation is available in a definite noun phrase.16

5.3. Non-restrictive Adjectives in English

Consider the following noun phrases:

(32a) the astonishing Egyptian pyramids
(32b) tasty organic carrots

Each of these examples contains an adjective (underlined) which may readily be interpreted non-restrictively: we do not generally assume, for example, that *the astonishing Egyptian pyramids* contrast with some unimpressive Egyptian pyramids, and, in the bare plural *tasty organic carrots*, as with the earlier examples of non-restrictive adjectives in indefinites, we interpret *tasty* as a property universally possessed by *organic carrots*. Furthermore, the opposite adjective orders are quite marginal, at best interpreted as contrastive focus–presupposition structures:

(33a) #the EGYPTIAN astonishing pyramids [not the Mayan ones]
(33b) #ORGANIC tasty carrots [as opposed to tasty carrots grown with pesticides etc.]

This shows that the site for non-restrictive interpretation of adjectives in English is higher than that where a restrictive interpretation is available. This is as would be expected if this interpretation is a reflex of movement to [Spec, Foc], a possibility which we would hope to be generally available cross-linguistically, regardless of the normal position of attributive adjectives in a language. The English data therefore appears to support the theory advanced earlier to account for the French case. As cases of post-nominal adjectives in English are fairly rare, and limited to a couple of exceptional constructions, we do not find a variation in word order similar to that in French to accompany the variation in interpretation in English cases with one adjective and a noun.17 This suggests that English adjectives

16 However, I have no proposal for why the nominal needs to be null for this to be the case. It strikes me that this is probably related to pronominalisation of the KIP in some way — compare the following related construction in French, and the standard equivalent in English, both of which involve pro-KIPs:
   i. *Je* en *ai pris le moins cher*. ‘I took the cheapest.’
   ii. I want a red one.

However, the correct way to formalise this in a non-stipulative way currently escapes me.

17 This raises the issue of the divergent overt identification or realisation of a focus head in the two languages. Although English does not exhibit such clear word-order variation as French, it more readily admits heavy stress on a focused element. I have little to say about the overt reflexes of a focus head. However, it should be clear that the validity of more or less everything in this paper is dependent upon
should, all else being equal, be generally ambiguous between a restrictive and a non-restrictive reading. Indeed, this seems to be the case.

Consider the following: some spiders are fairly universally considered to be terrifying (for example, the black widow). Some people with arachnophobia consider all spiders to be terrifying. For these people, the capacity to induce terror is a property that all spiders, even the tiny money spiders, inherently possess. However, there are other people for whom black widows are terrifying, but money spiders aren't. Now consider the following utterance:

(34) I couldn't sleep last night. There was a terrifying spider roaming around my room.

For the arachnophobes, the adjective would be interpreted non-restrictively: the spider, by virtue of being a spider, would have been terrifying. For the non-arachnophobes, the adjective is interpreted restrictively: a money spider wouldn't have interrupted their slumber, but a black widow would. My above proposals lead me to claim that this should be a generally available structural ambiguity in English, with real-world knowledge and presupposition accommodation often favouring one or the other interpretation in a given noun phrase.

6. Conclusion

The proposals contained in this paper have aimed at a general reduction in size of the typology of attributive adjective interpretations and related constructions. This was pursued in several ways. Firstly, an expanded conception of focus was proposed, which was able, in a natural and non-stipulative way, to account for non-restrictive as well as contrastive adjective interpretations. Secondly, the article gave an account of the distribution of non-restrictive adjective interpretations which was based not on strictly grammatical conditions, but rather on discourse well-formedness conditions and clashes between the presuppositions introduced by contrastive focus and definiteness. Finally, it was shown that certain classes of apparent contradictions to this model could in fact be naturally accommodated within the model, by seeing many constraints as related to the state of the current universe of discourse rather than to strictly syntactic or formal semantic constraints, and that the model could naturally be extended to cover the possibility of non-restrictive interpretation of attributive adjectives in English. These proposals, taken in conjunction with those in Truswell (2004), aim towards a unification of the range of possible English

some characterisation of the overt reflexes of adjectival focus in English and French being achievable, as the notion would otherwise become quite vacuous.

A further problematic issue is that English seems to admit much more readily than French the possibility of Adj_Foc Adj_Foc N orders, which should, on the above proposals, be equally possible in both languages in those few French cases of normally pre-nominal adjectives. Contrast (22) with the following, degraded, translation:

i. ?Tous mes amis conduisent de grandes voitures, mais je suis le seul qui conduise [une noire grande voiture].

‘All my friends drive big cars, but only I drive a black big car.’

Again, the desirability of these proposals is reduced to the extent that such differences are unaccounted for.
and French attributive adjective constructions, with the overall hope being to show that relatively few specific syntactic or semantic stipulations are required to account for attributive adjective use in these languages, and hopefully more generally, and that apparently anomalous cases can instead be explained by a careful consideration of the discourse function of different types of noun phrases, along with more universal syntactic and semantic mechanisms.

References


